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No. 1504

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## SI MEETING, KREISKY INTERVIEW ON PLO CONTACTS

AU021659 [Editorial report] Vienna ARBEITER-ZEITUNG on 1 November 1979 carries on page 1 a dispatch from Estoril by its special correspondent B. Kirchhoff headlined "Many Parties of the Socialist International [SI] Favor Further Contacts with the PLO." The report highlights a statement made by Chancellor Kreisky to the ARBEITER-ZEITUNG after the conclusion of the SI bureau meeting on 31 October that "The SI bureau session has made clear that nearly all SI member parties are of the opinion that the PLO is authorized to represent the Palestinian people." According to the paper the representatives of numerous SI member parties expressed themselves in favor of further contacts with the PLO in a discussion following Kreisky's speech at the SI meeting in which he had pleaded for recognition of the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians. In reply to journalists questions, Kreisky declared that he was "in constant contact with 'Arafat'" but that he had not met him during his current stay in Portugal.

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG also notes that the Israeli Labor Party leader Peres "found friendly words for (Hassan Kamin), the representatives of the Egyptian Nation-Democratic Party." The paper quotes (Kamin) as saying that his party would soon apply for SI membership, and notes his express thanks to Kreisky and Willy Brandt "because they succeeded in narrowing the gap between the PLO and Israel."

ARBEITER-ZEITUNG on 2 November frontpages a report on a telephone interview on 1 November with Chancellor Kreisky--who, according to the paper, is now spending a short holiday on Mallorca--stressing his statement that "neither the PLO, SI Chairman Brandt, nor he himself ever applied to the SI to grant the PLO observer status with this organization," and that "therefore the AP report asserting that the SI bureau at its session in Estoril (Portugal) refused to grant the PLO observer status is utterly unfounded." According to the paper, Kreisky added that "the DPA report that the PLO has not been recognized by the SI as a partner for talks is equally wrong--the question was not even discussed in Estoril. Every SI member may talk with the PLO all it wants." The report of SI President Brandt, who together with Kreisky had a talk with PLO Chief 'Arafat in Vienna in July, was received "with the greatest approval and applause, and he was authorized to conduct any further talk that he should regard as purposeful," the paper says.

## GOVERNMENT REPORTS ON NATIONALIZED INDUSTRIES

Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 11 Oct 79 pp 1, 2

[Report: "Nationalized Industries Have Stood Up to Competition--National Council Unanimously Takes Note of Report"]

[Text] Yesterday's consultations in the National Council were taken up almost entirely by a debate analyzing a report on the situation in the nationalized industries. As previously in the committee concerned, the report was taken note of unanimously by all parties. In the course of this, it was made clear that the nationalized industries have stood up well to competition and have not used any tax monies.

The first speaker was OeVP [Austrian People's Party] Deputy Graf. He expressed appreciation of the role of private industry, saying that it had to carry a great tax burden and had secured jobs with funds of its own. Opposing a distinction between state-owned and private industry, he said there was only an Austrian industry—one which had to stand the test of competition independently of ownership and legal form. Graf submitted a resolution calling on the federal government to base its economic policy on the principles of a social market economy, to insure a positive economic climate and to take steps to initiate a third wave of industrialization.

SPOe [Austrian Socialist Party] Deputy Hellwagner accused the OeVP of being fond of ignoring nationalized industry and its achievements while frequently painting an exaggerated picture of its difficulties. The nationalized industry, he said, today represents a social capital of about 9.2 billion schillings and tangible assets of 43 billion schillings. It pays 20.5 billion schillings for wages and salaries. In 1978, he added, despite many difficulties, the total turnover of the OeLAG [Austrian Industries Management Company Inc] group rose from 100 to 105 billion schillings.

Deputy Josseck of the FPÖe [Austrian Liberal Party] said he considered it desirable for the committee concerned to be informed about problems that had arisen by the members of the boards of the nationalized enterprises. Josseck also maintained that too much importance was attached to politics and parties in the nationalized sector.



## According to Private Industry Principles

Taking the floor, Federal Chancellor Dr Kreisky stated that it was in accordance with the intentions of the federal government for nationalized industry to keep strictly to the principles prevailing in private industry. One of the successes of the nationalized sector is that it has stood up excellently to industrial competition. Nationalized industry did not receive any tax monies; rather, it was financed by the OeIAG from dividend income.

It is of the greatest interest, the federal chancellor said further, for the committee for nationalized enterprises to have a maximum of information available. On the occasion of realizing the "grand solution," he had advocated supplying the new concern with 2 billion schillings.

So far 1 billion schillings have been made available. There was a clear pledge for the other billion, but it was first necessary to make it clear for what purposes this money was needed. Concerning the question of coal, the federal chancellor said the mining of coal apparently continued to be feasible. Austro-Hungarian negotiations had not been concluded as yet. Ecological problems exist primarily because a calorific power plant would cause waste gases. The federal chancellor, displayed the greatest interest in this project, however, saying that there was a prospect of further negotiations with the Hungarian prime minister in the very near future. Concerning General Motors, there was no agreement requiring a change in the current legal position. However, in talks extending over several months, the representatives of General Motors has been informed about the possibilities of the Austrian tax law. The firm will have the same rights and opportunities as any other Austrian or foreign firm.

Deputy Burger (OeVP) voiced his satisfaction about the improvement in the economic situation but saw no reason for being overjoyed about the situation. The profit situation continues to be tense, he said.

Deputy Ruhaltinger (SPOe) stated that the Austrian nationalized industry was a good partner for all those foreign customers who valued not only Austrian quality but the keeping of agreed deadlines. VOeST /United Austrian Iron and Steel Works Inc/ Alpine is proud of standing on its own feet and not being a subsidized firm.

Deputy Peter (FPÖe) emphasized that the course of the OeIAG had partly stood the test. No one will deny that profits have improved and losses decreased. On the other hand, it has to be added that the economic improvement in 1978 covered up the kind of problems important firms such as VEW /United High-Grade Steel Works/ or the United Metalworks continued to have to cope with.

He said no way was indicated for a structural reform of VEW.

Deputy Gorton (OeVP) thinks that the partly unsatisfactory situation in the nationalized sector is due to the exaggerated hard-currency and tax policy of the Socialist federal government. Despite individual measures, it had not yet submitted any plan for long-term solutions.

Deputy Dr Erich Schmidt (SPOe) posed the question as to the extent to which it was possible to reconcile industrial policy and bank policy objectives.

Deputy Wimmersberger (SPOe) supported the view that Upper Austria had been especially affected by the measures of concentration. VOeST would have fared better with a holding company.

State Secretary Dr Nussbaumer supported the hard currency policy and welcomed the revaluation of the schilling even though it had caused disadvantages for some firms. However, the currency policy had to be guided by overall economic points of view. The revaluation of the schilling, in the opinion of the economists, had only been a modest one anyway. The advantages of the revaluation, according to Nussbaumer, are: Pressure of costs in production, cheaper imports from Germany and Switzerland, and Austrians could also calculate their vacations better.

The shutdown of Fohnsdorf had been an occasion for creating new structures. Public funds-- said the speaker, endorsing the view of the federal chancellor-- should not be used to make up losses but to improve structures. As far as the Judenbrugg works was concerned, it would be taken care of within the framework of restructuring--that is, the employees will be accommodated otherwise.

For General Motors there had not been enough room either in Judenbrugg or in Klagenfurt. In Vienna the Lower Austrian border areas would also be furthered through this plant.

Deputy Rechtsberger (SPOe) pointed out that the nationalized firms contribute to fighting the unemployment of youth. The price rises would cause worries in alloy metals.

Deputy Neumann (OeVP) reproached the government for financially starving the nationalized but also the private economic sector.

Deputy Modl (SPOe) dealt with coal mining.

The report about the nationalized industry was taken note of unanimously. The resolution submitted by Deputy Graf was rejected by majority vote.

Finally, in lieu of Dr Franz Karasek, leaving the National Council owing to having been elected secretary general of the Council of Europe, foreign political spokesman of the OeVAP Dr Ludwig Steiner was unanimously elected to be one of the Austrian representatives in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

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## INDUSTRY PRESENTS PROGRAM FOR 1980

Vienna WIENER ZEITUNG in German 12 Oct 79 p 7

[Report: "Industry Presents '1980 Program'--No Longer a Question of Current Political Routine But One of Medium-Range and Long-Term Plans--Ceremony on Occasion of 'Day of Industry'"]

[Text] On Thursday [11 October] the League of Austrian Industrialists [VOel] held a "Day of Industry" centered around the presentation of a "1980 Program" by VOel President Dr Igler. During the ceremony, opened by Federal President Dr Kirchschlaeger, Igler emphasized that it was no longer a question of current political routine but one of both medium range- and long-term plans. As a matter of principle, industry was supporting the sociopolitical commitment of those engaged as entrepreneurs. In addition, it was demanding a renaissance of an attitude oriented toward performance and of taking measures oneself to provide for the future. Igler pointed out that more than 60,000 jobs had been lost in industry in Austria since 1974.

At the same time the industrial investment quota--in other words, the share of industrial investments in the total volume of economic investments, with 12.5 percent had now reached an all-time low. In light of the fact that industry was contributing more than 28 percent of the GNP, this was an alarming trend. A "structural-policy bath of steel" had lacked protection on its flanks by a cost-oriented industrial policy. Economic policy had been conducted far too long exclusively at the expense of the productive sectors.

In this connection, Igler expressly spoke out for the hard currency policy, provided it was accompanied by a policy of stability in domestic cost structures. An imported stability and at the same time soft flanks of costs domestically were, however, not conducive to restoring to enterprises the kind of profitability they required for coping with the engineering-technological challenge of the coming decade.

For the 1980's, Austrian industry therefore wished for a return to the kind of economic policy for which productive investments yield-intensive innovations and competitive cost conditions at home would again be decisive factors.

## Kirchschlaeger: Great Achievements by Industry

In his address, Federal President Dr Kirchschlaeger pointed out that Austrian industry as a whole and Austrian entrepreneurs as part of this industry had made a very great contribution to the Austrian economic upswing in the past 25 years. To be an industrialist, the head of state said, is a very great and responsible task. Kirchschlaeger noted in this connection that in its "1980 Program" industry was also dealing with the question of family policy and the subject of "Man and Labor."

Kirchschlaeger said that, while he did not want to indulge in idle optimism, it was a fact that the upswing of the Austrian economy since the State Treaty showed Austria to be on the right road. In conclusion the federal president addressed the same request to Austrian industry which he had already made at the Ninth Federal Congress of the OeGB [Austrian Trade Union Federation]--to continue also in the future on the path of proper perspective and to make decisions both from the overall economic point of view and from the overall aspect of the situation of the people as a whole and of the state.

## Cooperation of Social and Economic Partners

OeGB President Benya, in his statement, voiced strong support for the social partnership [between management and labor], which in the past 30 years had vitally contributed to preserving industrial peace. He pointed to numerous parallels between the program of demands of the most recent OeGB congress and the "1980 Program" of industry in questions of social and industrial policy and in the chapter about "Humanization of the World of Labor." While there existed different concepts about labor law, codetermination in enterprises and social, family and tax policy, it ought to be possible to eliminate these differences through joint talks.

The president of the Bundeskammer [Department of Interstate Trade], Sallinger, stated on the subject of social partnership that, fully conscious of its responsibility, industry wanted to point out ways in which the Austrian economic and sociopolitical problems could be solved. Industry was ever ready as a partner with equal rights to share in the solution of these tasks in the interest of industry, and thus of the people as a whole. Industry was playing a pacemaker's role on the way to a strong economy. Productive enterprises therefore must not be deprived of the opportunity of development and social security, for only a flourishing economy constituted the prerequisite for increasing prosperity, for which the social market economy formed a strong foundation.

## Kreisky: No Special Conditions for Nationalized Industry

In a brief statement, Federal Chancellor Dr Kreisky stressed the need for continuing to develop the policy of consensus. The policy of the federal government vis-a-vis industry was oriented toward the need to take justified desires into account. This attitude was documented best, in a significant way, by the fact that important positions in industry and government had been filled by men who were wedded rather to the economic thinking of the other camp.



Concerning the nationalized industry, the chancellor noted that there must not be any special conditions for these enterprises: like private industry, they had to be profit-oriented, dispense dividends and stand up to the inclement climate of economic competition. In Austria, Dr Kreisky emphasized, no changes should be made in the ownership structure of the economy as long as private industry was in a position to fulfill the tasks it had set itself. The federal chancellor added: "We are not enemies of business; we even get big foreign concerns to come into our country."

The government, Kreisky said, has created the necessary framework conditions for offering business initiative every opportunity of development. It also had managed in this way to open up new sales markets and was also making efforts to create the most favorable possible energy policy prerequisites for industrial manufacture. "It is our conviction," Kreisky concluded, "that [?there is nothing which could replace or improve on the entrepreneur in industry?]. [This is an approximate conclusion of the sentence, which is garbled in the original.]

#### Schoeller: To Insure Freedom of Ownership

The chairman of the Federal Department for Industry [Bundessektion Industrie], Schoeller, said in his statement that it was possible today to note a tendency of restricting the freedom of action of the individual and transfer responsibility to anonymous decisionmaking organs. Freedom of ownership, too, was being curtailed by a plethora of administrative, fiscal and political measures. The entrepreneur was thus being increasingly pressed into the role of a functionary charged with administering nationalized means of production.

Austrian industry therefore wants a return to individual freedom of decision in business responsibility and rejects a "role of plaything" being tossed between interventionist ideologies and routine political catalogs of measures. This long-overdue breakthrough, however, will succeed only if the sociopolitical commitment of each and every person engaged in entrepreneurial activity increases, Schoeller said, if the modern entrepreneur himself exercises an active direct influence on economic policy with its increasingly sociopolitical components, and if he is at least similarly successful in this field as he has been successful, through entrepreneurial measures, in insuring a probably unprecedented economic growth.

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## CYPRUS PAPER ACCUSES WALDHEIM OF BEING INFLUENCED BY U.S.

NC040641 Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 4 Nov 79 pp 1, 8 NC

[Excerpt] The United States does not favor any form of active involvement or initiative by UN Secretary General Waldheim that would expose the Turkish side in the Cyprus problem. Events show that Mr Waldheim complies with State Department wishes and persistently refuses to play an active role in the Cyprus problem; he has actually become a tool of the United States.

This has been disclosed to TA NEA by absolutely authoritative sources which report that in answer to a pertinent diplomatic demarche by the Greek Cypriot side, Mr Waldheim said "nor would the Turks agree that I undertake a more active role in the Cyprus problem."

Thus, the UN Secretary General is a mere observer of the repeated failures because of the Turkish intransigence at the inter-Cypriot talks. He confines himself to stating that "he offers his good offices."

In this way, the same circles stressed, Mr Waldheim has converted the important role of the UN Secretary General to a "role of simple messenger."

The same authoritative sources added: "At this moment the inter-Cypriot talks are suspended following a recess announced by the UN Secretary General. But there is a basis for the resumption of the talks; this basis is the agreement that was signed in Mr Waldheim's presence on 19 May.

"This this reason Mr Waldheim must immediately invite the two sides to talks on the basis of this agreement.

"Mr Waldheim must also denounce the side that fails to comply with this agreement or must call on it to comply with the pertinent provisions of the agreement."

In this connection it is pointed out that the interpretation that Mr Waldheim tries to give to his role is contradicted by the previous secretary general, the late U Thant, who not only correctly interpreted his responsibilities but was also actively and strongly involved in the Cyprus problem.

## ATUN REPORTS FAVORABLE RESULTS FROM LONDON TRIP

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 12 Oct 79 p 1

[Text] Nicosia: Having completed his contacts in London, Minister of Economy and Finance Hakki Atun returned to the island yesterday evening. Providing detailed information on his contacts and investigations in London through the Prime Minister's Press Office, Hakki Atun first responded to criticisms appearing in a portion of the local press while he had been in London. Maintaining that these regretful writings did not reflect either the facts or a serious attitude, he spoke as follows:

"I had stated when I left that I was going to devote a portion of my time there to a number of personal matters, including medical treatment. As a public servant who has worked for our community with pride and enthusiasm for 20 years, I was greatly saddened by the things written about me. The high interests of our society take precedence over everything else. Let alone actually harming the community, I have had no thought whatsoever to utilize, nor to allow to be utilized, even a single penny in an unjust manner. I took expense money from the state only for my official contacts. For my private purposes and personal affairs, I spent money out of my own pocket. This fact can be verified from the Finance Ministry's records. My daughter did not get a scholarship: her studies will be paid for out of my salary and my modest savings. My daughter also, just as every other young Turkish Cypriot, has the right to go to school, so that she may serve her community to the degree to which she is capable."

## Consolidation of Organizations

Reporting that he had conducted his official contacts in London within the framework of the decisions of the Council of Ministers and the instructions sent to the Representative there by the Prime Minister, Hakki Atun went on to give information concerning his contacts, saying that he had noted a number of matters which had been neglected and that he had taken steps so that the TFSC London Representative's office might function more effectively and more advantageously. Noting that considerable duties and responsibilities devolve upon the TFSC's Representative in London, Atun stated that deliberations would be held with the relevant minister prior to the start of the new fiscal

year so that more effective operational resources might be provided for the staff there. He also stated that the efforts at uniting our 14 separate social organizations in England within a single council have reached the final stage. Noting that he had reacted positively to Professor Mumtaz Soysal's expressed views on the by-laws of the council to be established, Atun said that "The formation of this Council, from the standpoint of its following a general policy, will be very beneficial, both for our community there and our community here." Announcing in addition that measures will be taken for the publishing activities of the Turkish Cypriot Society in London to be stepped up to a more effective level, the Minister of Economy and Finance stated that he had engaged in future-oriented, encouraging, and very beneficial contacts with Turkish Cypriot businessmen, who are showing a steadily increasing interest toward Cyprus. He said that "I am of the opinion that, if legal incentive measures are instituted in the TFSC in accord with international standards, great interest toward investment here will result. In fact, I even met people who are enthusiastic about making investments without even waiting for these measures."

#### Spare Parts Problem

Announcing that he had received only the most positive impressions from his investigations carried out in the businesses of our kinsmen who have achieved professional success in London, Hakki Atun said that these Turkish firms, which sell to England's most luxurious department stores and export to every part of the globe, could produce their products in the fashion industry in the TFSC and export them directly from the TFSC. Stating that they would thereby insure us of a significant amount of foreign exchange, he said that our businessmen are favorably disposed toward investments of this type. Reporting that he had returned with extremely positive impressions with regard to the efforts of our public enterprises such as CYPFRUVEK D. K. Ltd. [Cyprus Fruit and Vegetable Processing and Exporting Corp. Ltd.], active in London for some time, and TIEGLADE Ltd., which is affiliated with ETI [Industry, Commerce, and Management Enterprises, Ltd.], Hakki Atun explained that the managers of these concerns have attained great skill and knowledge in the area of marketing in London and Europe, and that this year, eliminating the wholesale dealers, they will be able to market our products directly. He spoke as follows:

"The spare parts shortage in our Federated State is becoming a great problem, especially in view of the steadily growing problems of the Cyprus lira. In order for our spare parts needs to be met on a regular basis, a number of measures have been taken within the auspices of TIEGLADE Ltd. TIEGLADE will furnish spare parts regularly to the Federated State by air; the parts will be paid for with foreign exchange."

#### Matter of Investments

Announcing that at the meeting in London, composed of a group of approximately 50 entrepreneurs, a decision had been reached on the topic of the purchase of a passenger airplane, its control remaining with the TFSC, Hakki Atun reported

that he had observed a great willingness among the Turkish community in London with regard to investment in this area. He said that, in order to respond to this desire as quickly as possible, shares will be offered to the public and sold for foreign exchange in London. Saying that the likely amount of the contribution of the Turkish community in London will be determined following Kenan Atakol's return to the island and in meetings with KTHY /Turkish Cypriot Airlines/ officials, Atun also reported that desire on the matter of investment in the TFSC comes not only from our kinsmen but from foreign firms as well, that a German businessman had gone all the way to London to talk with him about investment possibilities, and that this businessman will come to our nation very soon. According to Atun's statement, one of the foreign firms engages in ship transport, while the other is involved in investment in the Free Port Area.

#### Trade Center and Chamber of Commerce

Saying that the topics of the establishment of a TFSC Trade Center in London and the formation of a Chamber of Commerce by our businessmen in London had been met with great interest, Atun stated that a decision had been made in the latest meeting of the Council of Ministers on the matter of finding a suitable building for the trade center which will be established, and that the efforts expended toward obtaining credit in foreign exchange have shown positive developments. According to the information provided by Atun, one Arab bank in London has shown great interest toward our desires and has requested that it be given feasibility reports on our projects as soon as possible, while another Arab bank has also encouraged our Federated State on the topic of long-term credit. Reporting that a definite answer is expected soon on the matter of long-term credit, Hakki Atun also announced that the feasibility reports would be sent as soon as possible, and that official requests would be made for the other credits.

#### Courses

Revealing that he had engaged in talks with Lord Spence, who showed great concern for our problems, Atun said that he had engaged in an exchange of views concerning the British Government's showing an initiative on the TFSC's problems, and that, as the guest of the TFSC government, Lord Spence will come to the TFSC to engage in fact-finding and contacts with people here. So that a currency-exchange office may be established in order to carry out the function of a Central Bank within the structure of the Ministry of Finance, the opportunity has been obtained for personnel to be sent to courses in England lasting 3 to 4 months; the personnel in question will begin to be sent starting in March. Hakki Atun, who provided this information, also announced that, following the contacts made, a two-person delegation of experts will come to our island for the organization of our public services. Explaining that the delegation, which will come to the island soon, will make job evaluations in various ministries and then give their report to the Council of Ministers, Hakki Atun said that "I have noticed that the opposition press has unfortunately made an incorrect evaluation of this matter as well. The work which will be carried out is not counter to the Public Servants Law, and in fact parallels it. What is desired to be done in this work is to determine just how large a



staff is needed in each of our ministries and public institutions in order to provide service in a modern fashion. In our opinion, it is very important for this matter to be studied by an objective and expert team, not subject to any sort of influence. In this way, we will obtain the possibility of constituting our staffs --- which have had many vacancies due to the Retirement Law --- in the most realistic manner possible. At the same time, we intend to institute a regular educational program, beginning with the top administrators. A program of instruction in the form of courses approximately 6 months in duration will be utilized, all within the framework of an accord reached with the experts."

#### Discussion with Okcun

Explaining that, while returning from London, he had had the opportunity to talk with Gunduz Okcun, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, who was returning from New York, as well as with his technical committee, Hakki Atun stated that he had provided Okcun with information concerning the various developments, programs, and plans.

9173

CSO: 4907



## TFSC BUSINESSMEN URGED TO LEAD IN STRUGGLE FOR RECOGNITION

Nicosia EKONOMI in Turkish 18 Oct 79 p 1

[Text] Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet Fazil Kucuk, stressing the fact that the TFSC's effectiveness in the international arena can be enhanced with the development of economic relations, has stated that businessmen have made intensive efforts along these lines and achieved positive results.

Chairman Kucuk, answering questions from the Asian News Agency, pointed out that, despite these efforts by businessmen, the TFSC's economy is caught within a foreign exchange crisis, saying that "Just as this crisis has reduced our people's buying power, it has also negatively affected the political marketing of our state within the international arena." Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet F. Kucuk said that the Chamber was involved in a dialogue with the Government in order to resolve the foreign exchange problem and, mentioning that they had made a number of suggestions, stated that they expected positive results soon.

## Transport and Marketing

Stating that the economic life of the TFSC is dependent upon tourism and the sale of agricultural products, Chamber of Commerce Chairman Kucuk said that obstacles in both areas must be eliminated without delay. Explaining that transportation problems are causing great difficulties both in tourism and in the sale of agricultural products, Chairman Kucuk said that "The transport of fresh fruit, in particular, to England, which is the largest market for our agricultural products, is beset with great difficulties. Before 1974, fresh fruit picked here used to arrive in London very quickly. The elimination of the direct routes, however, has caused the fruit to arrive days later and thus decline in value as a result." Stating that the transportation problem also affects tourism, the Chamber of Commerce Chairman noted that tourists, who could come to the TFSC from every corner of Europe in 3 to 4 hours, are declining to come as a result of the long waits and routes.

Mentioning that, in addition to transport, the matter of marketing is also a problem, Chairman Kucuk said that the TFSC should appoint experts to and make use of Turkey's representatives in third countries, at the very least. Chairman Kucuk explained that this sort of work by experts could open new markets for our agricultural products and also augment the number of tourists who visit the island.

#### Rapid Solution

Stating that the foreign exchange shortage has begun to be felt to an extreme degree, and that imports of raw materials have therefore become impossible, Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet F. Kucuk spoke as follows on this topic:

"The emergence of a very serious shortage of foreign exchange and the subsequent impossibility of providing sufficient foreign exchange to our importers has led to the appearance of shortages or even complete inavailability of raw materials in every branch of commerce. Due to the lack of raw materials, a number of workplaces are threatened with closing. Some workplaces have already locked their doors. This, in addition to the damage done to this branch of industry, also causes the ranks of the unemployed to increase."

#### Systematic Development

Noting that, with the elimination of the import with waiver system, the route whereby Turkish Cypriots in England would convert their money into goods and send the goods to the TFSC has been blocked, Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet Kucuk pointed out the necessity of remedying certain deficiencies in the Differential Exchange Rate System. Announcing that, as the Chamber of Commerce, they approved of the system but have determined that it contains a number of deficiencies, Mehmet Fazil Kucuk reported that they have conveyed to the Ministry the suggestions which they consider necessary in order for these deficiencies to be remedied.

#### Political Bargaining

Noting that the TFSC, waging a diplomatic struggle in the international arena, must further develop its economic relations abroad in order to obtain positive results from this struggle, Chamber of Commerce Chairman Kucuk said that great responsibilities devolve upon businessmen in this regard. Stating that, as a result of the special efforts of the Chamber of Commerce, the TFSC has become more effective within the Islamic world, Mehmet Kucuk spoke as follows: "Despite the intense efforts of the Greek Cypriots to have the TFSC eliminated from the international arena, our Chamber has, with its own efforts, obtained positive results. Our members, who went to Karachi in 1977 as observers to the Islamic Trade, Industry, and Markets Association, achieved both the entry of the TFSC Chamber of Commerce into the Association and membership on the executive board. In addition to this, our Chamber has attained equal rights with those of other nations in the EEC and International Chambers of Commerce organizations."

TPSC Chamber of Commerce Chairman Mehmet P. Kucuk said that the continuation of trade and economic relations with foreign countries is necessary if his organization is to be effective in carrying out this important diplomatic task.

9173

CSO: 4907

## CYPRUS PAPER URGES CONCRETE MEASURES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TURKS

NC040825 Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 4 Nov 79 p 3 NC

[From the "Views and Comments" column: "Bold Steps Should Be Taken"]

[Text] President Kyprianou's conference the other day with the members of the administrative council of the committee for rapprochement with the Turks was interesting and very useful. Constructive views were submitted during the conference and convincing arguments were heard, all of them based on the events of the last 25 years, on experience from life and on the need for rapprochement of the two communities.

All the speakers--representatives of organizations, political and social figures--adopted the sound stand that rapprochement and reconciliation of the two communities is an issue of vital political significance. The president of the republic also takes this stand and he assured them that the government agrees with the policy of rapprochement.

This statement is a positive step that must be pursued. More bold steps must follow, based on an official policy. For this reason it is imperative that a government committee be set up to study this question in cooperation with the administrative council of the committee for rapprochement and make recommendations to the government for concrete practical measures that will implement the suggestions submitted during the conference held the other day and those included in the detailed memorandum handed to President Kyprianou.

CSO: 4908

## 'O FILELEVTHEROS' URGES ALL ASSISTANCE TO COMMITTEE FOR RAPPROCHMENT

NCO40827 Nicosia O FILELEVTHEROS 11. Greek 4 Nov 79 p 3 NC

[From the "Liberal" column: "The Walls Must Be Pulled Down"]

[Text] A substantive aspect of the efforts of Cyprus' enemies is to keep the two communities separated, because they expect that as time passes the present state of affairs will become permanent and the de facto partition will become de jure. They are not wrong. The judgment and assessment of the enemies of Cyprus are not wrong.

Thus, every effort must be exerted to back every move to tear down the walls that our enemies are building in order to keep the two basic communities of Cyprus separated. We hail the establishment of the committee for rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots because this important task, which is directly connected with all the efforts for the salvation of Cyprus, is undertaken by a special committee that will devote itself exclusively to the duties that must be fulfilled in order to achieve the correct goals to which it is committed. A delegation of this committee has already met President Kyprianou.

Because we consider the task of this committee extremely difficult, we stress that it should be given all assistance and all possible means to achieve success. The organizations represented on this committee will render a serious service if they assign their cadres with the work of this committee so that it may become not a hobby but a substantive and exclusive commitment. This is the only way to provide forces for a field of work which is of extremely vital importance for the future of our struggle.

CSO: 4908



## TURKISH CYPRIOTS BELIEVING IN RAPPROCHEMENT MUST INCREASE EFFORT

NC040829 NICOSIA I MAKHI in Greek 4 Nov 79 p 1 NC

[Editorial: "The Rapprochement"]

[Text] All must agree that rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots is an essential element and a basic prerequisite for the vindication of our struggle, that the government must take practical measures and that all parties and organizations must launch a vigorous campaign to achieve this because the Turkish Cypriots constitute part of the population of Cyprus and also have the right to live as equal citizens of the Cyprus state.

However, as we have stressed in the past, and as the refugee organizations "Free Morphou" and "Free Kyrenia" have declared, rapprochement is one thing and submission and betrayal of inalienable national rights and basic rights violated by Turkish invasion and occupation is another; nor can there be consolidation of faits accomplis.

For example, we cannot give up the struggle for freedom and justice for the sake of rapprochement; nor can we cease demanding our houses and property that have been usurped by the Attila hordes and the Turkish Cypriot supporters of Denktas, just as we cannot stop organizing our defense in order not to displease the so-called Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots who really want to live with us in a united, really independent and sovereign state are aware of the evils brought about by the invasion of the Attila hordes and that they justify all our defense efforts.

We insist that along with the effort for rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots, we must strengthen our defense; we must step up our activities at the United Nations and at all international forums and must demand the withdrawal of the Attila hordes from Cyprus, the return of all the displaced people to their houses and property; the restoration of the unity, nonalignment, sovereignty and real independence of the state; and the procuring of international guarantees.

In submitting these demands we must be resolute, unyielding, firm. Any concession would be tantamount to betrayal of some inalienable right or basic human right. Insistence of our demands--demands which are so fair and reasonable--would not mean that we are inspired by chauvinism or unreasonableness or great idealism, as the communist like to say. Insistence on our demands would show a sense of responsibility in the struggle for our rights.

Those Turkish Cypriots who wish rapprochement as we do, those Turkish Cypriots who believe, as we do, in peaceful coexistence and cooperation within a really free, united, sovereign Cyprus Republic must rise up against the Attila occupation hordes, against their chauvinistic leadership, and must struggle just as we are struggling for a real rapprochement and peaceful coexistence under the same conditions of freedom and security for all.

CSO: 4908

## CYPRUS SOCIALIST DAILY CALLS FOR STRONGER DEFENSE MEASURES

NC031041 Nicosia TA NEA in Greek 3 Nov 79 p 3 NC

[From the "Comments" column: "The Defense Shield"]

[Text] We too agree absolutely with the "unenslaved Kyrenia" organization on the question of the defense shield. The defensive shielding of the free Cypriot territories is in no way directed against the Turkish Cypriots; it is directed against the occupation; it is aimed at crippling and foiling Turkish plans to utilize Cyprus for the needs of imperialism; it aims at transforming the victory of the twin imperialist conspiracy at the expense of the Cyprus Republic into a hazardous adventure for imperialism and its proxy. From this point of view the defense shield is equally the hope for all Cypriots—Greeks and Turks.

Cypriot patriots realize its significance and support every government effort for defense. They demand more courageous strides; they demand the mobilization of the people and insist that every home become a fortress and every patriot a soldier. This is what lies behind the demand for raising Cyprus' fighting capacity, for organizing a civil guard, and for the immediate, active and mass involvement of the people in the question of defense.

## The Social Climate

Cypriot patriots correlate the question of defense with the more general political and social climate. They are disgusted with defeatist sermons and the foreign-inspired propaganda for surrender. They are concerned about the omissions of the government, which allows the disorientation of the people, the downgrading of their beliefs and the turn toward personal well-being. They are bothered by the superficial manner in which the occupation is treated by the state's mass communications media. They are displeased by the disorienting role played by the state theater. They are not satisfied with the patriotic antioccupation upbringing provided by our schools.

Government decisions, radio and television programs, theatrical repertoires, the atmosphere in schools ought to have been the vivid exponents of the anti-occupation, liberation will of our people, and they must become such exponents. It is here that the struggle will be won. We must realize this now, before it is too late.

## BRIEFS

**CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO CYPRUS**—A CPSU delegation arrived in Cyprus yesterday at the invitation of the AKEL Central Committee. It is composed of Borodin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Astrakhan Oblast Party Committee, as head of the delegation, and Muravyev, first secretary of the (Perioslavin Zaliefski) city party committee, and Taporikov, of the international department of the CPSU Central Committee, as members. In the afternoon the CPSU delegation met with the Central Secretariat of AKEL in the Central Committee's offices. The CPSU Central Committee delegation reiterated the stand of the CPSU and the Soviet Government in favor of a peaceful solution of the Cyprus issue within the framework of the UN resolutions, and of the independence, territorial integrity, nonaligned status and demilitarization of Cyprus, and assured the AKEL leadership that the Soviet Union will provide firm support and help to the just struggle of the Cypriot people. The delegation will leave for Moscow on Friday. [Text] [NC030710 Nicosia KHARAVGI in Greek 3 Nov 79 p 1 NC]

**TOURIST AGREEMENT WITH USSR**—Moscow—Following a visit to Moscow by a three-member delegation from the Alasia Tourist Office, an agreement was signed here last Friday between Alasia and Intourist for tourist cooperation between Cyprus and the Soviet Union. For 1980 Alasia has undertaken to promote Cypriot tourism to the USSR—within the framework of the Olympic Games—and Intourist has undertaken to send 4,500 tourists to Cyprus. The negotiations of the Cyprus delegation in the Soviet capital were held in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, the development of relations between the peoples of Cyprus and the Soviet Union, and generally within the framework of the agreements in the Helsinki Final Act for Security and Cooperation in Europe. [Text] [NC060823 Nicosia I KHARAVGI in Greek 6 Nov 79 p 8 NC]

CSO: 4908

## COMMENTATOR VIEWS HAZARDS OF TEHRAN EVENTS

DW091040 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLEGEMEINE in German 9 Nov 79 p 1 DW

[Editorial by Robert Held: "The Provocation of the Ayatollah"]

[Text] The UN secretary general maintained great restraint by pointing out to such compatriots as the Ayatollah's certain paragraphs of the diplomatic convention. Why does he not shout loudly "scandal" because the free conduct of ambassadors has always been the first form of civilization in dealings of tribes and nations? How far have we gotten in this world? The shrewd 'Arafat and his PLO sense correctly that the Ayatollah is going too far and that he is provoking the West in a way that could entail long-term reactions; reactions that could again point out the role of Israel as the only democratic constitutional state in the entire orient.

Now it becomes clear why Fidel Castro a few weeks ago congratulated Ayatollah Khomeyni: He is in a position to provoke the world power United States even more effectively without being punished than the Cubans. There is much talk of the "revival of Islam" and some people believe they can welcome some things for conservative reasons, things that are close to their soul. But probably this is not the proper term for analyzing a great part of the present phenomena. This is much rather a crisis of Islam, their own rebellion in view of their inability to face the modern world. The Ayatollah eliminated the Bazargan government with its promising efforts to achieve adaptation. The Ayatollah wants to shut off his country hermetically from Western liberties and their misuse. He wants to keep the country clean. The price almost does not matter, at least from his point of view.

For his permanent Islamic revolution the Ayatollah needs arguments he can use. If it were not the extradition of the Shah, he would find others. It is his asset that a constitutional theocracy was put down as early as in the 1906 constitution so that he can have the people play revolution in an almost traditional feeling of self-righteousness: They act with a good conscience and they fight against the devil. They get rid of their aggressions at the expense of bad foreign countries and they



believe that God is on their side. That is not far from the old idea of a holy war that once changed the world and the consequences of which the occident likes to ignore in the 20th Century.

But under the green banner of a religious fight one cannot achieve welfare for everybody; this insight will make the efforts of the Ayatollah end in absurdity. The idea of holding a position that is not merely anti-American but also anti-Western will not die, however; the awareness of being able to activate a number of nations against Western-oriented nations. That does not particularly serve the commonsense of the world and it does not promote a balance of forces; but it is like many other things of the north-south dialog, one of the important realities of tomorrow.

It is being demonstrated to the Americans and the Europeans that they cannot count solely on the success of their own insight and their newly developed helpfulness. They will have their hand bitten over and over again. They will have to adapt their action to a tough fight for survival and they will not merely leave things at a growth rate of zero and at making good deeds.

The citizens who represent as a whole the "world power America" to foreigners are gaining a painful experience. Some of them ask soberly whether it was necessary to provoke the present crisis through Washington's vacillating action as in the case of Somoza and Nicaragua. First the ex-Shah was not allowed through the door, and then he was still permitted to come after all. Indeed one ought to have recalled the turbulent events that took place during the last Shah visit to Washington in November 1977 when thousands of Iranians fought each other in front of the White House, keeping the ambulances busy up to nightfall. At that time it was demonstrated to the Americans at closest range that it would be better to handle that unfortunate nation carefully.

Doubts have been created whether the current President is capable of demonstrating outwardly the determination of America. It is not so much a matter of possibly wrong decisions as it is the lack of talent to make such a demonstration at all. It is not only Carter's fault that the great power America is incapable of taking ostentatious action in this special situation. The lives of a number of citizens of his country are in danger. In assessing the situation soberly one will realize that there is no possibility of taking direct action. Even a hint could cost the lives of the hostages. In addition, there is no materiel, no troops and no access way even for a small command action.

Eventually this kind of action will tough on and jeopardize the recent successes achieved in Mideast policy; in such a situation the hands of America are bound. The threat of an Iranian oil export stop is hovering over all that. It would create a shortage for the Americans of almost 80 million liters per day. The Americans are learning as never before the fatal difference between offense and the ability to feel offended.

## TRADE UNION OFFICIALS VIEW COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

DW081300 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1915 GMT 7 Nov 79 DW

[Interview with Thomas Heyll, former secretary of the Trade, Banking and Insurance Employees Union (HBV), and Heinz Vietheer, HBV chairman, by Richard Loewenthal, in the feature "Magazic," place not given--recorded]

[Excerpts] [Question] Our program created waves long before its telecast today. It ought to have become known in the meantime that the issue of communist infiltration of trade unions is not an invention of malicious journalists who are opposed to trade unions. Herbert Wehner, for example, warned against it, the top echelon of the German Trade Union Association, DGB, has expressed repeated concern about certain tendencies, and the federal minister of the interior recently commented on it.

In order to rule out every misunderstanding, I want to say that we do not pretend in an undifferentiated way that the trade unions have been fully undermined and that they are fully following the communist line. That is not the case at all. But there are warning signals that cannot be ignored.

When in the course of our research work we found a trade union that showed considerable undermining tendencies from extreme leftist forces, panic broke out in the leadership. It sounds like a novel adventure if you listen to what the management of the Trade, Bank and Insurance Employees Union HBV, disseminated in the way of insinuations, distortions, half untrue and completely untrue reports. Here is just an example of a leftist trend in a trade union.

[Film report by Ernst Martin] It is 21 October 1978. The delegates of the Mannheim DKP [German Communist Party] congress celebrate the unanimous adoption of a new party program that commits every communist worker, employee or state employee to be an active trade union member. It is noteworthy in this connection that all members of the Presidium and the Secretariat of the DKP Party Executive Board are organized DGB members. One central point of their work is the trade union HGV.

Thomas Heyll, a Social Democrat and the former head of the HBV department for economic policy, is one of the five HBV secretaries who joined the DAG [German Employees Federation] in protest against the communist infiltration or their trade union.

Does the membership of high-ranking DKP functionaries in the HBV trade union permit the conclusion that this trade union has been infiltrated by communists?

[Answer--Heyll] That would be too simple. Many leading DKP functionaries certainly have good contacts with HBV members. The main problem of infiltration, however, lies in the broad framework of memberships. Most of all, there are many Social Democratic trade union functionaries who do not follow the Godesberg program any more. They are oriented toward the DKP and Marxism-Leninism. The Berlin Land association is a particularly strong example of communist infiltration. Several SEW [Socialist Unity Party of West Berlin] members sit on the land Bezirk executive board, the land Bezirk chief is fighting with his back to the wall.. The broad masses of members have no idea of this development. The managing main executive board is paralyzed because of these internal quarrels.

[Answer--Viethier] We have completed a successful development phase. In the past 10 years, we gained 172,000 new members. In the meantime, our organization has 330,000 members. We scored successes in the elections for the board of directors and in shop steward elections. That actually proves the quality of this organization.

The charge of communist infiltration is a matter that reappears every 5 years. If a trade union is successful, one tries to find some fault in it. I consider this nothing but a chimera. There is no communist infiltration in the HBV trade union. You ought to just look at the figures. The DGB has been attacked lately too. The DGB has 7.8 million members. Let us assume that 30,000 DKP members are members of the 17 trade unions belonging to the DGB. That would amount to 0.5 percent. How can 99.5 percent of our members feel infiltrated by 0.5 percent of communists.

[Question] Then how do you explain the fact that a secret meeting of top HBV functionaries took place in Ratingen in 1978 at which measures against this infiltration were discussed?

[Answer--Viethier] I know nothing of a secret meeting in Ratingen.

[Film report by Ernst Martin] The former HBV secretary, the organizer of the secret meeting unknown to the HBV chairman, in Ratingen gave us details which make the statement of the HBV chairman dubious.

[Answer--Heyll] It was in this hotel that the secret meeting—one of several—took place on the evening of 13 March 1978. I will now show you the room. Those who participated in the secret meeting included: Heinz Viethier, first chairman of the trade union for commerce, banks and insurance; members of the executive board; the spokesman of the land Bezirk executive board. The bill for the meeting room was sent to my private address. This is the bill. I also have the expense accounts for food and drink. The amount is DM209.15. The bill was rewritten later and paid by the HBV trade union.

I can understand that Heinz Vietheer is reluctant to recall that meeting today, for one result of the meeting was a list which made the rounds in our headquarters as a documentation. This list showed all secretaries who were attributed to the procommunist wing. In this list G. Volkmar, second chairman of the HBV trade union, was shown as the head of these procommunist forces. Other, close aides of G. Volkmar are also contained in this list.

[Film report by Ernest Martin] The list referred to by former HBV secretary Heyll registers procommunist forces in the following sectors of the HBV trade union, among others: Main Administrator Duesseldorf; land Bezirk executive boards Berlin, lower Saxony-Bremen with headquarters in Hannover, in north Rhine-Westphalia with headquarters in Duesseldorf, Hesse with headquarters in Frankfurt; Bezirk and/or local administrations.

[Question] We learned just before the broadcast that HBV chairman Heinz Vietheer a few days ago surprisingly withdrew his readiness to run for the HBV chairmanship again in 1980. In his place G. Volkmar, hitherto the second chairman, is to be nominated for election by the trade union convention. Volkmar is considered to be the representative of the left wing. Along with him two of his closest confidential aides are to become new members of the executive board. Considering the latest developments HBV insiders reckon with considerable unrest at the grass-roots.

CSO: 3103



## RESTRUCTURING OF ARMY PLANNED FOR 1980-1985

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 19 Oct 79 p 4

[Article by Ulrich Mackensen: "The Army Will Be Reorganized During the Next Five Years"]

[Text] Frankfurt/Main, 18 October. During the coming 5 years, between 1980-1985, there is to be a reorganization of the largest component of our armed forces, the Army. This was announced Thursday in Bonn by Army Chief of Staff Lt Gen Hans Poeppel. This reorganization will, with a few changes, implement the new structuring of the army which had been announced almost 1 year ago by Federal Defense Minister Hans Apel.

The primary objective of this army reorganization is a reduction in size of units, while increasing their total number. This will not entail an increase in the number of soldiers on active duty. The Army high command is of the opinion that smaller units have a faster reaction time and greater mobility—especially in defensive actions. According to the Hardthoehe, this would serve to reemphasize the defensive nature of the Army. In addition, this would be an improved means of adapting to the Warsaw Pact's new leadership policies.

It was said that the new Army structure takes into account the new Eastern tactics of the "bold impact," which provides for quick multiple penetrations designed to gain territory.

In its new structure, the Army will continue to have 12 divisions. These divisions in turn consist of 36 brigades: 17 armored brigades, 15 tank infantry brigades, three airborne brigades and one mountain infantry brigade.

Each brigade will in the future have four combat battalions instead of three, as in the past: armored and tank infantry battalions. Each battalion will in turn have three combat companies. However, this configuration exists only during exercises or in a defense situation. In peacetime, the fourth battalion is "spread" over the other three, meaning that each battalion is "hosting" a supplementary company. The missing fourth battalion staff is made up out of regular and reserve officers as and when required.



Another innovation consists of three corps army aviation regiments, equipped with antitank helicopters. In addition, there are three antiaircraft regiments, again one per corps, equipped with the "Roland" antiaircraft armored vehicle. "Roland" will be allocated to the divisions also; each of the 12 major units will contain an antiaircraft regiment instead of an antiaircraft battalion.

There will be reorganization also in the defense in depth, which is responsible for the security of the rear areas and for ensuring the operational independence of the frontline combat team. There are plans for the formation of 12 territorial defense brigades, half of which are to be manned at 52-85 percent of their full strength in peacetime and which would become fully manned in case of hostilities. The other 6 territorial defense brigades are "equipment units"; they are to be manned almost exclusively by reservists. Finally, there will be 45 rifle battalions, to be contained in 15 territorial defense regiments, for security missions. These units will exist only in the form of cadres (command and housekeeping personnel). The same will be true for 150 territorial defense companies and 300 security units used for guard duties. Only weapons and equipment are available for these units; they are manned by reservists.

The combat team, meaning the above-mentioned 12 divisions, will be reorganized in 6-month increments—4 divisions at one time. The reorganization will essentially be completed during 1981. For the territorial army group this will take longer, probably until the end of the next decade.

General Poeppel described the reorganization plans last Thursday as follows: "A reorganization of this magnitude cannot be improvised. The Army's combat readiness must remain unimpaired while this is going on. Carefully prepared and well-integrated reorganization steps must serve to minimize social hardships."

To bring this about, only 25 out of 630 self-contained entities and 385 units will be physically moved, involving permanent changes of station for 1,500 to 2,000 personnel. This number is substantially smaller than had been estimated in the early stages of planning the new Army structure.

"The Army is faced with a great intellectual challenge," Poeppel said. The reorganization would demand total dedication by all Army members and would require a basic change of attitude at all levels. "Our task is to reorganize the Army without material loss of combat readiness and training time, while gaining a considerable increase in combat effectiveness."

9273

CSO: 3103

## 'LE MONDE' VIEWS IRANIAN ACTIONS AGAINST U.S., SEES LESSONS

LD081141 Paris LE MONDE in French 7 Nov 79 p 1 LD

[Editorial: "Wild Stampede"]

[Text] Revolutions have produced extreme actions but it has to be admitted that the Iranian revolution is breaking all records. Taking U.S. diplomats hostage with the barely disguised assent of the authorities is an act which is very disturbing, completely unacceptable and contrary to all international practices. If Ayatollah Khomeyni thinks the U.S. representatives are undesirable he could always rid himself of them by having them expelled.

That does not seem to be the Imam's real intention. By tolerating, if not encouraging, this new trial of strength with the United States, the Ayatollah is trying to use his people's very understandable anti-American feelings to perpetuate a process which looks increasingly like a wild stampede. The Iranian leaders are well aware that it is politically and morally impossible for Mr Carter to hand over the shah. The former sovereign was only allowed onto U.S. territory because of his state of health: it is unthinkable for the United States to send the patient--whatever his crimes--to Tehran. However, the deadlock is likely to continue since the shah, who has a new tumor, is to remain in a hospital in New York for at least 4 weeks.

This new episode should make our diplomatic chiefs think if, as is being said in Tehran, the French Embassy could now pay the price of Ayatollah Khomeyni's fanatical supporters. By demanding Mr Bakhtiar's extradition from Britain the Iranian leaders, who know quite well that the former government chief is in Paris not London, were apparently trying to convey a "message" to the French Government. If that was the plan it would show that moderation and understanding decidedly do not pay.

The removal of Mr Bazargan this Tuesday does not augur well to say the least even though it puts an end to an ambiguous situation. A silent struggle had been going on since February, when Mr Bazargan's cabinet was formed, between the moderate government in Tehran and the Revolutionary Council in Qom under Imam Khomeyni's supreme authority which held the real power.

Many attempts had been made in the course of the year to end that dual power. Mr Bazargan had more than once been forced to go to Qom humbly to threaten his government's collective resignation and assert his policies. However, each time a shaky compromise perpetuated an exhausted team which was increasingly deprived of any real power. The road to Qom had become the road to Canossa.

Indeed, since last August, when Imam Khomeyni severely criticized the "government's inaction" and threatened to go to Tehran to run affairs of state at first hand, Mr Bazargan had only been a prime minister under reprieve. When he submitted his resignation to the Qom patriarch once again at the beginning of September he spoke of his "weariness," bitterly pointing out that his government was like "a knife without a blade." His retreat in the face of his religious adversaries will probably not solve anything and there is a good chance that Iran, now entirely in the hands of the religious leaders who are far from agreeing among themselves, will continue its perilous course.

CSO: 3100

## 'L'HUMANITE' REPORTS MARCHAIS' COMMENTS ON VISIT TO ALGERIA

LD091147 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 3 Nov 79 p 7 LD

[Unattributed report: "Developing Cooperation With Algeria"]

[Text] George Marchais returned from Algiers yesterday afternoon. When he left the airplane at Orly he stated in particular:

"I am returning from another visit to Algeria at President Chadli Bendjedid's invitation on the 25th anniversary of the start of the revolution. The impression I obtained during that visit is very encouraging for the future. It fully confirms my experiences during my previous visits: Algeria is relentlessly pursuing its efforts to overcome its problems and to build a socialist society in its own particular conditions—thereby continuing to follow the path laid down by President Boumediene.

"In that connection I was particularly impressed by the celebrations to mark this anniversary and especially the great 1 November parade. These celebrations were marked by massive participation by workers, women and young people which clearly reflected a calm and determined popular commitment.

"This mobilization of the Algerian people's essential forces goes hand in hand with the efforts made by that country—as shown by President Chadli Bendjedid's speech on the state of the nation—to insure improved living conditions for the people.

"The other observation which must be made after the ceremonies which I have just attended, is undoubtedly Algeria's growing authority on the international plane—an authority acquired through its untiring action in favor of a new world system and of detente and peace. The presence of many heads of state and top leaders confirms the very important political and diplomatic role played by Algeria not only in the Arab world but throughout the African continent, and beyond that, in all developing countries and, more generally, in the world.

"I return from this visit more convinced than ever that our country decidedly has everything to gain from developing broad and frank cooperation with Algeria, respecting the independence of each nation and mutual interests. That is the essence of the proposals I made on behalf of the PCF."

Georges Marchais was accompanied by Central Committee Secretary and Politburo member Maxime Gremetz. CGT Secretary General Georges Seguy returned from Algeria on the same airplane.

CSO: 3100



## PCF SENDS ANNIVERSARY MESSAGE TO CPSU

LD121723 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 7 Nov 79 p 8 LD

[Apparent text of PCF greetings message to CPSU: "October Revolution Is 62 Years Old"--first paragraph is L'HUMANITE introduction]

[Text] The PCF Central Committee sent the CPSU the following message yesterday on the anniversary of the October 1917 Socialist Revolution:

Dear Comrades,

On the 62d anniversary of the October Revolution we send our fraternal and warm greetings to the CPSU and the entire Soviet people.

By making socialism a living reality, the October Revolution was and still is the decisive event of our century. The emergence of the first socialist state in history radically transformed the Soviet people's living conditions. At the same time this event profoundly influenced the history of all mankind.

Since October 1917 socialism has enabled your country to cover considerable ground, and we welcome your every success in your economic and social development, in the evolution of your people's prosperity and culture and in the progress of socialist democracy.

The French Communists, who are struggling for the extension of peaceful co-existence, for peace, disarmament and international cooperation, appreciate the USSR's determined action and new efforts for the sake of these major shared initiatives.

On this anniversary we express to you our desire to develop the relations of internationalist solidarity that exist between the PCF and the CPSU, on the basis of independence, equal rights and noninterference.

We hope that the concept of new relations among the communist parties will progress, thus facilitating the strengthening of their cooperation. Indeed, cooperation between our parties contributes to the development of the struggle for peace, disarmament and international cooperation, in the interests of both our countries, and to friendship between the peoples. We send your party, its Central Committee and your people our most sincere wishes for success.

## BRIEFS

COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS IN WEST SAHARA--The PCF, PCI and PSE delegation which visited the Western Sahara returned to Algiers Wednesday evening. It spent 3 days with the Saharan people covering several hundred kilometers in the liberated territory, visiting refugee camps, schools, hospitals and military training centers. "The Saharan people exist, are living and taking part in running their own affairs," PCF Politburo member Maxime Grenetz said on his return to Algiers. "There is no doubt that the Polisario Front is the Saharan people's sole representative. This visit has shown us that these people are fighting for their freedom and that they need even more political and material solidarity to force Morocco to put an end to its aggression and enable them to finally live freely on their land." [Text] [LD091151 Paris L'HUMANITE in French 1 Nov 79 p 7 LD]

CSO: 3100

## 'I KATHIMERINI' REPORTS U.S. RECONSIDERING CYPRUS, GREEK POLICY

AT091120 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 8 Nov 79 pp 1, 3 AT

[Text] Washington (Special Service)--The U.S. Administration is hastily re-considering its Cyprus policy to date and its general policy on Greece in order to correct certain mistaken political positions which contributed toward an anti-American feeling in Greece.

Within these limits, "a spectacular U.S. initiative" is expected toward solution of the Cyprus issue and to put in motion Washington's policy on other pending problems of interest to Greece, as for example, neutralizing Turkish objections to our country's return to NATO's military wing. The goal of U.S. efforts is to achieve a "happy" restoration of Greek-U.S. relations to be crowned, according to Washington's expectations, by an official visit by Prime Minister K. Karamanlis to the United States during the next few months.

These reports, originating from well-informed sources in the U.S. capital, are related to difficulties President Carter faces in his re-election and to his effort to regain the confidence of Greek-American voters who clearly turned against him and are clearly directing their support to Senator Kennedy.

Preparation of this "prohellenic overture" started about a month ago when McCloskey, U.S. ambassador to Athens, was invited to Washington. At the same time and during the past few weeks Washington undertook repeated soundings among leaders of the Greek Americans in order to find ways to dissolve their severe irritation in view of next year's presidential election.

During these soundings the American side was absolutely convinced that it is only through a "radical revision" of its policy to date on problems of interest to Greece but also through a speeding up of tangible results that the Carter Administration can hope to win back Greek-American voter confidence.

## Doubts

It is under this light that efforts are being made to promote the initiatives mentioned earlier, without this meaning that their success is guaranteed.

It is pointed out that any new U.S. effort on Cyprus will be faced with difficulties from Turkey because Washington's policy to date proved to be tolerant toward pressures and extortion from Ankara.

In addition, doubts are also expressed on the results Washington expects to get in Greece with the "new initiatives it will put forth," especially if it expects a visit by Karamanlis to the United States within the next few months.

It is recalled that during the presidential campaign between Ford and Carter the Greek prime minister refused to respond to a similar invitation by the U.S. Administration of that time, fearing his visit could be exploited by the candidates in order to influence Greek-Americans.

The same sources in the U.S. capital were wondering where and how the new Carter Administration initiatives could be applied, especially if they are to have immediate results in such a way as to overcome Karamanlis' hesitations and to convince him to make his visit to the United States during the pre-election campaign.

CSO: 4908

## 'RIZOSPASTIS' ALLEGES STALLING IN GREEK-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS

AT091720 Athens RIZOSPASTIS in Greek 9 Nov 79 p 1 AT

[Text] According to certain authoritative reports, the government has decided to implement stalling tactics in negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement for the construction of an alumina plant in cooperation with the Soviets.

It is reported among businessmen, experts and government personalities that instructions have been given for discussions on this issue to be time consuming.

These reports are strengthened by the following facts: Recently the minister of coordination announced that in addition to the government's discussion with a competent USSR delegation currently in our country, there is a proposal by EEC countries for the construction of an alumina and aluminum plant in Greece using Greek bauxites. He said he will discuss this issue during his visit to Brussels early in December. Discussions for the construction of such a plant, which began after the promotion of the Soviet proposals, strengthen the impression that it concerns a forceful intervention by the EEC to foil Greek-Soviet industrial cooperation in the aluminum field.

Another fact supporting this viewpoint is that since Karamanlis' return from Moscow, countries playing the role of middlemen in the international bauxite market have been offering to buy Greek bauxite at higher than market prices. These countries are even offering to buy the entire Greek production of bauxite in order to exclude the USSR, which has been a regular customer of Greece's for the past 25 years, according to reports.

CSO: 4908



## 'ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS' CRITICIZES GOVERNMENT'S NATO POLICY

AT091300 Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 8 Nov 79 p 1 AT

[Editorial: "It Is Trying To Correct Its Own Mistakes"]

[Text] The new round of talks on Greece's return to NATO's military wing is commencing. Whoever reads the explanatory statement of National Defense Minister Evangelos Averof on the meeting between Generals Rogers and Davos in Brussels, will remain with the impression that the government is attempting to settle a serious matter affecting our own defense which was created by others and not by the government itself.

Greece's withdrawal from NATO's military wing, however, was decided upon by K. Karamanlis and two or three of his aides in August of 1974 and it was made official with a meeting of lightning speed, of 5 or 10 minutes, held at the National Defense Ministry. Speaking in Salonica later, Karamanlis proclaimed that withdrawal was final. He even used special emphasis to stress this, speaking out of context. Georgios Mavros also hastened to add that even in the eventuality that we were proved right on the Cyprus issue and on certain other national issues, Greece would not return to NATO.

That decision was accompanied by tolerance, incitement and cultivation of anti-American, anti-Western and anti-NATO feelings. It was not even taken into consideration, because nobody thought of it and nobody knew of it, that from that very historic moment we were arming Turkey with the "veto" and that we made Turkey an arbiter over an important sector of our foreign policy. The government requested our attachment to NATO on the basis of a regime of special relations. Returning from one of his European tours, K. Karamanlis in February of 1978 gave the assurance that the question of reattachment would be settled within four months, in other words as of May 1978, or in any case at the same time as command of Smyrna headquarters was to be entrusted to the Turks. Since he was so emphatic with his assurances the prime minister and not met with nor had he discerned any difficulties. It was in vain that this newspaper issued warnings over the possible danger of a Turkish "veto." Nobody listened to us.

The new Greek ambassador to the United States Ioannis Tzounis recently argued that decision for our withdrawal from NATO "was taken under pressure from public opinion." But how was this done? Was it under the impressions created and under the force of the placards of communist demonstrations? Why did not the government hasten to inform public opinion about the benefits to be gained by Turkey, to say the least, as a result of the decision to withdraw from NATO? Unless, of course, those responsible are now trying to excuse themselves, that they were the unwilling victims of demonstrations organized in this country by the supporters of the Warsaw Pact.

As a result of the hasty and not negotiated decision to withdraw, serious and nationally damaging mistakes were committed. This is also proved by our insistent and over two-year long effort to return and this without even an excuse to settle the crisis in Greek-Turkish relations. Under other instances of smooth operation of the state, if what Mavros underlined had not taken place, the government would not have been able to remain in power because it had dismally failed. The government ought to have been replaced a long time ago by another, one able and capable to correct the monstrous mistakes of its predecessors with the least possible damage.

CSO: 4908

## GREECE

### 'PROINI' URGES FIRMNESS TOWARD NATO

AT101630 Athens PROINI in Greek 10 Nov 79 p 4 AT

[From the "Nonaligned" column: "No Compromise"]

[Text] When will the various U.S. generals of NATO, who are not versed in history, understand that Greece's sovereign rights cannot become the subject of any negotiation? Regardless of how much they pressure and directly or indirectly attempt blackmail, not one man in this small country is willing to accept discussions on issues which impinge on the country's territorial integrity, especially in order to make concessions for the benefit of others lying in wait to advance their expansionist plans.

The various NATO plans aim at co-sovereignty in the Aegean, that is, operational control in this sea to be exercised by Turkey. Such a settlement automatically divides the Aegean with the direct consequence that half of the Greek islands will be in the Turkish zone of responsibility. Now, therefore, is it possible for Greece to accept such a settlement?

Currently, the Haig plan is undergoing various amendments, but as it obvious from leaked reports, the new NATO supreme commander has not "departed" from the original plan for co-sovereignty in his talks with General Davos. In a way, General Rogers left open the issue of Greek-Turkish differences and suggested that NATO itself undertake the operational responsibility of the controversial area.

Regardless of the fact that this seems to be a concession from the original line, it is in no case a point for discussion. The Aegean issue is absolutely not subject to any negotiation. The Greek position should always be clear and openly expressed to all. Concessions, even to the alliance, are concessions at Greece's expense and to Turkey's benefit. NATO has never concealed its pro-Turkish orientation and has tolerated, without any reaction, even a formal one, Attila's invasion of Cyprus. It continues to tolerate the use of its own arms for the maintenance of the foreign occupation on the island. Under such conditions and such plans, how can discussions and negotiations be held for a return? Under what logic and morality is the victim asked to pay a new fee to the blackmailer?

In this entire issue, the government should align itself with the will of the overwhelming majority of the Greek people who reject any compromise and will continue to do so at the cost of any sacrifice for the sake of national independence.

## 'I KATHIMERINI' REPORTS ON TURKISH-GREEK STATEMENTS, MEETINGS

AT071500 Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 7 Nov 79 p 1 AT

[Excerpt] Turkey once again "provokes Greece as well as the truth" the Greek Government underlined yesterday in answer to the latest Demirel statements. Demirel blamed our country with responsibility for uncertainty on all Greek-Turkish problems, even resorting to the threatening advice that "an armed clash in the area would not serve either the Greeks or the Turks."

A government spokesman in Athens on being asked on the new Demirel statements, said, "The Greek Government fails to understand why the Turkish leaders continue their provocations against Greece. In his statement Demirel provokes not only Greece but also the truth because what is happening is exactly opposite to what he alleges. It is well known that problems existing between Greece and Turkey were created by Turkey, since it is this country which puts forth claims against Greece."

According to a French news agency report Demirel's statement is as follows:

"All existing problems between Greece and Turkey were created by Athens. We are not the ones who created the problem of Cyprus nor the problem of the continental shelf or that of airspace or even the problem of the Aegean islands." Demirel was addressing a press conference and added, "If Greece utilized its relations with Turkey and if it had not committed political mistakes in this sector, there would have been no problems between the two countries. An armed clash in the area would not serve either the Greeks or the Turks. The two countries must be extremely careful and they must avoid provocations."

## The Secretary Generals Meeting Was Postponed

It was reported in Athens yesterday that the meeting of the secretary generals of the Greek and Turkish foreign ministries, Theodoropoulos and Yigit, scheduled for next month, has been postponed. The official reason for postponement is that there is no Turkish Government at this moment which could be responsible for continuation of these talks.

According to the same reports the decision to postpone the talks was taken last week when Theodoropoulos and Yigit met in London. The two secretary generals agreed the date for the new meeting should be fixed when a new Turkish Government is formed.

# PROBLEMS FOLLOWING ACCESSION TO EEC ANALYZED

Athens O OIKONOMIKOS TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 6 Sep 79 pp 14, 15, 16

[Article by An. I. Papaioannou]

[Text] The accession of our country to the EEC is now a fact. The only thing that is left is for the national parliaments of the nine countries of the European Community to ratify the accession agreement, since it has already been approved by the Greek Parliament. The agricultural problem was perhaps the most central and most difficult subject during the negotiations for which a satisfactory solution agreeable to both must be found. And it seems that a solution has been found. This article makes an effort to define and examine some of the problems which are caused or may be caused by the Greek agricultural sector which will be of concern to our nine partners in the EEC.

The European Community will confront principally three kinds of difficulties in the agricultural sector as a result of the accession of Greece: Financial, politico-institutional, and economic. With the accession of Greece the present Community is extended to a geographic area in which agriculture occupies a more significant position than it does in the rest of the community countries.

Even though the Gross National Product of the Community increases by only 1.6 percent with the accession of Greece, the cultivated area increases by 9 percent, the number of persons occupied in the agricultural sector by 10 percent and the number of agricultural enterprises by 18 percent (see Table 1).

As is clearly evident in Table 1, our country presents all of those organizational problems that are closely connected with the transition from an economically developing agricultural stage to a more advanced industrial one (high rate of population active in agriculture, gross agricultural product and exportation of agricultural products). In other words, these were problems that the older members of the Community had to solve decades before the creation of the Common Market, if of course one does not count some isolated problematic areas (Mezzo-giorno Italy).

Some of the other characteristic organizational problems of Greece are:

1) The increased concentration of agricultural production to irrigated or



irrigable areas that comprise a relatively small part of the total cultivated area. 2) The existence of many very small and extremely divided agricultural enterprises frequently of small productivity. 3) The great importance of mountain agriculture.

#### Burdens on the Community Resulting From Our Accession

The enlargement of the EEC with Greece will result in relatively high financial burdens for the Community Agrarian Fund (referred to as FEOGA in French) and consequently for the member-countries of the EEC.

In its analysis in January 1976, the Committee of the European Community estimated that the accession of our country to the Community, as long as the existing market prices are applied and the present Community regulations in the current agricultural production (1975) apply, would require an increase in the Community Budget by 450 million accounting units or about 20.7 billion drachmae (see Table 2).

More than half of this amount (about 280 accounting units or 12.8 billion drachmae) will go for expenses exclusively connected with the accession of the Greek sector to the Community Organization of agricultural markets. Of this amount, 220 million accounting units (about 10.1 billion drachmae) will burden the "Guarantees" section of FEOGA and 60 million accounting units (about 2.7 billion drachmae) the "Orientation" section of the FEOGA.

The expenses of the "Guarantees" section of the FEOGA Fund specifically will be spent in the following six principal categories of products: Tobacco (4.1 billion drachmae), olive oil (3.4 billion drachmae), fruit and vegetables (0.9 billion drachmae), hard wheat (0.5 billion drachmae) and wine (0.4 billion drachmae) (2). These total 9.3 billion drachmae of the 10.1 billion which is the total provided for the protection of the markets.

The net income of our country from the amount of 20.7 billion drachmae will come to 13.8 billion drachmae as seen in Table 2.

Of course this entails a significant relief for the Greek budget and will lead to the availability of funds for other developmental purposes both in agriculture and quite likely in other sectors of the national economy.

According to the Supervisory advisor of the general directorate "Agriculture" of the European Committee, A. Ries, however, as emphasized in his report(3): "...The size of the financial problem that is created with the accession of Greece should not be exaggerated by the Europeans, since net expenses of 240 million accounting units (about 5 percent of the total Community Budget for 1976) are not more than what the Community expends at the present time for tobacco or for the offsetting-compensating income exclusively for the benefit of the United Kingdom. These expenses are one-half of the expenses that result from the practice of the status quo of counterbalancing monetary income and just 12 percent of the excessive expenses for milk...."

The newer estimates of the Committee based on the assumption that Greece will be a full and equal member of the Community by 1978 bring the amount by which the community budget must be increased by 700 to 750 million European accounting units, i.e., about 29 to 31 billion drachmae.

From this sum, it is expected that Greece will receive a net amount of 400 million European accounting units (about 17 billion drachmae) (Table 2).

The Ministry of Agriculture, Nourishment and Forests of the Federal Republic of Germany has also made the same estimates (Table 3).

According to these calculations, the Community will have to pay a net sum of 11 billion drachmae for 1976 and about 23 billion drachmae for 1978 to our country from the community agricultural fund.

At this point it should be emphasized that the estimates of these financial sums by both the Committee and the West German Ministry are subject to a great degree of uncertainty, on the one hand because of the lack of sufficient statistical data and on the other because of certain methodological difficulties which arise from estimating these sums.

Furthermore, these financial sums are arrived at from estimates based on syllogisms which have to be of a statistical nature and do not take into consideration the dynamic consequences the practice of various social policies in reality will have for our country, especially the Common Agricultural Policy.

#### Greek Economic Benefits

There are basically two theoretical possibilities for Greece to improve its economic benefits to the detriment of the Community funds: 1) With the substitution of imports of meat, dairy products and animal feed (corn), in other words products that are imported into our country to a large extent and upon which the Community imposes especially high counterbalancing income. 2) With the adoption of stronger protective measures by the EEC for the Mediterranean products (fruit, vegetables, wine etc.).

If one considers the progress made to date, the first possibility is considerably limited.

As for the second possibility, that is to say the strengthening of the degree of protection for Mediterranean products, it seems to be relatively easier to achieve, in view of the fact that this request was not submitted by our country or by the other candidate countries (Spain, Portugal), but by France, an old member of the EEC(4). This request was dictated by France's deep concern with the possible onset of a hard and unpleasant competition between its producers and the new expansion of the Community to the South. Both Italy and France fear that our country's free access

to the European market combined with the comparative advantages that Greece has at the present time and which are reflected by the perceptively lower prices may decisively endanger the economic survival of a large number of agricultural enterprises. This seems to be especially true in the case of tomatoes and certain other vegetables, table grapes, apples, pears, peaches, apricots and wine, in other words products that the Common Agricultural Policy in its present form does not protect as well as it protects cattle-breeding products (products of the northern countries).

Difficulties arising from Greece's accession should also be expected in the case of products such as tobacco, olive oil, hard wheat and rice where Greece seems to be especially competitive.

The truth is that the organization of the Greek economic productivity complements to a great degree the economic productivity of the Community. It does not, however, cease to partly compete with the productive organization of Italy and South France (that is why the latter are concerned) but also with the productive construction of two other candidates for accession (Spain and Portugal) and of course, many other Mediterranean countries which up to now were the basic providers of Mediterranean products to the EEC.

In its January 1976 report on the accession of Greece to the EEC, the Committee observed that the accession would not bring about a special change in the degree of self-sufficiency (in other words the rate of internal productivity which covers the internal consumption or  $\frac{\text{Internal Production}}{\text{Internal Consumption}} \times 100$ ) of the Community in agricultural products.

Furthermore, it added that, except for certain fruits and vegetables (such as peaches, tomatoes, olive oil and tobacco) the probable changes which would result from the accession of Greece to the self-sufficiency in various agricultural goods would be smaller than the ones caused by the yearly fluctuations of the Community production due to changes in climate. It also stated that even in the case of the products mentioned above which are exceptions, complete self sufficiency will not be accomplished in the Community in any case, so that even after the accession of our country there will be enough of a margin for importations of Mediterranean products from third countries (Table 4).

At this point, two basic points should be emphasized which continue to cause big headaches for the nine of the EEC despite these comforting observations.

The first point is the possibility that the adoption of a higher and in every way guaranteed level of Community agricultural prices will lead the country to: 1) an extensive rise in the volume of production of a number of Mediterranean products that are critical for the Community; and 2) a reduction in the consumption of these products, the level of which

is either especially high (in other words it approaches the saturation point) or shows signs of stagnation or has already started to decline.

Typical examples are the many fruits and vegetables, the olive oil, wine and wheat.

In one such case the degree of self-sufficiency of the Community will rise much more than the information in Table 4 perhaps indicates (increase of the numerator (production) with a simultaneous decrease of the denominator (consumption)).

The possibility of an additional increase in the production of agricultural products of the Mediterranean kind should not be precluded, if the wish/request of France which was mentioned previously regarding the upward re-adjustment of the community compensatory prices finally becomes a reality, preferably in the high level production costs of France's farmers(4).

In such a case, it would be logical to expect even larger uphill trends by the EEC in the volume of agricultural production both within the Community and Greece, inasmuch as the Greek producers will discover that it would be more profitable not to make their production available domestically (or not to make their production available only to domestic markets) but to make it increasingly available to various community intervention stations.

#### Self-Sufficiency for Mediterranean Products

The second and more important point--which Greece always tried to forget during the negotiations but was constantly being reminded of by her future partners--is the fact that the Greek accession to a Community whose initial establishment and future survival are based to a great degree on the principles of "Precedent" and "Compensation" seriously complicates the corresponding negotiations for accession on the part of Spain and Portugal and possibly, even if at a much later date, Turkey.

So, the magnitude of the problems that will arise from the accession of Greece to the EEC may be small or of limited importance in almost all sectors. In a Community of 12, however, they necessarily assume an entirely different dimension.

Thus we see in Table 5 that in a possible Community of 12 (in opposition to the Community of 10) the degree of self-sufficiency should be expected to rise considerably and the possibility of unwanted surpluses of a series of critical Mediterranean products should also be expected.

More specifically: the degree of self-sufficiency of olive oil increases from 80 percent that it is today (with Greece 85 percent) to 100 percent.

A similar situation is estimated in the case of wine: it increases from the 99 percent that it is today (with Greece 100 percent) to 104 percent, even if one does not count the estimated quantities resulting from the Community intervention for distillation.



In the case of vegetables, it increases from almost 94 percent to 100 percent, with or without Greece. Especially in the case of the tomato it goes way past 100 percent (110 percent).

Only in fruits and citrus products does a relatively satisfactory margin remain for the importation of products from third countries.

Indeed the self-sufficiency of the Common Market in agricultural products could well surpass the figures presented in Table 5. This would happen when the proper additional motives exist or are created for increasing production, as for example the increase in land productivity (increased use of fertilizers, pesticides or other means of production which exclusively strive to better acreage productivity).

In other words, it is possible to achieve a considerable increase of production, even if it is assumed that prices as well as the structure of agricultural enterprises will remain the same, under the assumption, however, that there will be improvement of the entire agricultural substructure, that is, guidance services for farmers, etc.

The comparison of the productivity of the land and the use of fertilizers between the countries that are candidates for accession (Greece, Spain and Portugal) and the Mediterranean areas of Italy and France clearly shows that the mobilization of additional productive means is possible and indeed much easier in the case of the traditional Mediterranean products than in the sector of cattle-breeding products.

And even in this case, the danger again does not appear to be caused by our country, which has exploited the available production potential to a large degree (the Greek acreage yield of many crops has already approached or already surpassed that of Italy). The danger appears to be caused principally by Spain and Portugal (Table 6).

The rise of the community degree of self-sufficiency in agricultural products up to the critical levels that appear in Table 5 or possibly even higher must lead to a burden of the relations between the present EEC and the rest of the Mediterranean countries with which the Community has made various commercial treaties.

The almost total achievement of self-sufficiency in agricultural products of a broader Community restricts, in other words, to an exceptionally large degree the negotiating field of mobility of the EEC with many third countries whose products have very few or no alternate markets.

Specifically in the case of olive oil, Turkey, Morocco and Tunisia are affected. In the case of wine, Cyprus, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. In the case of tomato paste, Cyprus, Malta, Morocco and Israel. In the case of potatoes, Cyprus and in the case of fruit, Turkey and Israel.



On a short-term basis, the export losses by these countries could be counterbalanced by export benefits which will be created for them in the international market by the shifting of the commercial currents as a result of the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal to the Community.

On a long-term basis, however, it is very possible that the disposition of the products of these countries to the so-called "Fourth Markets" will face considerable difficulties from the possible subsidized exports of Mediterranean products by the EEC of the 12. If things come to that point, however, the Community should expect the sharpest reactions and counter-measures from these countries, including demands for financial or other damages.

Through this prism, one sees clearly the other side of the argument that was so popular during the negotiations and that was delivered so frequently by the Greeks: "Greek agriculture is complementary to the agriculture of the community."

The benefits that will be obtained for Greek products by accession will burden other countries that offer the same goods and whose level of economic development is comparable to and even lower than that of Greece so that the EEC would become an exclusive club of the privileged few—as incidentally stated by members of the Greek government—not so much by excluding the poor countries from the Community as by the inclusion of only certain poor countries (5)!

#### Exports of Agricultural Products

It appears that the accession of Greece and also the two other candidate countries of the Iberian peninsula will have the least negative influence on the exports of agricultural products by third countries outside of the Mediterranean area. Tobacco, rice and certain canned fruit and vegetables are exceptions.

This, of course, does not mean that these countries are necessarily enthused with the prospect of the new expansion of the Community to the south. To the contrary. The reason is that in addition to the possible cut in their exports, they are afraid, and not without reason, that a large part of the financial help which the Community makes available at the present time to support their developing economies will be directed from now on to the poor countries, the privileged members of the EEC.

Finally, we would like to recall the fears and anxieties (whether they are justified or not will not be explored here) which the Community expressed regarding the possible accession of Greece and the two other candidate countries igniting the creation of powerful "blocs" or coalitions both among Mediterranean countries for promoting an agricultural policy which would serve their special agricultural interests and by certain other economically underdeveloped countries such as Ireland to force a larger and more productive transfer of means from the richer countries.

Thus the possibility of a powerful competition (struggle) between North and South within EEC itself dangerously increases possible negative influences on the further efforts for the unification of the countries of the Community.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The gross domestic product of Greece in 1976 came to 22 billion dollars, while that of the Community came to 1,387 billion dollars (current prices). Source OECD "National Accounts of OECD Countries" Volume I, Paris 1976, p 132.
2. Buletin of the European Community "Position on Greek Admission" Commission, Brussels. 2/76 p 41.
3. Adrian Ries, "Structure of the Agricultural economy of Greece and joint agricultural policy. Institute of European Studies "Greece and the [European Economic Community]", Brussels, 1978, p 195.
4. Edgar Pizani, Michel Sardel "Report on agricultural repercussions of the EEC Mediterranean policy on the regions in the south of France", No 259, pp 172-176.
5. K. E. Buck. Greece and the European Community, Bonn pp 132-133

Table 1: Comparison of Certain Agri-Economic Measures Between Greece - EEC

Table 1. ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 1: ΣΥΓΚΡΙΣΗ ΟΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ ΓΕΩΡΤΟ-ΟΙΚΟΝΟΜΙΚΩΝ ΜΕΓΕΘΩΝ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ - ΕΟΚ						
	(1) Καλλιεργούμενη Εκταση (1976) σε χιλ. στρέμ.	(2) Ένεργος γεωργικός πληθυσμός 1976 σε χιλ. άτομα	(3) Αριθμός των γεωργ. επιμεταλλεύσεων (1976) σε χιλ. άτομα	(4) στο ΑΕΠ (1974)	(5) Συμμετοχή της Γεωργίας στον ένεργό πληθυσμό (1976)	(5a) στις εξαγωγές (1976)
(6) ΕΟΚ-9 Ελλάδα	(93,3) 8,7	8496 866 (1)	(5835) 1037 (2)	(5,0) (17,3)	8,4 28,8 (1)	10,8 30,4

(7) Οι αριθμοί σε παρενθέσεις αποτελούν εκτιμήσεις της Commission, Βρυξέλλες 1978. 1) Αναφέρεται στο έτος 1977, 2) αναφέρεται στο έτος 1971.  
Πηγή: Eurostat, "Statistische Grundzahlen der Gemeinschaft, 1977", Luxemburg, σελίδες 29, 36 και 134.  
OECD, "Labour Force Statistics 1965 - 1976", Paris 1978, σελίδες 35 και 43.

Key:

1. Cultivated Area (1976) in thousands of acres.
2. Active agricultural population 1976 in thousands
3. Number of agricultural exploits (1976) in thousands
4. In the AEP (Gross National Product)
5. Participation of Agriculture in the (5a) in exports active population
6. EEC Greece
7. The numbers in parentheses represent estimates of the Commission, Brussels 1978. 1) Refers to 1977, 2) refers to 1971.  
Sources: Eurostat.....Luxembourg, pages 29, 36 and 134.  
OECD.....Paris 1978, pages 35 and 43.

Table 2. Financial Flow Between Greece and EEC

Table 2 ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 2: ΤΑ ΧΡΗΜΑΤΟΔΟΤΙΚΑ ΡΕΥΜΑΤΑ ΜΕΤΑΞΥ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ ΚΑΙ ΚΟΙΝΟΤΗΤΑΣ

	1976 λογιστικές μονάδες	(1) αέ έκτομαύριο 1978 Ευρωπαϊκές λογ. μονάδες	1976 (1) αέ έκτομαύριο δραχμές	(2) αέ έκτομαύριο δραχμές	1978 (2)
(3) I. Σύνολο Δαπανών	453	700-750	20.740	29.400-31.900	
εξ αούτων					
- Για την Αγροτική Πολιτική	280	500	12.820	21.000	
εξ αούτων					
(Ταμείο Έγγυησης)	(220)	(400)	(10.070)	(16.800)	
(Ταμ. Προσανατολισμού)	(60)	(100)	(2.750)	(4.200)	
- Για την Κοινωνική Πολιτική	40	20-30	1.830	840-2.100	
- Για την Περιφερειακή Πολιτική	100	105	4.580	4.410	
(4) - Διάφορα	33	70	1.510	2.940	
II. Σύνολο Εισπράξεων	151	330	6.910	13.840	
εξ αούτων					
- Τελωνειακοί δασμοί	70	100±20	3.200	4.200±840	
- Αντισταθμιστικές εισπράξεις	8	100±20	370	4.200±840	
(5) - Όρος προστιθέμενης αξίας	73	260	3.340	10.920	
I-II Καθαρές Εισπράξεις για					
την Ελλάδα	+302	+400	+13.830	+16.800	

(6) 1) Η μετατροπή έγινε με την χρήση της συνάρτησης 1 λογιστική μονάδα = 45,78 δραχμές για το έτος 1976 και 1 ευρωπαϊκή λογιστική μονάδα = 42 δραχμές.

Πηγές: — Bulletin der EG, "Stellungnahme zum griechischen Beitritts-gesuch", Kommission, Brüssel, 2/76, σελ. 42.

— Bulletin der EG, "Erweiterung der Gemeinschaft, Wirtschaftliche und sektorale Aspekte", Kommission, Brüssel, 3/78, σελ. 40 - 42.

## Key:

1. in millions  
Accounting European  
units accounting  
units
2. In millions of drachmae
3. I. Total Expenses  
of which
  - for Agriculture  
Policy
  - of which  
(for Guarantee Fund)  
(for Orientation Fund)
  - for Social Policy
  - for District Policy
  - Miscellaneous
4. II. Total Income  
of which
  - Customs duty
  - Counterbalancing income
  - Tax on added value
5. I-II. Net Income for Greece
6. 1) The conversion was done by using the equation of 1 logistical unit = 45.78 drachmae for 1976 and 1 European logistical unit = 42 drachmae

Sources: Bulletin.....Brüssel, 2/76, page 42

Bulletin.....Brüssel, 3/78, pages 40-42.

Table 3. Expenses and Income of the FEOGA Fund (Community Agrarian Fund)  
in Case of Greece's Accession

Table 3. ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 3: ΔΑΠΑΝΕΣ ΚΑΙ ΕΙΣΟΡΔΕΙΣ ΤΟΥ ΤΑΜΕΙΟΥ FEOGA ΣΤΗΝ ΠΕΡΙΠΤΩΣΗ ΕΝΤΑΞΕΩΣ ΤΗΣ ΕΛΛΑΔΑΣ				
(3)	1976 (1) σε εκατομμύρια λογιστικές μονάδες	1980	1976 (2) σε εκατομμύρια δραχμές(1)	1980
Δαπάνες του FEOGA	891	471	13.320	28.260
εξ αυτών				
- Τμήμα Έγγυησεων	(321)	(411)	(10.570)	(34.640)
- Τμήμα Προσανατολισμού	(60)	(60)	(2.750)	(3.600)
(4) Εισορροήσεις του FEOGA				
(5) (Αντισταθμ. Εισορροές)	80	82	2.290	4.920
(6) Καθαρές εισορροές Για την Ελλάδα	+241	+389	+11.030	+23.340
(7) 1) Η μετατροπή έγινε με την χρήση της ισοτιμίας 1 λογιστική μονάδα = 45,78 δραχμές για το έτος 1976 και 1 λογιστική μονάδα = 60 δραχμές για το 1980. Πηγή: Εκτιμήσεις του Γενικού Υπουργείου Γεωργίας, Δασοκομίας και Δασών της Δυτικής Γερμανίας, Βόννη 1978.				

Key:

1. In millions of logistical units
2. In millions of drachmae
3. FEOGA Expenses  
of which  
-Guarantee Fund  
-Orientation Fund
4. FEOGA Income
5. (Counterbalancing Income)
6. Net Income for Greece
7. 1) the conversion was made by using the equation of 1 logistical unit = 45.78 drachmae for the year 1976 and 1 logistical unit = 60 drachmae for 1980.  
Source: Estimates of the General Ministry of Agriculture, Nourishment and Forests of West Germany, Bonn 1978.



Table 4. Degree of Self-Sufficiency for Principal Agricultural Products in Greece and the EEC

	<u>Greece</u>		<u>EEC-9</u>	<u>EEC-10</u>
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1972/73</u>	<u>1972/73</u> <u>1966+1972/73</u>
	percent			
I. Vegetable Products				
Total Cereals	110	-	90	91
Wheat	-	104	100	100
Cereals for Animal Feed	90	-	85	85
of which				
Rye	94	-	99	99
Barley	-	99	104	104
Corn	-	67	57	57
Oats and other cereals	101	92	-	92
Rice	-	91	82	82
Sugar	-	71	94	94
Potatoes	-	98	101	101
Fresh Vegetables	103	-	94	94
of which				
Tomatoes(1)	-	148	83	89
Fresh Fruit (not including citrus products)	108	-	78	80
Citrus Products	190	-	41	47
Olive Oil	-	105	79	85
Wine	-	134	99	100
II. Animal Products				
Beef	-	67	87	87
Pork	-	101	101	101
Mutton	-	67	56	58
Poultry	-	97	103	102
Other Meat	100	-	87	87
Eggs	-	100	99	99
Milk(1)	-	99	100	100
Skim Milk(1)	100	-	100	100
Condensed Milk	-	-	139	130
Powdered Milk	-	-	153	154
Cheese	-	98	100	100
Butter	-	87	100	100
Fresh Fish(2)	96	-	95	94

1) For the EEC-9 the average production for 1971/72 and 1972/73.

2) For the EEC-9 productive year 1973/74.

Source: Bulletin der EG, "Stellungnahme zum griechischen Beitrittsge such"  
Kommission, Brussel, 2/76, pp 32-33.

Table 5. The Degree of Self-Sufficiency for Certain Mediterranean Products in the Old EEC and in the EEC That Is Under Expansion

ΠΙΝΑΚΑΣ 5: Ο ΒΑΘΜΟΣ ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑΣ ΟΡΙΣΜΕΝΩΝ ΜΕΣΟΓΕΙΑΚΩΝ ΠΡΟΪΟΝΤΩΝ ΣΤΗΝ ΠΑΛΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΣΤΗΝ ΥΠΟ ΔΙΕΥΡΥΝΗΣΗ ΕΟΚ			
(1)	ΕΟΚ-9 1972/73	ΕΟΚ-10 1966+1972/73	ΕΟΚ-12 1972/73 Α 1966+1972/73
(2)			
Έλαια-Σοκολά	41	47	76
Έλαια-Λαδο	79	88	100
Μαρού Αποξηνισ	94	94	98
Ταμάτες	83	89	110
Μαρού Φρούτα	78	80	88
Ρύζι	82	82	90
Οίνος	99	100	104

(3) Πηγή: Kersten (Sommer) Uhlmann, "Die zweite Erweiterung der EG", Inst. für landw. Marktforschung, Braunschweig 1977, σελίδες και πίνακας 4.

Key:

1. EEC
2. Citrus Products  
Olive Oil  
Fresh Vegetables  
Tomatoes  
Fresh Fruit  
Rice  
Wine
3. Source: Kersten,.....Braunschweig 1977, see Table 4.

Table 6. Productivity of Land, Fertilizer Consumption and Irrigations in the Countries That Are Candidates for Accession in Comparison to Italy and France

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΓΕΝΤΙΝΗ ΓΙΑ ΤΗΝ ΙΤΑΛΙΑ ΚΑΙ ΤΗΝ ΓΑΛΛΙΑ												
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(16) 1) Εκτιμήσεις από επίσημα στοιχεία, έτος 1976.

2) Εκτιμήσεις από "Παραγωγή Γεωργικών Προϊόντων, έτος 1976".

Πηγή: - FAO, "Production Yearbook 1977", Ρώμη, εκδόσεις 55, 95, 106 και 147

- Εκτιμήσεις Γεωργικών Προϊόντων, έτος 1976

# Key:

1. Productivity of Land 1977  
(yield by acreage)  
by one thousand acres
2. Fertilizer Consumption 1974  
by one thousand acres
3. Irrigation
4. Wheat
5. Barley
6. Corn
7. Rice
8. Sugar Beets
9. Tomatoes
10. Wine
11. Irrigated Area in 1,000 acres
12. Irrigated Area as a Percentage of the Cultivated Area
13. Yearly Rate of Increase in 1,000 acres
14. France
- Italy
- Greece
- Spain
- Portugal
16. 1) One hundred liters per acre 1976.
- 2) Estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture of West Germany.

Sources: FAO.....Rome, pages 55, 95, 106 and 147

Estimates of German Ministry of Agriculture.

## STATUS OF CHILDREN ABDUCTED BY COMMUNIST GUERRILLAS REPORTED

Athens PROINI ELEVTHERYPIA in Greek 16 Sep 79 p 11

[Text] This year makes it 30 years since the settlement of about 100,000 Greek political refugees in the socialist countries of Europe and Asia, 25,000 Greek children being included in this number. They were of pre-school or school age, the new generation of exiles who since the end of the civil war (1949) were studying in Greek schools of the socialist countries, in a system that would provide them a scientific education, but also maintain their national conscience. The subject of the education of the Greek children as refugees assumes a special timeliness during our days. Days of the repatriation of the political refugees to their homes in stages, or rather in a trickle. Days when it is finally realized that there is a need to settle and exploit such a useful dynamic as hundreds of refugees who did well in the sciences, in literature, in the arts and in all sections of social activity and who are now ready to offer their best self to their country.

The present reference to the Greek children of the political refugees is based on authentic narrations of Mavra Thanasi Mitsopoulos, general director of Greek education in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and Asia, and Periklis Kalodikis (father-in-law of the unforgettable Nikif. Mandilaras), professor of literature at the 12-grade Greek School of Bucharest. Both have had rich and fertile writing careers. They have edited readers and manuals of the Greek language. As writers, the first one, Mitsopoulos, compiled "An Anthology of Ancient Greek Literature" and the second one, Kalodikis, a four-volume "Modern Greek Literature." During the research for this article, a valuable aid was a book of about 300 pages of Thanasi Mitsopoulos titled "We Remained Greeks" that will be published soon and which covers an account of the flight, settlement and activity of the Greek political refugees and their children from 1949 to the present time.

Both educators are attempting to give a broad account of the national education that they took upon themselves together with many colleagues, from teachers to professors of the University, from the unimportant

teacher of the rural village to the distinguished professor of Athens University, the surgeon, Petros Kokalis, and Elli Alexiou, who left Paris and settled in the socialist countries to organize together with her colleagues the exceptionally delicate but also inspired program for the education of the Greek children in refuge.

The presence of the personalities who worked with the patience of an ant and the art of a bee for the patriotic education of the refugees in this study is indicative. For this reason, any omission should be considered coincidental and not deliberate. The book of Thanasi Mitsopoulos "We Remained Greeks" covers a very wide spectrum of personalities in its wide coverage over and above the educational and political activities of the refugees. These personalities greatly contributed to the maintenance and cultivation of the patriotic and progressive spirit of tens of thousands of refugees. Among them are mentioned Melpo Axioti; Dr Giorgos Athanasiadis of the School of Philosophy of the University of Geneva; Giannis Kourtis, philologist-high school principal in Cairo who left Egypt to teach the refugees; Giorgis Karatzas, teacher, general superintendent of schools in Uzbekistan; Giorgos Papageorgiou, philologist and professor of Greek literature in the University of Sofia, and others.

#### The Escape

Many years ago, immediately after the end of the civil war, the subject of sending children to the socialist countries made a lot of noise in Greece and abroad. The Democratic Army considered this a mission of salvation. The Greek authorities in Athens talked about it as a "paidomazoma" [the gathering of Greek children by the Turks during the Turkish occupation of Greece for the purpose of raising them as Turks away from the influence of their parents] "genitsarism" [the Turkish practice of raising these Greek children to become fanatic Turkish soldiers who later were used to fight the Greeks] and genocide. They systematically used the argument that the leadership of the guerrillas led the Greek children to the socialist countries to continue the "foreign-motivated and antinationalist brigandism."

The leadership of the KKE [Greek Communist Party] and the Democratic Army made counteraccusations against the government of Athens, charging it with the detention of thousands of Greek children in "reform schools" that even the conservative press described as abhorrent.

At this point Thanasis Mitsopoulos observed that: "The acuteness of this dissension was one of the main sources of food for the political passions and the national division for decades following the civil war. Even at the present time there are prejudices and psychoses to be found as heavy leftovers of a nightmarish past. At the present time, however, this problem should not be looked at through the prism that was confronted



during the difficult days of our national division. Political passions were at their peak then and the solution of social problems were taken over by arms. Our real national interest calls for the cool and unprejudiced examination of the matter, its objective assessment and the derivation of conclusions that help the nation. It helps to just contribute to the removal of the old political passions, to cultivating the democratic conscience and the popular unity. It also strengthens the persistence to respect democratic procedures for the solution of our social problems. Only this way, will we touch the truth that is the only thing that can teach us all."

#### The Departure for Foreign Lands

The reception of the children was organized with great care by the authorized services of the socialist countries. Special trains were waiting at the border to receive the children. Representatives of the youth and the Ministry of Education of every country were welcoming these little refugees who were crossing the borders of their countries in missions, some small in number and others large, and entered their territories. They welcomed them, offered them sweets and flowers and with the help of interpreters assured them that they would find every care, affection and love in their country. Groups of local children would greet them at the railroad stations, offering them flowers and with childish joy and song would chase away from the eyes of the Greek children the terror and fear of the war that still wrinkled their childish faces and would bring a smile to their lips.

The missions were escorted by health service teams, by doctors and nurses as well as by groups of children's educators.

The children were escorted to special centers with all the relative comforts, where they were first taken care of, given medical examinations, were cleaned, took their baths and were dressed in new clean clothes. There they would recover from the fatigue of a long trip, and regain their youthful energy. From these centers, they would then be organized into missions of children and sent to children's stations especially prepared for them. In many instances, the children would be transported directly to the children's stations that had been prepared by agreement from before. The children's stations were mostly luxurious hotels at bathing resorts, palaces of old leaders, old villas of the previously rich and other comfortable buildings in picturesque locations of the country.

In an atmosphere of warmth and love, they began to recuperate body and soul, to enter into the rhythm of a regular life, to find again their emotional stability and their intellectual vigor.

In all the countries where the children were sent and were settled, a Greek representation was placed well ahead of time to meet the first

missions. They were put there especially for the children, to help in settling the children by working with the authorities of the country. Its main purpose was to monitor the way of life of the groups of children that were arriving daily. Educators would head these representations.

Thus, in Yugoslavia, the responsible official from the Greek side was teacher Kostas Sangas who up until then was serving as a teacher at the Greek refugee community of Bulkes in Yugoslavia.

In Bulgaria, the first responsible official was Vasilis Kaparis. In Rumania, Thumios Plastis. In Hungary, teacher Mikahalis Oikonomou. In Czechoslovakia, Giorgos Noutsos and in Poland, Kostas Karakitsos. The children went to Germany somewhat later. The person responsible for watching them from the Greek side was the then teacher Stratis Tsirantridis.

The assignment of these responsible officials was very important, because the Greek children, tired from hardships and travel, looked upon them as their own, the fatherland in an environment foreign and strange for them that nevertheless gave them so much care.

#### Settlement in the Casinos of Plutocracy

"Let it not seem strange to you," says Per Kalodikis, "that our children settled in the homes of the nobility and the casinos of the plutocrats. In 1949, the Palace Hotel of Sinaia, more luxurious than the Grande Bretagne of Athens, was turned over to the Greek children in refuge. Four hundred rooms for students, professors, kindergarten teachers and teachers. The same thing happened at the "Casino" and at the "Royal" of the same area that was the center of Rumanian aristocracy and money. This is the kind of welcome we and our children got at a time when rumors were raging about the "paidomazoma."

The first children's stations operated in Schodre, Albania and Bulkes, Yugoslavia.

Two thousand five hundred children arrived in Hungary and settled in Chiurgo, the palace of feudal lord Festetis and in many other buildings of the privileged Hungarian society of that time.

Three thousand five hundred children arrived in Poland and settled in three bathing resorts that were transformed into children's stations. The best known station was Stetin that included 400 rooms, medical offices, classrooms, libraries and a multitude of teaching aids.

In addition to the children's stations in Sinaia in Rumania, prototype stations and camping centers operated in Lallimanesti and in the cities of Arant, Mirlaz, Orestia. Eight hundred refugee children settled in the historic building of the seminary (400 years old) in Oradea. Similar stations operated in Tulkes and Stefanesti.

The buildings in Czechoslovakia that were used as children's stations were the Kisiblik Kiselman, summer resort of the royalty, the castles of the nobles Velikhov, Randesiov, Tepla Fridland, Mankhin, Khroostava and many other homes of the nobility. More than 3,500 refugee children were housed there.

In East Germany wings of the impressive "Kulturhaus" were made available.

In the USSR and specifically in Uzbekistan more than 40 Greek schools were in operation.

The list set forth below shows the activity of the Greek refugee schools in Tashkent of the Soviet Union from 1952 to 1975. We include the list so that the reader can get an idea about the educational work of the refugees in the depths of Asia.

<u>School Year</u>	<u>Number of Students</u>
1952-53	298
1953-54	700
1954-55	1,028
1955-56	1,028
1956-57	1,321
1957-58	1,083
1958-59	1,688
1959-60	2,049
1960-61	2,465
1961-62	2,600
1962-63	2,887
1963-64	3,136
1964-65	3,354
1965-66	3,288
1966-67	3,267
1967-68	3,653

#### Old Literature

The teaching of modern Greek literature--as noted by P. Kalodiki--was performed without the slightest intervention of the Rumanian Ministry of Education and covered the entire period from the Byzantine years to the present. At this point, the person we were talking with compared the system of authoring the manuals of "modern Greek readers" in Greece and noted that: "There was no writer of prose or poet and essay writer of our time that was not taught to the children in political refuge. To the contrary, the time period for the local manuals still is the time of I. Polemis, not to say Ioannis the Chrysostome. Yes, it should not seem strange to you that in one of these manuals I read "Hymns to Easter" in a language using the Attiki syntax. The most you would find would be one or two

poems of Ritsos or Seferis, excerpts presented without adequate interpretations or correlations and comparisons with previous periods so that the Greek child could understand that he is deriving something from our national heritage and not parroting 10 to 15 lines by every known poet.

"The editors of the school books of our literature in the socialist countries gave not only simple readers but books destined for the student's library and at the same time for those who are fond of learning and every academic citizen. One of our students would think about it a lot before he would deny his book as soon as he would get his diploma. This book would be with him for the rest of his life. The history and content of modern Greek literature is really captivating when it is unabridged, whole in all its evolution. How can a 'reader' talk to you with its limited ties?

"In selecting works of the modern Greek authors," Per Kalodikis continued, "we tried to provide large representative pieces that have a continuing timeliness, that cope with modern social problems, because this is the only way that literature serves our people. It is weird and unacceptable to give you only the words of a monk in 'Foteinos' of Valaoritis, that refer to the 'great idea' sermon--on how we will recapture Constantinople and become great again.

"They do not cope with the substance of this work of Valaoritis that is the struggle against the foreign conquerors. Where are the lines? 'Wretched Franks who fall on the carcasses as birds of prey--You are always the hunter, and we the prey--You do not know how I detest this scab--that comes each time and bites the country,' or 'better a noose around the neck than a knee on the ground.' This is the meaning of 'Foteinos,' and not what the monk says in the eighth ballad.

"You will ask me: Do you not do what they are doing? In other words, do you not put what is in your interest in the book, just like the others? I submit that it is nationally timely at the present time. What is our objective now? To get Constantinople back, or to break the chains of imperialism? We are, therefore, touching upon the present problems of the nation and project the works that raise questions and patriotically educate the reader and the student."

Myrivilis Confesses.....

In 1958, a group of intellectuals from Greece visited Rumania as guests of the Rumanian Institute of Civilizing Relations with other countries. This group included writer Stratis Myrivilis, Athens University professor Kourmoulis, poet Giannis Ritsos, Menelaos Loundemis and writer Maria Rilli. The refugee organization got in touch with them and asked them to visit their club to meet and get to know the Greek political refugees. They gladly accepted the meeting we proposed to them and it was set to take place after they would finish their tour in Rumania and they would be taken to the meeting by their Rumanian colleague escorts. Among



the cities they visited was the city of Cluj, second city of Rumania after Bucharest and one of the more important university centers of the country. At that time, 100 Greek students were studying there. They went to meet the Greek visitors and invited them to their refugee club.

When the meeting materialized in a few days in Bucharest, among other patriotic words, Myrivilis emphatically said: "You are Greeks, from the meat and bones of our people and you must come to the motherland as soon as possible." He also added these words that were typical of that period and that began to melt the ice of dissension and prejudice: "I would like to make a confession at this point. When the Greek students came to Cluj to invite us to the club, I accepted with the sly thought that I am going to see if these children are still true Greeks and if they are being educated as Greeks. Whatever you may say, a doubt was secretly burning inside of me.

"We went to the club. The children, boys and girls surrounded us and continuously would ask about Greece, if we had a Greek book, anything, even a postcard, something Greek. And one, the smallest student told me with tears in his eyes: 'Barba, take us to Greece! We want to go to our motherland.' The way this young man said it and the spontaneous and unique approval from all the others touched me, it touched all of us. And yet, the affliction of sly doubt did not leave me. I thought of doing something to test them further. 'Hey children,' I said suddenly, 'as long as we are gathered here and are saying so many nice things about our country, why do we not sing our National Anthem?' This is the way I would catch them, I thought. But before I could complete my thought, a quick stir among them and in no time an entire choir formed in front of my open eyes with the choir director in front and they began, beautifully, indeed very beautifully to sing: 'I know you from sight...' Well, that is when I surrendered. Tears came to my eyes and I told myself: Yes, they are indeed Greeks! Yes, dear ones, you are Greek and we will tell the Greek government about it."

Later, writer Maria Ralli writes in the magazine "Nea Estia" these lines about the Greek character and the Greek refugees longing to return, as she lived it during that meeting in Bucharest:

"...When I left Bucharest, I took a piece of a large offering that they call Greece with me. This offering is operating in the hearts of 7,000 wounded Greek hearts... When I returned from Rumania and brought their emotion in my grasp, I hold it as one takes the holy bread from the hand of the bishop. I will never forget the welcome they had for us at their club. Myrivilis talked to them patriotically, with love. Kourmoulis did the same thing. They were not listening, they were tasting the words. At the end of this meeting, the gathering became a large flagship that was sailing after a long separation and was returning back to port. We left without any joints, with our hearts ground to dust and with the promise to bring the voice of their longing to the government. But the



bitter taste of foreign settlement, however, cannot be transported. It is something that poisons you on the spot."

#### Epilog

The dialog with Messrs Periklis Kalodikis and Thanasis Mitsopoulos has no end. The memories of 30 years life in foreign lands were inexhaustible fountainheads. The first one gives us, in motion picture speed, the phases of his education in the University of Athens, the first years of teaching in Greece. The later persecutions by Metaxas and the "government" of Logothetopoulos, the epic of the National Resistance, the civil war, the flight to Yugoslavia and Rumania, the scientific activity in Rumania. The second one has a wound from the counterrevolutionary battles with the 306 Battalion of ELAS [National People's Liberation Army]. He talks about these battles in his book with the same title. He continues the memories with the organization of Greek education in all the socialist countries. He started as a teacher, self-made. He graduated from the school of philosophy of the University of Bucharest. Periklis Kalodikis is waiting together with so many others for recognition of the time he spent for the education of the Greek refugee children in foreign lands as being eligible for pension. Then. Mitsopoulos is waiting for his degree to be recognized as being of equal value by the University of Athens and indeed during a time when thousands of Greeks are seeking positions in a Rumanian university.

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## KKE-INTERIOR CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY ADDRESSES FESTIVAL

Athens I AVGI in Greek 25, 26 Sep 79

[25 Sep 79 p 3]

[Text] Below is the first part of the speech Babis Drakopoulos, KKE-Interior Central Committee secretary, delivered at the AVGI-THOURION festival. The second part of the speech referring to the proposals of other political parties, the KKE-Interior contribution and steady development, the unity of the communist movement, etc., will be published tomorrow.

Dear friends and comrades:

I convey to you the warmest fighting and comradely greetings of the KKE-Interior Central Committee.

In our last year's speech to the festival we had noted a certain worsening of the international and especially of the domestic situation. Today, a year later, we can say that the situation is even more complex, more ominous, and characterized by contradictory elements.

As we follow the development of our national issues in connection with the international developments especially in the Middle East, we focus on the suffocating pressures exerted by the United States and NATO daily and with increasing intensity on our country to make concessions to Turkey, at the expense of our sovereign rights in the Aegean as compensation for our return to the military NATO, as well as for the reduction to the point of complete elimination of our country's opening toward the Soviet Union and the other socialist states.

#### A National Front Against These Pressures

The American imperialists want to use our country as a steppingstone to the Middle East and our draft-age youth as mercenaries-guardians for the oil fields and gendarmes for the Arab peoples. All these are part of the American designs on the Middle East, following the momentous events in Iran. This is why the USA and NATO exert those suffocating pressures on our country. Today the situation is different. Our people are determined to fight to block imperialism's designs on our country.

The government, whose policy for our return to the military NATO arm gave the United States and Turkey the opportunity to exert this blackmail, is resisting those pressures. It refuses to give in and has moved to expand its contacts with the USSR and other socialist countries. This resistance must be supported and strengthened by all democratic forces so that it can be stronger and more effective. This is a position we supported and promoted with particular emphasis as soon as the disagreement between the government and US-NATO on the Haig proposals became apparent. We did this at a time when other forces of the left regarded such support of the government's resistance as detrimental, either on the grounds that the overall policy of the government was erroneous or that such support would merely raise the government's prestige. Such arguments are not politically valid.

We are pleased to see that this national front policy against the US-NATO-Turkey pressures and in support of the Cypriot people and their struggle is now being accepted by other democratic forces. Only the dogmatic Communist Party is against it.

This is a policy that we as a party have had the boldness to chart since the early days following the fall of the dictatorship, along with the struggle against NATO and the government's inconsistencies and vacillations. This is a policy we have never ceased to uphold during all the critical developments in our national issues and more recently with the intensification of the imperialist pressures on our country. This was a sound policy because any other policy would have objectively strengthened the foreign pressures while weakening the government's resistance, especially since we know that the extreme Right within the New Democracy Party and above all the junrist forces and the unconcealed agents of the United States are actively trying in our country to restore the pre-dictatorial policy of subordination. The government ought to know that to the extent it resists the imperialist pressures it has the entire nation on its side, while a policy of surrender would totally alienate it. At the same time, we must declare: Not the secret diplomacy but only the full information of the people, the Chamber of Deputies, and the political parties, can insure a sound course on national issues and required national unity. The policy of return to the military NATO, as well as the policy of authoritarianism and one-sided austerity undermine both the resistance and the all-nation unity. Also, the time has come to put an end to the activities of the junrists who openly declare their support for a policy of national servility and their hatred of democracy.

The government must reject for good the country's return to the military NATO and close down the military bases which have no reason to exist any longer. On the contrary, it must broaden its relations with the socialist and Arab countries, moving forward to accord diplomatic recognition to the PLO and allow this organisation to open offices in our country and to strengthen our ties with the non-aligned movement abroad.

## **The Government Instead of Cutting Down Inflation Is Hurting the Income of Workers and Peasants**

The policy of one-sided austerity which has been in evidence during the last few years and which is aimed at burdening the people with the hardships of the economic crisis, not only has failed to reduce the crisis of inflation but has instead intensified it while at the same time increasing the stagnation of investments and the signs of recession and threatening to increase to a high degree the unemployment which has already begun to hit certain categories of young professionals, women, etc.

The government does not want to see that the inflation in our time is basically caused by the effort of the monopolies to fix arbitrarily the prices of their products to maximize their profits and to resist the trend toward lower profits; also, that the inflation is further intensified by the reduced development effort, by the use of credits given to the big capitalists not in productive investments but in speculative investments; by the land speculation which results in profits of millions without any productive effort into the pockets of big landowners and land speculators; on the many forms of tax evasion, as well as by the unproductive expenditures in the national budget and the waste of public funds.

To cut down inflation, the government does not attack its real causes but hits the income of workers and peasants while limiting public investments to the detriment of the country's development and social services (education, health, housing, etc.). In reality, the government is trying to cut down the income of the lower income groups and to allow a greater margin of profits for big businesses so that they can ensure a greater incentive for productive investments. It believes that in this way it can cut down inflation and eventually strengthen the country's productive base. Minister of Finance Kanelopoulos himself, however, acknowledged during a speech at the Rotary Club that the profits of big business account more for cost-of-living increases than other factors such as wages or the prices of farm products.

While the lowering of wages and salaries and of farming income has no positive effect on reducing inflation, as experience shows, it has resulted in the reduction of demand with negative effects on the growth of the national income and production, and this at a time when our induction into the EEC requires that our country move forward with a concerted development effort in order to deal from a better position with the great problems connected with the induction, and in order to safeguard the interests of the country's working people.

Is there anyone who denies the complete bankruptcy of the government's economic policy? But this is not the bankruptcy of the policies of just one party of the Right but of the policies of all bourgeois governments until now. It is a bankruptcy of the bourgeois economic theory and practice. Our party, a party of the working class and of all working people, convinced



that the interests of the exploited strata of our population coincide with the interests of national economy and the interests of the nation, opposes the policy of one-sided austerity and defends the interests of the working people on the basis of another policy which takes into account not the interests of big business but the interests of all the people.

At the present stage of the international and domestic economic crisis, a crisis which as we said is a deeply structural crisis of the capitalist system and which is further complicated by the intervention of the energy crisis and the crisis of other raw materials, our country's working class, all working people, fighting against the policy of one-sided frugality, do not remain indifferent to the interests of the national economy. On the other hand, they are ready to participate in efforts to deal with the crisis, contributing their own sacrifices but under the following specific conditions: a) that they will participate with their genuine representatives in formulating the economic and social policies for the reorientation and the charting of developmental and progressive social targets; b) that the costs of carrying out such a policy will be carried according to the economic strength of each category; and c) that the purchasing power of salaries and wages will be safeguarded and that their increase will correspond to the increase of productivity, especially of those categories of working people who have insufficient income; and that the control of prices and profits will be assured.

The government, facing the growing opposition of the working people to the policy of one-sided austerity instead of starting a dialogue with the working people and the modification of this policy, is turning against the labor union rights and democratic freedoms, attacking the right to strike and the right of assembly while at the same time trying to exercise suffocating control over the activities of the local self-government.

Throughout this period the government has openly sided with big business, supporting it in all its anti-worker measures and especially in the firing of syndicalists, the terrorizing of workers and the mobilization of the security agencies on the side of the employers. At a time when we must have the democratization of syndicalist and overall labor legislation in order to bring it closer to the corresponding legislation of the EEC countries, the government is cutting down the syndicalist freedoms in order to support its economic policy. We should not forget that the government itself is emphasizing in its promotion leaflets adverse to foreign investors that it has the best, the most effective anti-strike and anti-syndicalist legislation.

Even beyond the economy, the failure of the governmental policy is complete in all other sectors--in education, radio-television [RRT], transportation, protection of the environment, the problem of land use, and the sectors of public administration. Characteristic evidence of this is the law on the forests, the few remaining forests, which are taken away from national control and turned over to the exploitative mania of private capital. And



also the innumerable scandals which are revealed daily in all sectors of public life, and which show that the administration is not only incapable, bureaucratic and inefficient, but also deeply corrupted and penetrated by private interest groups, big middlemen, the speculators and the various groups of big capital.

The working people have reacted to this governmental policy by their struggles which during the summer gained in intensity and sharply colored political developments. Today these struggles are organized on a wider scale under SADEO [expansion unknown] which embraces hundreds of thousands of working people in the public utilities, industry and the branches of commerce and services. It has programmed great struggles against the government's policy of one-sided in defense of the interests of the working people, starting with the public demonstration on Tuesday and the 24-hour strike on Friday.

The KKE-Interior fully supports these struggles and the demands of the cooperating syndicalist organizations which are being mobilized on a broad front these days. KKE-Interior, while supporting SADEO which unifies the struggle, is at the same time expressing its opposition to any further breakup of the syndicalist movement by establishing a new Greek General Confederation of Labor [GSEE]--a breakup promoted by the dogmatic Communist Party and the United Anti-Dictatorial Labor Movement [ESAK]--and supports the Anti-Dictatorial Labor Front [ADF] demand for a unifying labor syndicalist forces which provides the only positive democratic way out of the present conditions of fragmentation and crisis of the labor syndicalist movement.

#### New Democracy Policies Lead to Impasse

The New Democracy policies lead to a dead end and increasingly depart from the country's pressing needs which are determined by the level of economic, social and cultural development, and increasingly come into conflict with the people. This is shown by the unfolding popular struggles and the continuing slide of the government's popularity.

Under these conditions, the need to remove the New Democracy from power, to end the Right's monopoly on power--a monopoly which has been going on for decades--becomes evident. [Equally evident is] the need to replace it with a democratic government duly elected and capable of moving ahead with a program of structural changes and reforms of a democratic, progressive character, reflecting the country's needs and the people's deepest expectations. Today this is the country's main problem which demands solution.

On the other hand, the level of organization, unity and struggle of the people and the policy of the parties of democratic opposition and especially of the Left do not allow as yet the formulation of a clear-cut policy to overcome the impasse and open the path to change.

We must take into account that such a change will affect the key interests of the ruling class, the foreign monopolies, the United States and NATO. For this reason, it is a very difficult task. The big monopoly capital, the forces of domestic and foreign reaction in the state and in the economy will react with all the strong means in their power in order to prevent or undermine such a change. Thus, in spite of the increasing popular opposition, the electoral success of any opposition party cannot bring about by itself the real overthrow of the Right from power and the ascent and perpetuation in office of a democratic government to implement a program of change.

#### The Main KKE-Interior Policy Proposal for a Democratic Way Out of the Present Situation

The way we propose to deal with this problem with our main policy proposal, namely, the plan for a democratic solution, is the way of the broadest unity and struggle, the way of cooperation from this day forward among all democratic forces around a program of positive, realistic solutions for the country's problems, from the particular to the most general, a program which will raise the level of struggle and popular unity and which will eventually lead to the electoral defeat of the Right and the election of a government of democratic coalition based on the widest possible spectrum of democratic forces.

This is our proposal, our way, as contrasted with the proposals of the other opposition parties for bringing about the change, and even with the policies of New Democracy for dealing with the country's great problems.

We believe that any differences that may divide the opposition parties should not obscure the fact that there are broad areas of agreement which justify and call for their cooperation and for a joint effort to work out and struggle for the implementation of a democratic program. [This is needed] to create through today's fighting cooperation the necessary conditions for the victory of the democratic forces in the next election and for their post-electoral cooperation to form a government of democratic coalition, capable of staying in office and of implementing the program of democratic reforms the country demands.

The road we propose sees the election as a significant part—but only one part—of the political and social struggle and of the complex process which is necessary to change the character of political power in our country. It is therefore necessary to focus our attention on the totality of social and political struggles and processes including the election through which it is possible to shape such a force capable of snatching away solutions for the people as well as securing victory for the democratic forces and also capable of overcoming the resistance of the Right, thus opening the way to the steady democratization, independence and progress of our country.

This force will be measured by the number of people who support the Change, and will be manifested in one way or another at the election. The number of

people must be exceptionally large and impressive to win the election. But this is not enough. It must also be manifested at the level of the people's organization, above all, that of the working class in the syndicalist, cooperative and other social organizations, around the Local Self-government and within its political organisations. [It must also] be manifested at the level of unity of the people and the development of their struggle, especially that of the working people.

Yet, this broad and great fighting unity needed to grasp and solidify the democratic victory cannot be realized by itself, neither can it be realized by the separate political or organizational activity of this or that party, let alone by the efforts of a single party. [This can be done] only with the close cooperation on the basis of equality of all democratic and progressive forces and especially of the forces of the left for the growth of a mass movement, for a cooperation which, as we know, does not merely add together the forces which follow each party but leads to their multiplying. Some may say that such cooperation is difficult today. But the correct way, especially in our country, is always difficult. What is not understood today as to whether it offers a sound solution which will be accepted tomorrow, provided we fight for it starting today.

#### Cooperation of the Democratic Forces and the Struggle for the Proportional Electoral System

Dear friends and comrades:

We wish to underline that the people's mobilization requires the closer cooperation of all democratic forces. But such cooperation should not necessarily take the form of an electoral coalition or an electoral front. However, it may take the form of cooperation around a program of democratic solutions which will include positive solutions for the country's basic problems, solutions binding on all, and for which everyone will struggle, working together at different levels. In the election, this cooperation can take the form of a parallel struggle for the success of this program. It is important that, in this cooperation, all political forces and all currents of democratic public opinion which agree on such a program must be represented so that the broadest possible popular forces will line up around such a program in order to take away popular support from the Right and reduce substantially its strength and role.

This requires respect not only formal but real for the multiparty system and for the struggle against the theory of the wasted ballot, a theory which distorts the parliamentary system, weakens the Republic and ensnares the citizens within political organizations they do not really support but for which they vote because they wish to bring about immediate results of questionable quality. At the same time, it is necessary to wage a struggle for the simple proportional electoral system which is needed today to insure the equal expression of all political forces and also to overcome the climate of polarization exploited by the Right for its anti-democratic



objectives. Together with the struggle for the simple proportional system, we must struggle for the abolition of the inequalities in the electoral quota between the cities and the countryside, as a basic element for the country's democratization.

One argument presented against the cooperation of all democratic forces is precisely that the opposition will easily exploit it to foster the climate of polarisation, accusing the cooperating democratic forces of organising a popular front, a climate which would allow the Right to unify the scared conservative forces.

But this argument is rendered null and void if one looks at the problem of changing those who hold power in Greece not merely as an electoral process but, as we underlined, as a complex process in which the election is only one aspect. In this particular case, the main concern cannot be how the Right will react, nor the charges it levels against the democratic forces, nor its attempt to scare the masses. The activities of the democratic forces should not be paralyzed because of the real or imagined threats by the Right. If the democratic forces were to follow this road of retreat before the threat of the Right, they would be forced to be on the defensive facilitating its continuation in power. The main means of dealing with the Right is the gathering through the people's struggle of such a popular force large enough and strong enough to overcome the resistance of the Right, take forces away from the Right, nullify the conspiracies of the extreme Right and open the road to change. Our attention must be focused precisely on this great problem of gathering together each time and at critical moments superior forces capable of overpowering the opposition of the Right so that we can give the proper solution.

On the other hand, the problem is how to give sound leadership to those forces, how to orient them to struggle when problems are ripe and their solution is sought by the great majority of our people, how to isolate in this way the extreme reactionary forces, how to avoid untimely confrontations on premature demands which lead to hopeless struggles, to an untimely polarisation, to the fragmentation and defeat of the popular forces. This is an essential aspect of the proposed policy for a democratic solution, and also a lesson from the struggles of the last 5 years following the fall of the dictatorship.

[26 Sep 79 p 3]

[Text] We give now the second part of the Babis Drakopoulos speech at the 3rd AVGI-THOURLIOS Festival. The secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party-Interior spoke of the party's main policy proposal for a democratic way out of the present situation and made reference to the proposals of the other parties. Then he spoke on the party's contribution to the workers' movement and to the country's political life, and concluded with the announcement that "our party is ready to compete in the election using its own label, its standard and its platform."

This is the second part of the Drakopoulos speech:

But let us see what the other political forces propose to do to overcome the present crisis. To save time I shall speak only about the three major parties, without in any way slighting the other parties especially since the significance or contribution of each party does not depend on its size.

The New Democracy [Party] proposes its perpetuation in power as the only party which can safeguard both the consolidation and progress of democracy and the modernization of the country, thus preventing a return to the dictatorship. Nevertheless, the experience of the last 5 years under the New Democracy government--in spite of any differences from the old National Radical Union [EKK] which do exist, and in spite of certain positive aspects of its policy especially in the foreign sector--shows that the National Democracy always remains the party of the Right, that a significant part [of its following] belongs to the extreme Right, and that it remains the main spokesman for the interests of the monopolistic oligarchy and of the country's capitalists in general, with close ties with their representatives and with the special interests of their various groups. This party is in no position to promote the democratic modernization sought by the country, even within the framework of the capitalist system. For this reason it is incapable of dealing with the economic crisis, modernizing the public bureaucracy, or broadening and consolidating democracy. On the contrary, its policy creates great dangers because it follows the line of "assimilating" the junrist elements. Ending the monopoly of power by the New Democracy is a basic prerequisite for the country's democratization.

#### PASOK: A Force for Change Despite Contradictions in its Policy

PASOK, the largest opposition party influencing very broad popular forces, is a party of the Left with democratic, socialist, anti-imperialist orientations and remains--as we said at the congress--a force for Change. This is so in spite of the contradictions of its policy and our general disagreement on a number of particular theses and positions. Nevertheless, its central policy position to win the election and come to power to lead the country to Change by itself reveals a single-party attitude. It does not correspond to the present situation in the country, the correlation of political and social forces. It is not realistic. It bypasses all the complex and interdependent processes which must be fulfilled through the organization and unity of the people to open up the path to Change. No doubt, PASOK talks about mass struggle, calls the people to such struggle and contributes to it. However, all this fighting activity is essentially subordinated to the electoral victory of PASOK, which it believes can assure its election and stay in power. PASOK, by subordinating all other aspects of the struggle to its electoral victory, underestimates or ignores the significance of real cooperation among the democratic forces on all fronts of struggle for organizing the people and their struggle



and for its effectiveness; it also tries to ignore the steps the popular struggles must go through in order to lead to a firm victory for democracy and progress, and for opening the path to Change.

### Dogmatic Communist Party [KKE-Exterior]

The dogmatic KK after speaking ad nauseam about the "anti-imperialist unity" as the principal form of unity for our people at the present stage, recently has started talking more often about the cooperation of the democratic forces, a "cooperation" which it does not consider to be necessarily equitable or to include all democratic forces, and which it undermines and splits daily. However, in his most recent speech, KK's secretary general essentially set aside the "cooperation of the democratic forces" and placed it in a secondary position. Returning to older dogmatic slogans, he spoke categorically about the need for the cooperation of the "democratic anti-imperialist forces," meaning by this only the dogmatic KK and, charitably, PASOK.

This is, to begin with, a spasmodic effort of the dogmatic leadership to assure its participation in the hoped for future power bloc, dreaming and promising to its members a coalition government of PASOK-dogmatic KK, which will come out of the future election and in which the leading forces will of course belong to dogmatic KK since, in its opinion, "it is the party of the working class." One does not know what to admire first: the lack of elementary realism or the political speculation of the dogmatic leadership.

It is, secondly, a return to the slogan of the unity of the anti-imperialist forces as a direct form of political unity ostensibly necessary under present conditions, at a time when the situation requires the widest possible cooperation of all national forces to fight all imperialist pressures and more generally the cooperation of all democratic forces without exception to form the camp of Change and to be capable of winning. [This is] a basic precondition for victory over imperialism and for safeguarding the country's independence.

But, thirdly, even this cooperation of "democratic anti-imperialist forces" called for by dogmatic KK is undermined in effect by its hegemonism and by its demand to exclude forces it does not like, such as KKE-Interior. [It further undermines it] by its splitting practices in the various sectors, its inability to chart an independent foreign policy and a democratic path toward socialism in a democracy, which is the most significant element in the unifying policy of a Leftist party today in our country. Generally speaking, that party side by side with its policy of daily efforts to split up the democratic forces cultivates self-illusions among the people and in the segment of the left it influences, and it disorients the people as to the targets and the cities which are needed to cope positively with our country's present problem.

### KKE-Interior and its Contribution

This brief comparison of the central policy proposed by KKE-Interior with

the theses of other parties solidifies our belief in the soundness of our policy which offers an answer not only to the question as to what--namely, the target of Change--but also to the question of how--that is, the way of realizing the Change.

We said previously that today we see the justification of our party's position on the necessity to forge a national front composed of all national and patriotic forces in the country without exception. We spoke of the program for a democratic way out which offers a solution to the country's central political problem. At this point we wish to underline the positions of KKE-Interior on a series of other basic problems. Its positions on how to overcome the crisis of the syndicalist movement and assure its stable growth are truly pioneering. It is enough to recall our position on the complete autonomy of the workers' syndicalist movement from the employers, the state and the political parties. Today, this position is a key [to any effort] to overcome the difficulties and the crisis of the syndicalist movement, deal with the government-sponsored syndicalism, restore the unity of the movement and assist its stable growth and its effectiveness in the defense of the interests of the working people. It is also the key [to any effort] to open a democratic path to socialism, to the construction of a socialist system controlled by the workers themselves. Our party has particularly worked out this thesis, has given it great weight and is supporting it with clarity and consistency. This thesis is supported by the Anti-dictatorial Labor Front [ALF] from among the syndicalist organizations, while the dogmatic KK is openly fighting it.

We underline our party's unifying line in the syndicalist movement and its effective resistance to the efforts of the dogmatic KK and United Anti-dictatorial Labor Movement [EIAK] to draw the syndicalist movement into another split by establishing a new Greek General Confederation of Labor [GSEE]. This effort of the dogmatic KK and EIAK has been stopped temporarily with the help of the Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union [PASKE] and other independent syndicalist forces. EIAK gave up the separatist scheme for 102 unions and was forced to join in the broader line-up within SADED [expansion unknown].

Our party is the only party among the parties of the Left which has explained and continues to enlighten and tries to mobilize the working class [to deal] with the problems which will result from our country's induction into the EEC. [Our party] opposes the government's policy of beautifying the EEC, which tries to use the accession [to EEC] as a means toward the strengthening of the capitalist system and of the regime of the Right in our country, but, on the other hand, [it opposes] the prophecies of doom voiced by the opponents of induction, namely, PASOK and the dogmatic KK, because both policies objectively lead to the neutralization of the masses.

Our party, having accepted the accession to the EEC under certain conditions as an objective process and as a field of class struggle, has worked out a

program of struggle for Greek workers for the defense of their rights and the expansion of their conquests in the new conditions following the induction, and for fighting against its negative aspects. This program of struggle has been outlined in a special pamphlet.

The pioneering theses of the Greek Communist Youth [EKON-Rigas Feraicos] outlining and publicising a platform on the political and social rights of the youth, represent something new and creative in the area of the youth movement.

We finally note the theses of our party in the women's movement which is pioneering for our country--a thesis which represents a prerequisite for the development of an authentic women's liberation movement as an autonomous and significant factor in our country's revolutionary movement.

By now everybody realizes that our party is a reality for the Greek workers' movement and for the country's political life and that no force can eliminate it because our party has its own separate profile, its own unique positive contribution to the workers' movement and to the country's political life; because our party has a force of cadres and members which is smaller than that needed for a swift growth of the party but which is devoted to the cause of renewal and totally committed to the cause of EKE-Interior. With such cadres and EKON-Rigas Feraicos party members, the EKE-Interior has a force which, with better utilization and organization and with better mobilization, can become the foundation for the party's further development and for the widening of the circle of its cadres--more-over, because our party has a stable force of non-party sympathisers and friends (tonight many of them are with us) who are equally devoted to the cause of renewal, who have made and are prepared to make even greater sacrifices in support of the work of our party, provided we utilize properly their desire and their contribution.

These forces remain steadily devoted to the cause of renewal of our country's communist movement. It is worth noting that no one, either from the party members or its non-party friends, has gone over to the dogmatic KK.

With such party and youth cadres and members, regardless of any other ideological-political and organizational weaknesses, and on the basis of the party's sound policy line and the sound organizational orientation, our party has a chance to achieve an upward movement in all sectors and areas and to enter the path of steady progress. It is known that the attempt of the dogmatic KK to isolate the EKE-Interior under the cloak of the National Liberation Front [ELAF]-originating forces ended in failure and caused many more problems for the dogmatic KK and its youth than it has yielded in party benefits, because this was a scheme without principles and was insincere. It was without principles because it did not tell us on what basis this unity should come about, at what point views were compromised or what mutual concessions the participants made from their particular political programs and political views. On the other hand, it is insincere



because it merely tries to conceal the seizure and control [of the coalition] by the dogmatic KK.

It is time to stop the use of false labels in the country's political life especially by the parties of the Left which must be in the forefront of any effort to clarify the political life and use clean, honest methods and crystal clear formulations in the political struggle. It is characteristic that the objectives and methods of the dogmatic KK, the conflict of its policy with Greek reality and with the interests of the workers' movement, together with the ideological and political activities of our party, have caused fissures in the ranks of the dogmatic KK and especially in the ranks of the Greek Communist Youth [KNE], where a section of members and cadres expresses disagreement with this line and their agreement with the line and the theses of the KKE-Interior. Evidence of this situation is the unpublicized expulsion of members from the organisations of the dogmatic KK and KNE.

#### For Unity of the Communist Movement

As long as the split in our country's communist movement continues, the communists, the people of the Marxist Left and more generally the working people, will always be concerned with the unity of our country's communist movement.

It must be clear that the KKE-Interior rose out of the split which was forced upon it, its main objective and mission being a new, firm unity of the communist movement on the basis of renewal and modernisation. By its very nature it is a unifying party.

At the present stage when the two communist parties are separated by deeply ideological and political differences, the policy of unity requires, as a prerequisite for ending the split, recognition of the reality that there are two communist parties. [It requires] cooperation between the two communist parties on the points on which they agree. [It requires] exchange of views and a dialogue before the masses of communists and working people on the issues which divide [the two parties].

Consistent with this policy and confident in the soundness of its course, the KKE-Interior has never refused to sit together with the representatives of the dogmatic KK to discuss these problems. But the leadership of the dogmatic KK, having no confidence in the course it has charted or in the attitude of the party's members when they are not under its absolute control, gets panicky just thinking about such a discussion under conditions of equality, whether it is to take place in public or behind closed doors.

The KKE-Interior, clearly setting the limits for its relations with the dogmatic KK, knows that there is outside the party a wider sector of working people in the cities and villages, political cadres of the Left who have not been formally enrolled in the party, intellectuals and young

leftists who are interested in the ideas of a fighting revolutionary path leading to the kind of socialism where the working people will be the masters of its building. [These are people] who are interested in the ideas of Euro-communism, who agree with the political program of KKE-Interior, who believe in its pioneering role and who wish to contribute to the opening of this path through broader moves, without formally enrolling in the party.

Our party is in favor of cooperating with those forces, and already cooperates with some of them in the syndicalist area (workers, farmers, professionals, youth, self-government, etc.) and in the political field. But in promoting such a movement, such cooperation, we cannot imitate the dogmatic KK, ourselves making up organizations with fake labels. We want to follow the path of discussion with them to promote a political alignment on a purely political basis for a Greek path to socialism in which the contribution of all these forces will be precise and essential. We are also interested in discussion and dialogue with all the non-dogmatic communist forces on theoretical and other major problems of the contemporary workers' movement.

On the occasion of the festival, we call on all these forces to help us as much as they are able to. We invite them to join the ranks of KKE-Interior. We also invite them to support its effort from outside the party with whatever ways or means they can, in order to strengthen the front of communist renewal.

#### For the Permanent Solution of the Political Refugee Problem

Dear friends and comrades:

On the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the end of the civil war, the KKE-Interior emphatically presents the demand for the solution of the great national problem of political refugees. The KKE-Interior contends that this problem can be solved immediately with an act ending the whole residue of civil war and anomaly and restoring Greek citizenship to all those who were deprived of it unconstitutionally and by giving them the right of repatriation without limitations.

On the basis of the government's negative attitude until now, it is imperative that a multi-party committee be formed to coordinate the activities of all parties in the struggle for the solution of this problem. At the same time, we regard as a decisive element of the repatriation problem the transfer of pensions and pension funds to our country, which constitute an undeniable right of the political refugees, a transfer which must receive the support of the Greek government which has a responsibility to help with positive and realistic proposals, as well as the support of all the governments of the socialist countries where the political refugees of the democratic army have lived and worked. The socialist countries have specific and undeniable material and moral obligations toward these people.



## Preparation for Elections

Dear friends and comrades, men and women:

Nobody can tell exactly when the elections will be held. But we should not subject our preparations to the whims of the government, and in any event we should not be taken by surprise. For this reason we must relate the electoral preparations to the other objectives of the party.

To the extent we build the party in conjunction with the struggles of the working people and tie together and broaden our influence; to the extent we daily spread our unifying political activity in wider circles interested in the realization of the course we have charted in the context of renovating the communist and, more generally, the progressive left; to the extent we increase the circulation of the newspaper AVGI, to that extent we strengthen our positions for the next electoral struggle and we improve our preparation for it. We must never lose sight of this target of the electoral struggle and we must take from now on the necessary measures to carry out this struggle with the greatest possible success.

We cannot determine now what electoral tactics we will follow, but our party is ready to go to the election with its label, its standard, and its program. In any event, the party will go to the election with clean hands, while any possible cooperation will be limited to forces whose objectives coincide with our policies and under conditions which will not in any way cast a shadow on its record and its character.

Based on the experiences and activities of our party during this year, we can say with confidence that no matter when the election will come, our party is in a position to keep and expand its forces both in terms of votes and in terms of parliamentary deputies, so that it can emerge from the election stronger and ready for a new beginning.

## Better Than Any in the Past

For the last 3 years each festival of AVGI has been better than the one before. The 3rd Festival exceeded all previous festivals in terms of its program and popular participation. This is irrefutable evidence of the party's steady progress, of the progress of its youth organization, and of the warm support given by the broader forces favoring communist renewal in our country.

This year's festival should become a starting point for the all-around strengthening of the party and its finances, for the expansion of AVGI's circulation, and for its many-sided improvements.

The presence of representatives of foreign communist parties and youth organizations at the festival is evidence of the respect being accorded to our party and to our youth organization "Rigas Feraion" by several

communist parties which subscribe to the principles of autonomy for each communist party and to the democratic path to socialism.

Let us hope and let us work, starting now, to see that the 4th Festival of AVGI-THOURION will enjoy even greater success.

7520  
CSO:4908

## KKE (INTERIOR) OPPOSES INSTALLATION OF NEW MISSILES

AT091347 Athens I AVGI in Greek 8 Nov 79 p 1 AT

[Statement issued by the press office of the KKE (Interior)--date not given]

[Text] The press office of the KKE (Interior) issued the following statement:

Approval by NATO's Permanent Council of the U.S. proposal for "renewal of its nuclear armament and for installation of Pershing and cruise missiles in West Europe" is an action which undermines detente and increases the danger of calamity which hangs over our continent in case of a clash.

Specifically application of pressure against our country and a possible Greek acceptance of installation of these dangerous missiles on its territory would expose it to the danger of a total destruction far greater than those it has had to face to date as a result of U.S. bases and the storing of nuclear weapons on its territory.

The government, naturally, stated it has not been requested to accept such missiles. This, however, does not mean that such a proposal cannot be made to it in the future. This statement, at the same time, does not reject the possibility of its acceptance if such a proposal were even made in the future.

The KKE believes that particularly since the country is faced with coordinated U.S.-NATO-Turkish pressures the political forces, the government and the democratic opposition, must agree on two basic points on the Pershing issue and on the more general crisis being created in the European area.

1. The government must emphatically refuse installation of Pershing missiles upon its territory under any circumstances. This must be done both for more general reasons as well as because of the country's special position on the borders of the socialist world and because of the vital need to maintain and develop its friendly relations and cooperation with the USSR, the Balkan and other socialist countries.

2. As a member of political NATO and in view of the meeting of its Council of Ministers and on the basis of proposals being submitted by other peace-loving and progressive forces in Europe, Greece must also make proposals against installation of these dangerous missiles in Europe. Such an installation of missiles would only lead to a greater armaments competition and to an effort to reach a balance at a much higher and more dangerous level. It would not facilitate discussion between the two military coalitions on proposals for some form of balance at the lowest possible level, as supported by the government itself in its recent statements.

Such a handling of the problem would free our country of dangers from nuclear weapons and it would be a contribution toward detente. It is only through development and strengthening of this detente that small countries like ours can defend their independence and guarantee their progress.

CSO: 4908

## INTERVIEW WITH GEORGIOS MAVROS ON REESTABLISHING THE CENTER

NC061330 Athens AKROPOLIS in Greek 4 Nov 79 pp 1, 11, 14 NC

[Exclusive interview with Georgios Mavros, former leader of the center]

[Excerpts] Question: Mr President [form of address used in Greece for ex-prime ministers], how much importance do you attach to the prime minister's visit to countries of East and West Europe and later, in November, to China?

Answer: The prime minister's and other ministers' visits to other countries are today, as Mr Brezhnev said a few days ago, daily routine. In a matter of very few weeks Mr Karamanlis will have visited the Soviet Union, China, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Germany, France, Britain and Italy, not to mention his earlier visits to Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania. From this point of view the Greek prime minister's visits to foreign countries is not something new or strange. Whether they were properly planned and have produced the expected results is a different matter.

Question: With particular regard to the prime minister's visit to Moscow, how do you view this visit and its results?

Answer: The prime minister's visit to Moscow was a correct action but unfortunately it came very late. For the sake of national interests--in addition to economic and cultural relations--friendly relations with the Soviet Union should have been restored. This does not imply any change in our national policy. But it is unacceptable to maintain a status of cool relations with one of the two superpowers. Out of the 152 UN member states we are the only country whose prime minister has not visited the Soviet Union since 1917. Prime ministers of all the other countries, both West and East, have not failed to do so; Turkey has done likewise repeatedly. Therefore, from this point of view the long delayed Greek action has been useful. It has served to warm the Greek-Soviet relations to a certain extent. It is enough to recall that during the 1975 Helsinki conference Mr Brezhnev did not even shake hands with the Greek prime minister. This improvement in climate of the Greek-Soviet relations is the positive element of this visit.



Question: You have referred to a positive element of the visit. Are there any negative elements and if so, what are they?

Answer: Unfortunately, there are many negative elements. The negative elements have been created not by the visit but by the noise made in Greece over this visit. Fear that what has happened in Greece has exposed the seriousness of our country's situation internationally. The government bears great responsibility for this, and so does the opposition because it has cooperated in creating this climate.

Question: Following the prime minister's visit to the Soviet Union, can we today rely on the Soviet Union not to oppose Greek interests?

Answer: We can rely as much now as we could rely prior to Mr Karamanlis' Moscow visit. The protection of Greek interests is our own job. The great powers look after their own interests and it is with these interests in mind that they adjust relations with other countries. Woe to the small country that entrusts the protection of its interests to a great power. Then it is converted into a protectorate and loses independence of movements. From this point of view there has been no change whatsoever in Soviet policy. Also, it would have been ridiculous to expect that a mere trip could bring about a change in the foreign policy of a great power. The fact that the Soviet Union did not move from its well-known positions can be clearly concluded from the joint-communique released after the talks.

Question: Has there been any progress in Moscow in the question of extending our territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles?

Answer: I do not know if this question was discussed in Moscow. It would have been a mistake if it had been. Extending our territorial waters from 6 to 12 miles is not, in any case, a matter for negotiation between Moscow and Athens.

Question: What do you think about the prime minister's visit to China?

Answer: I find it absolutely natural, China is the biggest country in the world; it has one quarter of the world population. Its appearance on the world stage after occupying its seat in the United Nations gave new dimensions to world balance and strategy. One after the other, the leaders of Western and Eastern countries visit the People's Republic of China. I see no reason why the Greek prime minister should not pay a visit. The timing of the visit is a matter for the government to decide; the pertinent decision has been made.

Question: Irrespective of the importance, extent and content of its "multidimensional" policy as the government calls it, do you think that there is more room for expansion into other directions as well?

Answer: The limits within which a country can move are confined by facts. Particularly in the case of Greece, shifting from the Western bloc to the Eastern bloc is ruled out. On the other hand, a declaration of Greek neutrality or exit from its alliances and Western coalitions as well as participation in the nonaligned movement would be tantamount to immediate and unconditional surrender to the voracity of any invader who conspires against our territorial integrity. This would mean a national calamity. The Turkish chauvinists could not wish for anything better. What Greece can and must do is not get out--but activate itself within the European sphere--in doing this, and by other parallel diplomatic activities, it would secure the protection of its national interests and territorial integrity. We must not fail to note the fact that the Common Market which Greece will join on 1 January 1981 as the tenth member has the following goals: joint political defense, joint monetary policy and joint foreign policy. All initiatives by EEC member states in these fields must be within the framework of the European policy. Greece's exit from the EEC would, within a short period of time, lead to a complete collapse of the Greek economy and particularly the agrarian economy. Estranged from the Common Market--the greatest market in the world, which is linked with 58 countries in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean--Greece would be unable to find a market for its products. Therefore, any initiatives and strides in foreign policy must take place within the European sphere along with maintaining friendly relations with non-EEC countries. Within this sphere we must seek guarantees for our independence and territorial integrity to protect us against any dangers that might threaten us. Within the same European sphere we must seek economic development and progress. We must struggle for all this because nothing will be served to us on a platter.

[NC061400] Question: It has been maintained that Mr Karamanlis' repeated trips constitute a new "progressive dimension," that they are preparations for leaving the prime minister's office and rising to the presidency of the republic. What kind of developments do you see at home if Mr Karamanlis does jump from prime minister to president?

Answer: This is not as simple as it looks. It needs deep analysis that would take into account the correlation between the present political forces and the general state of the country. Because today our country is going through the greatest crisis in modern history,

Question: What are the main manifestations of the crisis?

Answer: That in our country the institutions are not functioning; I would say none of the institutions of parliamentary democracy. Mr Karamanlis has proved that he does not believe in the parliamentary democracy system; he believes in the one-man government. Parliamentary democracy as a system of government has died in Greece and unfortunately this has happened with the consent of the opposition.

Question: Do you maintain that Mr Karamanlis really aspires to become president?

Answer: It is definite that Mr Karamanlis clearly and steadfastly aspires to become president of the republic. The 1975 constitution has been made to his measure. The increased presidential powers were devised for his presidency and that is why the current president has not exercised any of them. In effect the country fell into a constitutional crisis immediately after the new constitution in 1975 came into force.

Question: In what sense?

Answer: There is no distinction between president and prime minister which are separate organs of the regime. Both functions have been amalgamated in the person of the prime minister. During the first 5 years of the republic, Mr Karamanlis together with his job as prime minister also exercised the powers of the supreme ruler. The president confined himself to ceremonial duties only. When Mr Karamanlis succeeds Mr Tsatos as president the reverse will happen.

Question: Is there a possibility of Mr Karamanlis not getting the required majority for his election as president?

Answer: That too can happen.

Question: Is there a possibility of new democracy deputies not voting their leader for president?

Answer: This should not be ruled out at all. With the announcement of the prime minister's candidacy for the presidency a crisis will break out in the ranks of the new democracy.

Question: What reason would PASOK have to strengthen Mr Karamanlis' position and prestige by voting for him as president?

Answer: This depends on what PASOK would get from Mr Karamanlis in exchange. That is, what price will Mr Karamanlis pay to secure the PASOK votes.

Question: What do you think these exchanges will be?

Answer: They may concern the composition of the new government at the time of the next elections, the electoral system, and maybe even other sectors of our domestic or foreign policy. In any case, the problem is a particularly difficult one both for Mr Karamanlis and Mr Papandreou. For such a deal to be made, one of them or even both must sacrifice something from his political credo. Mr Papandreou does not miss any chance to stress that his party is also a Marxist one. He also talks about nationalization in Greece, a country where the nationalized percentage of the economy is the largest of all the countries in the Western world, even those that have been

governed by socialist parties for 50 years. There are, furthermore, the questions of the common market and the Atlantic Alliance on which PASOK's positions are clearly opposite to those of the new democracy. PASOK wants Greece to be out of every Western bloc, neutral and in the Third World, in other words in the area of the Asian and African states. What concessions can Mr Papandreu make to these questions? And how can he support Mr Karamanlis for presidency with the wide powers that the constitution gives the president? And if Mr Papandreu persists in his ideology and slogans, on which the people voted him in, how can Mr Karamanlis make a deal with a party whose line is diametrically opposed to his own on the most vital problems of the country?

Question: Do you believe that it is possible for Mr Karamanlis and Mr Papandreu to compromise on basic issues of policy?

Answer: Only time will tell. Mr Karamanlis and Mr Panandreu have long ago given us the first taste of mutual concessions and compromises on vital issues of the regime. But I don't know how much farther they can go.

Question: What are these concessions?

Answer: A basic concession, and moreover of constitutional significance, is the government-PASOK agreement which even if unspoken is for the abolition of the parliamentary dialog, that is for the abrogation of the parliamentary democracy regime. This is handy for Mr Karamanlis and especially for PASOK. It has been announced that the prime minister's annual address to the Chamber of Deputies will be made this year shortly before Christmas. This will be followed by speeches by the heads of parties and the debate will close. The prime minister's next annual address will be made in December 1980 if the present chamber survives till then.

NC061490] Question: You said if the chamber survives till then. When do you foresee the next elections?

Answer: No prediction can be made in this country where everything is fluid. The responsibility for this anarchy in public life weighs heavily on both the government and the opposition. Although the opposition may gain party benefits from this confusion, the country, however, is gradually being led into chaos.

Question: You spoke about the electoral law as part of a Karamanlis-Papandreu agreement. PASOK has already come out in support of the simple proportional system. Will it ask for its establishment and will Mr Karamanlis accept?

Answer: I don't think that PASOK would support the simple proportional system today. A possible government-PASOK agreement will not concern itself with passing the proportional system but with not passing it.

Question: In your opinion what electoral system would best serve national interests under present-day conditions?

Answer: The stability of an electoral system is the basic factor for the smooth functioning of the democratic regime. The proportional electoral system is the one used in all the Western countries of continental Europe. If this system does not always provide a comfortable majority for a single party then coalition governments are formed. Only such a system could protect national interests because it also acts as a deterrent to any risk of polarization.

Question: How do you think we can get out of these dark prospects you have described?

Answer: Only through the functioning of democratic institutions. The Chamber of Deputies is not functioning. This is the essence of the grave political crisis through which the country is passing. This crisis cannot be cured no matter how many trips abroad the prime minister makes.

Question: And one last question concerning the elections; regardless of when these may be proclaimed: Where do you think the voters who used to vote for the center in past elections stand today?

Answer: In the center. The center faction has never been so necessary for the country as it is today. Its failure in the 1977 elections is due to the responsible nature of its policy, and its weakening is an anomaly that is pregnant with grave dangers. The citizens of the center remain firm and loyal to their ideas and to their mission which is the salvation of the democracy. And when the moment comes they will be ready to do their national duty to the full.

CSO: 4908



## OPEN PASOK-KKE CLASH REACHES CLIMAX

A1051315 Athens 1 KATHIMERINI in Greek 4 Nov 79 no pages given AT

[Article by Khr. Karanikas: "Leftwing Crisis Is Now Deeper"]

[Text] After lengthy and silent preparation, the open clash between PASOK and the KKE suddenly climaxed last week. Sparring between the newspapers of the two parties was succeeded by violent counter accusations, even though their tone was lowered--eventually--in an obvious attempt to keep the clash at controllable levels.

This open clash gives new dimensions to the country's political life. Of necessity it changes our entire political physiognomy because of repercussions both upon party tactics as well as on the very character of the left. On the surface the PASOK-KKE clash reflects the different goals of the two parties and demonstrates how little common ground there is between the two larger political forces of the opposition.

PASOK has already set attainment of authority as its main goal. It is striving to rid itself of its previous extremist slogans; consequently and of necessity, its policy is turning toward the center. It tries to prove its qualifications for authority which are considered essential in its effort to convince that section of voters which could give it a majority. At the same time, however, it also wants to keep its left wing covered in an effort not to lose votes from that sector. This is why it severely attacks the KKE and maintains pro-Soviet positions in its foreign policy.

Faced with such tactics the KKE is forced to defend itself. If it does not, it feels that it will "be pushed into a corner." Thus the only course open to it is to denounce PASOK's shift and to increase its intransigence in areas where it has greatest strength: trade union organizations and the student sector. In addition, the KKE realizes it is being used by PASOK for its own reasons, as was the case of the Chamber of Deputies debate on the EEC accession agreement.

All this means that the period of general well-being in the left, which was a characteristic of the first post-dictatorship years, has ended. This also becomes obvious because of the fact that only two parties, the KKE and the KKE (Interior), have now remained in the left. All

other smaller parties and small groups, which were numerous earlier on, have virtually disappeared. PASOK sides with these two parties to the extent that it insists on a leftist ideology, in order to hold on to its original voters and, primarily, to maintain the militant spirit of its youth.

### The Intermediate Area

The political area between PASOK and the KKE may not hold many voters. Under the best estimates it may cover 3 percent held by the "alliance" movement. It is, however, the border area in which the political prospects of the majority opposition party may be clarified. The harsher PASOK moves toward the communist movement to control more effectively its left wing and to attract voters both from the center and from the right easily. It is admitted at its own leadership level that a move of voters from the "new democracy" right toward PASOK is already observable.

In an obvious attempt to separate itself from older extremist positions, PASOK now very clearly refuses every form of pre-election as well as any post-election cooperation with the KKE. The communist movement clearly sees itself being indirectly isolated from the rest of the political world by these PASOK tactics. Perhaps this is also the reason why KKE leading personalities admit during private conversations that they are afraid that when and if PASOK comes to authority it will follow a harder "anti-communist" line than that of "new democracy." Naturally, it is expected that the severest clashes between the two parties will occur within the populated sectors. Recent strikes and student mobilizations were the first fields of action. Such future events will demonstrate how far the two parties are prepared to go.

What may become clearer in political life will be repercussions from the clash of these two monolithic organizations, PASOK and the KKE. PASOK, lacking the necessary means, is trying to confine the clash to the political sector, because it knows that this is the way to win more votes. The KKE, recognizing its weakness in the political sector, concentrates its power in the populated sectors. In the end we shall have to wait for the voters' reaction--whether they will confine themselves to movement between the two parties or whether they will also move toward other smaller parties of either the center or the left. We must also wait to see what sort of balance will be reached in the populated sectors.

Repercussions upon the left itself, as it has evolved in the post-dictatorial years in our country, will perhaps be more significant. In some way this is a customary confrontation between communists and socialists, one of the many which have occurred in European countries during the last 60 years. It has been historically proved that as the right becomes more democratic, the socialists approach authority and they become harsher toward the communists.

The PASOK-KKE clash, however, has another dimension in Greece. It speeds the process of questioning within the area of the left. As a first stage it facilitates the country's emancipation from the communist-anticommunist myth. With the exception of the KKE (Interior) only in certain instances, neither PASOK nor the KKE have yet dared restore the truth on our country's recent history. They are behind all other political forces in our country, with the exception of the extreme right, which did not hesitate to describe the civil war as "a civil war" and to accept the objective evaluation of that period.

In a second stage destruction of the myth about the socialist countries and particularly the Soviet Union will be speeded up. Recent exchanges of visits and direct communication will permit us to view these countries under their true light and not as "the promised land" or even as a place of "the damned." Destruction of the myth at both these levels could perhaps help the country acquire a calmer political climate. In such an eventuality the extreme right, whose game is being played by others, will not be able to incite fanaticism because fanaticism needs something which could be used as a scapegoat.

#### Questioning Within the Left

All these changes within the left will have repercussions upon its own ideological and organizational structure because they coincide with a time of severe questioning within the left itself. To the degree that PASOK continues to proclaim it is a leftist party based upon a Marxist ideology, this questioning will increase since the main representative elements of the left will continue to clash with each other. The problem with our country is that this questioning comes rather late, as is the case with every innovation. Any possible delay in time, however, does not mean that it does not have deep roots.

In respect of its extent it is still limited to certain theoretical magazines and is confined to small groups with a limited influence. Their critique starts from the premise that communism and socialism have lost the creative spirit of the last century. The theoretical weapons of their official representatives in our country such as their ideological and organizational structure, still remain within the framework of the last 10 years of the last century or the first decade of this century,

The most important weapons of critique is confined within the primary purpose of socialism as it was defined at the beginning of the 18th century, to the priority it gave to the political emancipation of the individual, to the conversion of the individual from an object to a subject in political life, in other words to the attainment of his true nature.

This means that the individual becomes a citizen and decides on his own free will on everything which affects him. The remainder of socialist goals, in other words, state control over or socialization of production

apparatus, the role of the party and the rest, that is which production sectors must be developed first, only have a secondary and supplementary significance and in reference to the final goal they are only important if they serve this goal.

In Greece and perhaps to an equal degree as in other countries, the priority of goals has been turned upside down. Apparatus has taken over the place of the goal which is rarely, if ever, mentioned by leftwing parties. The impersonal party has been placed on top of all priorities. It can and is the only authority to determine the policy to be followed. Through implementation of democratic concentrationism, since the time of [word indistinct] decision making was limited exclusively to party members and they in turn confined it to the leadership and, in a last analysis, to the secretary general. All the rest were turned into simple followers who had to await for the faithful interpretation of the scripts and for party instructions for every given instance. The liberation of the individual, and his conversion into a citizen were forgotten. Theoretically he was given the promise that when he reached socialism and communism then democratic concentrationism would be abolished and that this would then be followed by an abolition of the state.

In face of Leninism, PASOK officially separates its position since it does not accept it. In practice, however, it is based upon the same theoretical model. The party's organization and its leading personalities must have the first word before all else, even before parliamentary deputies. Its organizational structure remains as monolithic and concentrationalist bringing to mind the harshest periods of communist parties themselves.

#### Slogans Instead of Socialism

In this way in our country the individual, the citizen, has been turned into a follower. The promise of socialism has rather a messianic form instead of a practical implementation. When the parties of the left gain authority then they will bring socialism which will be limited to certain nationalisations, even though they may be questionable, together with many promises about increased consumption. The first includes PASOK's program in the alleged form of socialist policy, as for example: nationalization of banks. Yet to date it systematically avoids answering those who remind it that our banking system is under state control now by 94 percent and that this control must become even more effective. It is natural that in face of this position everyone believes that possibly PASOK is not interested in the implementation of a socialist program but only in the declaration of slogans. If this is true, however, then it is nothing but a movement of the crowd and not a socialist party.

Criticism of the left by the non-believers is no more limited to questions of party policy on local issues because, perhaps, they got tired of asking questions and getting aphorisms back as an answer. This criticism

has gone deeper and touches upon the very party policy itself, upon the fact that both parties completely refuse dialog and an open discussion on any issue. Dialectics, which is the essence of socialist policy, has long ceased to be employed by the socialist parties of the left in our country.

The only leftist elements they have preserved are certain slogans and some more or less basic theoretical values which they represent. The conflict between labor and capital has been demoted to war against every form of capital with only one modern element added: Now they have added multinational companies to it.

The study conducted before Marx and even by Marx himself on the role of various types of capital and on the particular influence of certain of these types of capital is entirely forgotten. The best we can hear are some of Lenin's theories and some others imported from the West about regional capitalism. Most of these are nothing but chewed cud without any basis on Greek reality.

As to Greece they even deny the obvious gains of the past 20 years. The most recent models both of PASOK and the KKE about agrarian country and excess labor potential date back to the decade of the 1950's. None of these parties took up a position on the more serious problems of environmental pollution. Between NATO and capitalism they only use certain innocuous phrases.

The clash between these two parties, however, cannot fail to speed up the questions. This could not have taken place during a period of calm and coexistence. Where all this will lead, will become clear in a few months. It will also become clear which one, if any, of the two parties will benefit most.

CSO: 4908



## EARTHQUAKE CASUALTIES, DAMAGES REPORTED

AT061125 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1100 GMT 6 Nov 79 AT

[Text] According to reports available to this moment one person was killed, three were seriously injured and many homes in Igoumenitsa and surrounding villages suffered severe damage as a result of a strong earthquake which occurred at 0530 GMT today in the Thesprotia and Kerkyra areas.

As announced by the Seismologic Institute of Athens observatory, the earthquake had a strength of 5.5 on the Richter scale and its epicenter was 360 kilometers northwest of Athens.

The dead man was identified as Thomas Dindoras, aged 73, who was killed when the roof of a house collapsed in the community of Ambelia, Igoumenitsa Nomos. The seriously injured were identified as Leonidas Dimitriou, aged 50 from Ayia Marina; Ioannis Pappas, aged 75 from Mazarakia and Simi Laza, aged 28, from Faskomilia.

Many houses suffered severe damage in the town of Igoumenitsa. The dock which serves ferry boats on the Igoumenitsa-Kerkyra line cracked.

Serious damage was caused to houses in the villages of Nea Selefkia, Ayia Marina and Kryovrisi and in the communities of Argyrotopos, Mavroudi, Platari, Margaritis, Kastri, Agios Vlasios and Karitsa.

The roof of the church collapsed in the village of Ladokhori.

Telephone communications and electric power were cut in the villages affected by the earthquake. There is no damage in Kerkyra Nomos. Only electric power supply was disrupted.

Tents are being transported to Thesprotia Nomos to aid the homeless from the areas of Ioannina and Salonica. Estimation of damage has already started by nomarchy services.

CSO: 4908

## ATHENS RADIO REPORTS LAUNCHING OF GREEK-MADE MISSILE BOAT

AT101550 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1230 GMT 10 Nov 79 AT

[Excerpt] This morning, the first of six missile boats that are being built for the first time in Greek shipyards, was launched at the Skaramangas shipyards. The new missile boat is considered to be one of the most modern sea weapons and was built on the basis of designs by the French shipyards of Cherbourg. Its length is 56 meters, can develop a speed of 35 knots and has as much firepower as a Corvette. The other five missile boats that are being built at Skaramangas will begin being delivered at the rate of one every 4 months. As chairman of the shipyards Drakopoulos stressed, the Greek shipyards of Skaramangas are now in a position even to build submarines.

Speaking at the launching ceremony, Minister of National Defense Averof conveyed the congratulations of Prime Minister Karamanlis and the government to all who contributed to the successful building of the missile boat in accordance with the requirements of modern technology. Averof specifically stressed that the government defending the country with the most modern weapons, not for war but for peace and because it desires the country to be always ready and able to resist any designs.

The minister of national defense referred more generally to the Greek military industry and said that the industry for the production of rifles satisfies Greek needs both in quantity and quality. He added that negotiations are already taking place with other countries and with large companies for the sale of Greek weapons.

Minister of Merchant Marine Kefalogiannis also spoke and hailed the building of the first missile boat by Greek hands and praised the development of the Greek Merchant Marine as something that has a favorable impact on the country's economy.

CSO: 4908

## BRIEFS

KARAMANLIS NOT TO VISIT IRAQ--Prime Minister Karamanlis will leave tomorrow morning for an official visit to China, the first to be made by a Greek prime minister after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1972. Meanwhile, it has been learned that the prime minister's visit to Iraq will not take place because this country's President al-Tikriti will be at a planned conference in Tunisia from 18 to 20 November. [Text] [AT101530 Athens Armed Forces Radio in Greek 1400 GMT 10 Nov 79 AT]

KARAMANLIS TO VISIT IRAQ--It was reported that after his Beijing visit Prime Minister Karamanlis will, in the end, also visit Baghdad where he will be next Sunday, 18 November, for talks with Iraqi President Saddam Husayn. [Text] [AT131038 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1930 GMT 12 Nov 79 AT]

GREEK-ALBANIAN TRADE PROTOCOL--The Greek-Albanian protocol of the new agreement on trade exchanges is due to be signed in Tirana today. It will come into effect in 1980. The protocol will be signed by Greek Trade Minister Georgios Panagiotopoulos, who departed for Tirana this morning and by Albanian Foreign Trade Minister Nedin Hoxha. [Text] [AT061143 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1100 GMT 6 Nov 79 AT]

KARAMANLIS NOT VISITING WASHINGTON--Since we "belong to the West" and since we blame the West and particularly the United State with all adversities in our dispute with Turkey, it is very peculiar why we did not attempt a direct understanding with those who are able to encourage or recommend just solutions. It is even more peculiar that the "roster" of the prime minister's visits abroad did not include Washington. A crypto-pro-Karamanlis democratic newspaper, reporting after the fact, stated: "Well informed sources in Washington confirmed 'they have no knowledge of an official or even an unofficial expression of interest by the Greek prime minister to visit Washington.' On the contrary, these same circles observed, the U.S. Administration is under the impression that Karamanlis is not interested in high level talks in Washington. In Athens, at the same time, authoritative reports stated the Greek Government was neither asked nor sounded out about a visit by the Greek prime minister to Washington." In other words we are ignoring the most important factor upon which development of our national affairs may depend. [Text] [AT091150 Athens ELEVTHEROS KOSMOS in Greek 8 Nov 78 p 8 AT]

ANARCHIST INCIDENT IN SALONIKA--In reference to yesterday's incidents at Salonika during a meeting of followers of the "Greek Amnesty" organization which demands release of junta personalities held at Korydallos Prison in Athens, the Ministry of Public Order announced that the incidents were caused by anarchists and extremists. Approximately 5,000 persons congregated in and around the "Ilisia" cinema in Salonika. Approximately 200 anarchists originally gathered in the surrounding areas. They later increased to 400 and attacked police who stood between them and the followers of the amnesty organization. Many police officers were injured. Three of them are being treated in hospital. The anarchists then took over university areas in their effort to protect themselves under university asylum. They also set up road blocks. [Text] [AT13111 Athens Domestic Service in Greek 1930 GMT 12 Nov 79 AT]

CSO: 4908

## COMMENTATOR DISCUSSES CHANCE OF CONSERVATIVE-SOCIALIST CABINET

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 23 Oct 79 p 10

[Article by Ellert B. Schram]

[Text] There can be no doubt that the election campaign has begun. The parties are brushing off their old slogans, waging endless battles within their own ranks and wooing the voters like angels of liberation. It is the same old inevitable story when a government crumbles and everything is in a dither. We will soon realize that the inflation problem and our breakdown are caused not by economic but by political factors: the inability of politicians and parties to come to an agreement or to have the determination and strength to do what must be done. And no party is excluded.

The election campaign, which started with discussion of the Althing dissolution last Tuesday, is interesting in two respects. On the one hand, a fierce anger erupts among the parties that have cooperated for the last 13 months. Sharply diverging opinions and personal dislikes come to the surface, clearly confirming that left-wing governments, or the coalition of the three parties, are destined to be short-lived. This is a great disappointment to the left wing. They put the blame on each other, though they are all to blame.

Voters have had enough of such quarrels.

On the other hand, it is surprising that people are talking, perhaps for the first time seriously, about a possible majority for the Independence Party in the Althing. The members of the Independence Party are not the only ones dreaming of such a majority. Its opponents obviously fear it. Is this realistic? There are three major things involved in this matter.

First, the dislike and dissatisfaction of the voters with the government of Olafur Johannesson are so great that they will do whatever they can to prevent another one like it from gaining power.



Secondly, people in Iceland are fed up with coalition governments in general and their constant internal strife, which leads to temporary measures that do not solve any problems or shape any policy. This squares with what I said before: the problems this nation faces are political, not economic.

Possible cooperation between the Independence Party and the Social Democratic Party after the elections has been grossly exaggerated. It might not turn out to be a worse coalition than the others. It could possibly be better, especially if such a government had as much success as the old Restoration government. But nonetheless, it would be a coalition government, with all its shortcomings and subject to the whims of the social agitators who now seem to lead the Social Democratic Party. The Independence Party does not desire such cooperation.

Thirdly, there is the Independence Party itself. Is it capable of governing alone?, people ask. Is the leadership strong enough and is its policy strong enough?

Of course, the Independence Party maintains that it is. But we should consider that people have not forgotten the government that was in power from 1974 to 1978 under the leadership of the Independence Party and that did not succeed in the battle against inflation. We hope that the party has learned from the experience of those years, and the country as well. The failure of that government was caused by the political attitude of the working class leadership and by strained cooperation between two of the coalition parties.

If the Independence Party gains power again, its leadership will be stronger and more cooperative and its policy more definite, and it has a group of young people within its ranks who have close contact with the citizens of our country. That group must have more of a chance to be influential.

The main point for the Independence Party is to steer clear of social agitation and rhetoric and to speak the language that people understand without using fancy jargon. We should not fight with the other parties, but concentrate instead on making it clear before the elections what we are going to do after them.

It is useless to say that inflation will be cured without setbacks and without some drop in living standards. The people here know this and are no longer interested in leadership that deals in illusions and claims that it can do everything for everybody.

This, of course, does not mean a depression or that the Independence Party is hostile towards wage earners. It has called for collective bargaining and has appealed to the responsibility of all partners in

the labor market. Some people might find it difficult to understand what this involves, which is a struggle but not necessarily worse living conditions. It depends on how things are handled.

The reciprocal effect of wages and prices must be eliminated or limited, but with an eye towards the lowest wage earners. Such a policy has often been declared by both left-wing and right-wing parties but has never been implemented properly enough.

The Independence Party does not intend to cure inflation at the expense of the lowest wage earners. It is not declaring war on the workers, but it must oppose every leader of the working class who uses his backing for partisan political purposes and it must oppose the policy mentioned earlier.

This is my honest opinion. I honestly think that the wage earners in this country will join with the Independence Party or any administration that is willing to eliminate inflation with determination and with justice.

It is about time.

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## PEOPLE'S ALLIANCE STANDS ASSURE FOREIGN POLICY ELECTION ISSUE

Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 23 Oct 79 p 22

[Editorials: "Defense and the People's Alliance," "Oil Trade"]

[Text] Defense and the People's Alliance

The election campaign now beginning will involve issues other than foreign policy and defense. The economic chaos and people's fear of a complete breakdown in the wake of the left-wing parties resignation will have an effect on voters' attitudes. They must make up their minds whether they want continued disarray or responsible leadership. On the other hand, we cannot forget that the 1971 election was not a foreign policy and defense debate and that when it was over, the left-wing government decided to pursue a policy that excluded defense.

The People's Alliance firmly holds to its policy of breaking the defense agreement and states that Iceland should withdraw from NATO. The Progressive Party has always been willing to take a diverging step in defense matters, if it so pleases, in order to gain power with the People's Alliance, and in 1965 the Social Democratic Party joined with the other left-wing parties in a policy that excluded defense.

The most recent left-wing government was the last of these administrations since 1965 whose policy did not call for a decrease in the country's defenses. The foreign policy of 1949, which was shaped by Iceland's membership in NATO, was maintained, and the U.S. air base at Keflavik Airport was not moved an inch. Quite to the contrary, the defense army updated its equipment, and preparations for the construction of a new air terminal were continued in cooperation with the Washington government. The question arises, therefore, of whether the People's Alliance did not actually retract its policy in practice.

Recent indications are that the air base opponents realize that their policy is obsolete. They are unable to point to an option other than the one that we are living with, which can guarantee the security of the country and its people. The actions and statements of this group,

which has become short on arguments, have this fall focused on details regarding the presence of the defense base or their dislike for Icelandic police agents, who are only doing their duty and preserving law and order in the country.

The problems of the air base opponents and the People's Alliance become clear when we consider that the location of the country has put us at the axis of East and West in the competition for sovereignty in the North Atlantic, which is the pivotal point for our own defense and the defense of the Northern Hemisphere. Nonetheless, the voters are entitled to know what defense policy the People's Alliance will adopt after the elections, before they make up their minds. They must give a definite and clear-cut answer concerning this. Therefore, people are asking: Will the Communists set as a precondition for their participation in a post-election government that the breakup of the defense pact will be part of its platform? Or will the People's Alliance maintain the attitude it adopted in the last administration?

#### Oil Trade

The so-called Oil Trade Committee has completed its first investigation into reaction to the new arrangement for oil imports. The answers obtained were to be expected. Oil purchases from new partners are not immediately possible, but of course there are opportunities available other than the energy agreement with the Soviet Union.

Now that the guardian of USSR trade representing the People's Alliance no longer holds the post of foreign relations minister, we should be able to make the most favorable oil deal without prejudice.

The history of the oil issue shows better than anything else how Icelandic Communists are submissive to Moscow. It is only natural that people who suffer from such an inferiority complex vis-a-vis a superpower do not realize that there are other Icelanders who let frankness, not submissiveness, prevail in their dealings with other nations.

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## BRIEFS

POLL SHOWS MARXISTS DOWN--According to a DAGBLADID poll published yesterday, the Independence Party would win considerable support if Althing elections were held now. The Progressive Party would also gain considerable support; the People's Alliance would lose a bit, and the Social Democratic Party would suffer a considerable loss. The poll comprised 300 persons, half of whom were from greater metropolitan Reykjavik. Thirty-eight percent of them declined to respond or had not made up their minds, and DAGBLADID underscored that the poll should be interpreted cautiously. If only the replies of those taking a stand are counted, the Social Democratic Party would win 12.8 percent of the vote and 7-8 Althing seats, a loss of 6-7 seats; the Progressive Party would take 21.9 percent of the vote and gain 1 Althing seat; the Independence Party would gain 43.3 percent and 6-7 Althing seats, and the People's Alliance would garner 21.9 percent of the vote and lose 1 Althing seat. [Text]  
[Reykjavik MORGUNBLADID in Icelandic 23 Oct 79 p 3] 8743

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## CDA INSISTS ON INTENSIFIED ENERGY-SAVING MEASURES

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 9 Oct 79 p 9

[Text] The Hague, 9 October--The second chamber faction of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] wants Minister Van Aardenne (Economic Affairs) to come up with an additional package of short-term energy savings before mid-December. CDA member Van der Linden introduced a motion to this effect yesterday. The PvdA [Labor Party] agrees that more should be done but the socialists will only support the CDA motion if more government funds are made available for this purpose.

Yesterday during the general meeting of the Chamber Committee on Economic Affairs, Minister Van Aardenne made it clear that the Netherlands will have to save 5 percent in oil consumption by the end of this year over and above the original estimate. This saving, unrelated to natural gas, will not quite be the result of a lesser use but partially due to opening the gas tap wider. This happens especially at electrical stations which are unable to buy sufficient fuel oil.

Van der Linden found, therefore, that additional economy measures are needed soon. The VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] and also the minister himself have no objections. A decision about the additional package cannot be made until the end of the year, just a few weeks before the Energy Note announced by Van Aardenne will take effect. Therefore the minister did not know quite what to do with the Christian Democratic motion. He was willing, however, to take an advance on the energy measures before they are approved by the Second Chamber.

VVD member Porthof had constitutional objections. The Economic Affairs Committee budget will not come up for discussion until mid-December.

## Export Price of Gas

Next week in the FRG, Italy, Belgium and France, Minister Van Aardenne will discuss an interim increase in the export price of Dutch natural gas. The

minister finds that he has particularly good arguments for an increase in the contract price, even though three of the four countries are not nearly at the end of their contract. In a few months, the gas export price situation must be clearer, Van Aardenne finds, "otherwise I will have to come up with different arguments." The minister will talk exclusively with his ministerial colleagues in Bonn, Brussels, Paris and Rome.

The real negotiations about the gas contracts will be conducted by the Gas Union and the distribution services in the various countries.

At the moment, natural gas for Belgium, France, Italy and the FRG brings in an average of 15.6 cents [Dutch] per cubic meter while gas is sold domestically for about 18 cents per cubic meter. This appears from an answer by Van Aardenne to written inquiries by Second Chamber members Lubbers and Van Houwelingen (CDA) and Portheine and De Korte (VVD).

The Economic Affairs Committee estimates that the average export price will be 18.3 cents per cubic meter by April of next year, while that for the domestic market is expected to be 23 cents per cubic meter next year. The latter is dependent, however, on a domestic price rise about which there is disagreement between the minister and the Society of Gas Services (Vegin).

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## 'TERCUMAN' COLUMNIST INTERVIEWS JP CHAIRMAN DEMIREL

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 22 Oct 79 pp 1,12

[Text] Ankara: JP General Chairman Suleyman Demirel has given his interpretation of the results of the elections held on 14 October and the question of the government to our colleague Yavuz Donat, providing statements on the problems awaiting the new government and ways of resolving them. The discussion between Demirel and Yavuz Donat was as follows:

Donat: Mr. Demirel, how is the matter of the government to be resolved? How will the new government be established? What are your views and interpretations on this matter?

Demirel: I believe that this is not the first time that the government problem has emerged in Turkey. Nor will it be the last. With the 14 October elections, Turkey was rescued from a regime which was not in keeping with our system of government.

Now, a government will emerge from out of Parliament. The JP General Executive Board has discussed the matter a number of times... However, what we are talking about today isn't just the formation of a new government. A government must be established which can take on Turkey's problems. Turkey has always had problems — and always will. But the control over these problems has been lost. It is for this reason that the problems have reached such great dimensions. A government will be established such that these problems, which have reached extreme dimensions in Turkey, will be vanquished.

Donat: Is this possible?

Demirel: To say that it isn't possible means abandoning Turkey to chaos. It is possible for Turkey to resolve these problems. We believe that we can save Turkey from all the difficulties that beset her. We are certain that we can re-establish the control, which has been lost, over these problems.

Donat: In your opinion, what are Turkey's most important problems?

Demirel: Turkey has many problems. But if I must list a number of them, security of life and property, the rule of law and order, and the establishment

of peace and tranquillity head the list. Who will accomplish this? Someone is going to have to do it. It is just this which is the duty of the state. To say that it cannot be done is to accept the defeat of the state. I cannot accept this. If you ask when the state is needed, it is needed today. The government runs the state. The government which Turkey is seeking will run the state of the Turkish Republic, and will assure complete public order in Turkey.

Donat: What is the second most important problem on the agenda for Turkey?

Demirel: Another major problem in Turkey is the lack of essential goods. Over forty articles of daily necessity are unavailable. Some of these are products produced in Turkey. The interventionist policy which has been pursued has caused some of these shortages; in Rize, tea is being dumped into the sea, while it can't be found at all in other regions. Where is the tea? The state is unable to distribute it. The production of sugar beets this year was the same as last year's, yet, in spite of this, there is no sugar in some provinces. We have now a society where people are in desperate need of a few drops of fuel oil, a couple of aspirin, a spoonful of cooking oil. The result of this is people standing in lines. The government which will be formed must put an end to these shortages. Winter is coming, and Turkey is going to be faced with shortages of coal and bread. Turkey is already in the midst of a shortage of electrical power. During the winter, she will be faced with further electric shortages. At hydroelectric power plants, the water has gone below the desired levels. Important facilities have been taken out of the grid. They've sacrificed these installations to their slogans and their political posturing...

Donat: You've mentioned two important problems which the new government must solve; what others can be added to these?

Demirel: I would say inflation is the third problem. Last year was the champion for inflation, with a rate of 70 to 72 percent. This year it will be 100 percent. The volume of money issued has already gone from 77 billion to 140 billion lira. Without any plan or program whatsoever, they have tried to administer Turkey on the basis of whatever ideas pop into their heads in the morning. Budgetary expenditures of 400 billion have now exceeded 550 billion. The losses of the Economic State Enterprises are over 100 billion. None of the measures to fight inflation are in force. Production has fallen, they've gone to deficit financing, there are no imports being made, and they've increased expenditures. Turkey absolutely must put a stop to this sort of thing. The result of all this is a rising cost of living, the destruction of the middle-income groups, and the further impoverishment of the poor, not to mention the outcry of complaint from workers, peasants, civil servants, and small businessmen.

Donat: Now we've come to the fourth problem, sir.

Demirel: Turkey's schools: today they're in such a state that it's impossible to study in them. And it isn't at all clear just what's being taught. What I am talking about is not just education but rather national education. Education

has strayed far from any character of national identity. And the tragedy of the teacher-training institutes, which is enough to break one's heart, is there for all to see.

As for the fifth problem... it is the raids which the Economic State Enterprises and the cooperatives have undergone and the plundering to which they've been subjected. They've even attacked the state itself.

Donat: What is the sixth problem awaiting the new government?

Demirel: The citizen in Turkey has lost his confidence in the state, in the nation's future, and in himself. Events to the point of the inspection incidents and the raids on the till have greatly harmed the feelings of confidence and trust within the nation. No one can defend smuggling and corruption. But, also, no one has the right to say "We are going to fight smuggling and corruption" and then turn the nation into a land of fear and suspicion. If something is to be done, it is done without turning the country into a land of fear. No state can be suspicious about all its citizens. Whoever is guilty should be held responsible. The idea of everyone being obliged to prove that they are innocent died out a thousand years ago. No one should have to prove his innocence. If that sort of environment is created, then no trust at all remains. I place great importance on this in Turkey from the standpoint of production and of confidence, and thus from that of investment and of eliminating the shortages as well. Bringing back the citizen's feeling of confidence is a task of the greatest importance.

I think we have now come to the seventh matter:

Over the past years — many years — a significant production capacity has come into being. But today, in agriculture, in industry, in mining, and in tourism, only 30 percent of this is being utilized. It is necessary to mobilize this capacity as soon as possible so that we can have some production; if our production capacity is not activated, next year will be even worse than this year.

Donat: We've listed the problems; how is the new government to solve these problems?

Demirel: I've listed the first seven problems. I see unemployment as the eighth problem. The ranks of the unemployed have grown. We must open up new possibilities of employment. Hundreds of thousands of young people are without work. The rate of growth is zero. Investment has stopped. Yet Turkey's population continues to increase by a million a year. And Turkey's investment program, of a trillion in 10,000 different places, is utterly demoralized. Money set aside for investment has been spent on current expenses, and the program has been set aside. In order to create a good mood for the elections, money has been spent in a totally irresponsible manner.

I see the paralysis of the health service system as the ninth problem. It's gotten to the point where the citizen can't find either medicine or a doctor.



And the tenth problem is Turkey's balance of payments. In spite of all the boasting, Turkey's balance of payments still hasn't reached the proper state of function. There are a number of other problems that could be added to these, of course, but the new government to be formed will certainly have to be successful with these ten problems.

Donat: On what conditions does the government's success with these ten problems, and with the various other problems, depend?

Demirel: The conditions are harmony within the government, sufficient support from outside the government, an avoidance of the fear that "we might fall", and a courageous approach to the problems. And thus I have mentioned a matter which is even more important than the formation of the government. That is, it's always possible to make up a government by means of one combination or another. But, at the present time, Turkey is seeking a government which will take on and overcome these problems.

Donat: With the arithmetic of the Assembly being clear, will the government you've described actually come about?

Demirel: The days ahead will show. The search for such a government is a step forward for Turkey. The elections of 14 October have made it possible to seek a government which will be what Turkey needs, in place of one which has existed in name but not in reality. The will of the nation emerged in the 14 October elections. The nation showed that it didn't want the government which ran the country for 21 months; it showed its confidence in the JP. The administration which has resigned interpreted the matter in the same way and resigned for just that reason. However, the nation's trust in the JP didn't translate into great numerical strength in the National Assembly. This wasn't a general election. And in most provinces it wasn't even an election for National Assembly deputies. Only five deputies were chosen. It is clear that the will of the nation and the arithmetic of the Assembly are in contradiction. This is Turkey's present dilemma. It seems that those who are telling us "Come on, form a government" are forgetting that the nation's confidence in us hasn't translated into sufficient numerical strength in the Assembly.

Donat: Then doesn't the question come to mind of just what this election has accomplished?

Demirel: It has accomplished this: the balance within the Senate of the Republic has shifted. The position of Senate Chairman, currently occupied in an illegitimate fashion, will be recovered. The election has opened up the road toward this.

The balance has shifted within the Grand National Assembly. And the influence of the JP on every issue, from Martial Law to the selection of the President, has increased. This election also has brought about the fall of a government which had run away from the Assembly. And of course, it has made it possible to set about seeking a sound government. A great paralysis has reached its end, but the problem of forming a government has emerged. There is no need for

panic. The nation has taken hold of its destiny. He said "No one will beat me." And what were they all saying before the election? They said they'd stay in power until 1981. We've seen that the government can't stay in power in spite of the people. The answer to the question of what the election has accomplished is obvious: It's accomplished a great deal.

Donat: Can you overcome these ten problems, as well as Turkey's other problems?

Demirel: We'll overcome them. Someone is going to have to overcome them, and that someone is us. But we have one condition: We need harmony, we need support.

Donat: How can the harmony and support that you're talking about be assured?

Demirel: I don't know; it will be studied.

Donat: Could unconditional support for you by the NAP and NSP be a way out of the dilemma?

Demirel: The President of the Republic is holding consultations; the problems we've listed here, and the matters we brought before the public, have also been communicated to the President. I myself am to speak with him at 1100 hours on Wednesday. The government problem this time is different from the others. A government is needed which can solve today's problems within today's conditions. And here is another matter which goes along with this: The time is past when Turkey can say "We need a government, any government, no matter what kind." We need a government which will take on today's problems within today's circumstances. This is what we need.

Donat: If the task is assigned to you of forming the government which you've just described, what will you do?

Demirel: Naturally, the duty of forming a government would devolve upon the JP General Executive Board. If such a duty should be conferred upon it, it will consider what is necessary.

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## PANEL LOOKS AT NATION'S PROSPECTS FOR THE '80'S

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 7 Oct 79 pp 2, 11

[Panel discussion among Professor Dr Nermin Abadan-Unat (Senator), Professor Dr Tarik Zafer Tunaya (Istanbul University Political Science Faculty Dean) and Professor Dr Gulden Kazgan (Istanbul University Economics Faculty Teaching Member), moderated by Ali Gevgilili and prepared for publication by Nilgun Alacakaptan]

[Text] Gevgilili: The world is rapidly approaching the 1980's. This is a time in which all international life is undergoing great economic, social and political crises, and Turkey is sometimes caught in the middle of these upheavals.

The first indication of where Turkish society will be heading in the '80's will come as a result of the Senate one-third replacement elections and the five mid-term provincial elections to be held on 14 October. Nevertheless, it is seen at present that, in the short and long run, Turkish society will be facing even more problems, needs and probabilities in the new decade.

The purpose of this forum is to look at the major features of Turkey's social, economic and political structure on the threshold of the 1980's in particular and to try to evaluate where they are headed in the current climate of internal and foreign relations.

Professor Abadan-Unat, why is contemporary Turkey leaving behind its old social structure and taking on one which seems so hard to manage? What sort of structural factors play a role behind the conflicts or contradictions in the political area? What are the prospects for Turkey from the standpoint of democratic developments and transitions?

**Class Society Replacing Group Society**

Abadan-Unat: Looking at Turkey's present situation, one must start primarily with the fact that society is in the process of a "lopsided" structural development.

This makes it possible to set forth a lot of different stages of socio-political development which facilitate getting down to the reasons for the present conflicts.

In order to answer the question of how societies pass from a "group society" to a "class society," political science studies the conditions they move away from as well as those they move toward and scrutinizes the role of economic forces in this transition.

The "class formation" phenomenon together with the stages of sociopolitical development serve to elucidate the historical environment.

There are three stages in looking at the problem from this angle:

1. The stage based on "blood ties,"
2. An "authoritarian" stage based on institutions and
3. The "citizenship" stage or "democratic" stage.

In some societies, all political power derives from the relationships in which the blood tie prevails. "Kinship" plays such an important role here that all political authority is made up of this blood relation interface. Authority is concentrated in those persons of age, influence and most extensive blood relationships. A structure of this sort signifies the social structures of the tribe, clan and such.

#### Isolated Islands: Tribes

One wonders why structures of this type can be so important in Turkey, even a half-century after proclamation of the Republic.

The reason is that groups based on that sort of blood tie occur in society each as an isolated island. The tribal way of life still has not been eradicated in the country. The nomadic way of life is an enigma. We have it in the form of tribes which graze their animals in one place in the summer and live somewhere else in the winter. The important point is that subsocieties of this sort are engaged in an activity to pursue a livelihood in a society where land is growing more and more scarce. Authority in groups in this situation is the authority of the oldest person of the tribe rather than the authority of the state.

Confronted by the rapid developments of the time, however, nomadic tribes may gradually come to desire their own attachment to the authority of the state also. For example, the Beritan Tribe's transition to a settled order has even been the subject of a recent film.

The existence in Turkey of isolated islands of this sort, despite the enigma, shows that, after all, a conflict exists in the order from the standpoint of authority. Although the authority of the state applies to these tribes,



the authority formed directly by blood ties within the tribe is still an important fact from the standpoint of national realities. At the stages where the fate of society is decided, such as elections for instance, the tribal phenomenon may be a determining factor to a degree. Every political leader who visits Selahattin Firat, son of Sheik Said, in Erzurum at election time has the hope of attracting to himself those 17,000 votes.

Institutionalized authority, which is the second stage, is still somewhat behind in Turkey's historical development. In this form of authority, the holder of political power, even if he also derives power from the divine source, does not govern alone, as there are various institutions organized around him such as the army, church and palace bureaucracy. If there can be in the Turkey of today a sort of palace guard concept, if there can be complaints of the pressure from groups which depend on the basic institutionalized authority and of its not being sufficiently impartial, then the door on the second stage is not yet closed all the way.

The democratic experiment has been undertaken rapidly in Turkey since 1946 and is heading toward the citizenship stage, which the fact of power, not its vehicles, forms within the class society. Yet the pluralist structure, which conflicts with economic, political and thought interests and which is developing in Turkey in an unequal and unbalanced way, prevents the citizen from exercising his political preferences in a healthy manner. Owing to the principle of secularism, for instance, there were three associations for the advancement of science in Turkey around 1948, while in 1967, we had reached the point where upwards of 10,000 religious organizations were active. It may be said that a religion-oriented party like the National Salvation Party has largely benefitted from the momentum created by these expanding religious associations. On the other hand, even though the country has a Village Affairs and Cooperatives Ministry, it lacks an organized peasantry. The producer cooperatives have no political weight. In other words, while approximately 60 percent of Turkey's population has no influence within the pluralist structure, the remaining 40 percent is able to exert its influence in the most comprehensive way in the cities. Opposite the silent, unorganized peasant sector, we have the relatively advanced organization of the urban sector. Yet despite this inequality, we try to draw both sectors into the fray simultaneously. Thus, you see the imbalance here.

### Three-Pronged Structure and Cultural Vacuum

Turkey today is a society in which the three stages are intermingled. In a way, the existence in the same country of a social structure organized after the tribal manner, the authoritarian social structure based on democracy and the modern class structure of society created by industrialization explains to an extent the reasons for the growing pains it is experiencing.



With respect to the beginning of the modernizing process, Turkey has a 150- to 200-year lag as compared to the rest of the world. The first newspaper was published in the West in 1605; Turkey's was in the 19th century. The first publishing house which began operating in the West in 1450 would appear in Turkey only with Ibrahim Muteferrika. The pre-Republic constitutional regime was another of the stages which came late to Turkey.

The price for all these delays is being paid today in the extensiveness of the cultural vacuum in the country.

An evaluation which stopped at Turkey's borders alone would be remiss here. It is necessary to bear in mind the universal conditions in which the country lives also.

While the political development of the world towards the year 2000 was outlined in a report by the well-known "Trilateral Commission" of Westerners (which included President Carter before he was elected), one may contend that, in economically powerless nations like Turkey which are building democracy from scratch, the spigot of democracy should be turned off as much as possible. The rationale for this thesis is that the multinational companies which have established a network of economic relations on the five continents look first for political stability in the nations in which they invest. That Marcos of the Philippines is praised for having an authoritarian, constitutional, non-pa... regime must be evaluated among the implications of these facts.

The battle against the conditions sought by the multinational companies for the future of their investments which the developing nations must fight in order to establish their political freedoms is contradictory in the fullest sense. This dichotomy also elucidates to a degree the reasons for the conflicts in Turkey.

Actually, Turkey's democracy is on a rather sound footing. In spite of all the negative conditions, development is not so much towards the interim regime as it is committed to democracy.

Foreign Debt: \$20.5 Billion

Gevgilili: Turkey is confronted by a broad range of economic and social problems which complicate these crises in political structure on the eve of the 1980's. Professor Kazgan, which problems from the standpoint of Turkey's present structure, the society's internal dynamism and world development are coming to the fore as fundamental facts? Why does the Turkish economy have a payments deficit? Why are inflation and income distribution inequities growing so in the country?

Kazgan: The economic problems confronting Turkey on the threshold of the 1980's are much more serious than those of the 1950's, the 1960's or even the 1970's. The current problems may be divided into two categories -- external and internal -- for examination.

The foreign economic influences are:

1. As of the end of 1978, Turkey's debt to the outside world was approximately \$20.5 billion (the total of loan installments and interest). This total may not seem so great in comparison with the national income. With the loan burden at 20 percent of national income, Turkey is in good shape compared to a country like Egypt.

However, the true gravity of the problem is in the ratio to Turkey's export revenues of the loan burden and the time spread within which the installments and interest must be paid.

Turkey will not begin to feel the full weight of the loan burden until 1983 because of the rescheduling which has been done. There will be a \$4.5 billion loan due in 1983, if the burdens created by rescheduling are added to the \$3.6 billion due in principle and interest. When this sum is compared against the total foreign exchange income from tourism, worker remittances and exports projected in the plan, it is seen that a loan burden of 65 percent of the national income is what we have in 1983. This is an extremely serious prospect.

The dimensions which Turkey's foreign loan burden will assume in the next few years show that we need to export foreign exchange-producing goods and services at a much greater rate than envisaged in the plan.

2. "Foreign trade exchange patterns" are steadily turning against Turkey. In other words, the ratio of prices of Turkey's goods for sale abroad to prices of goods purchased abroad took a turn for the worse after the oil crisis.

For example, with 1973 as 100, the index showing the sales abroad/purchases abroad price differential is seen to have fallen to 92 in 1974 and 74 in 1978. The gradually rising cost of foreign purchase items as compared to foreign sales items creates two important problems:

Turkey has reached the point of paying a great deal more foreign exchange than it used to even to make the same amount of purchases abroad. Unless the country makes an enormous jump in income from sales abroad, indeed, unless it designates for sale abroad the commodities whose prices are rapidly rising on the world markets, it will be hard put to escape the foreign exchange shortage.

A portion of the national income produced in the country is transferred abroad by way of the international price spiral. In other words, Turkey is being impoverished as to income growth by the negative ratio of prices of goods sold abroad to prices of goods purchased abroad.

Since, in all likelihood, oil demands and worldwide price increases will persist in the 1980's, Turkey will not be easily rid of the foreign exchange problem.

#### Inflation May Reach 100 %

As for problems in the internal economic structure:

Internal problems have been seen to grow more serious on a broad scale especially after 1975:

1. Inflation reached virtually uncontrollable dimensions as of 1977. The annual price increase which was 10 percent in 1975, for instance, was 15.6 percent in 1976, 24 percent in 1977 and 52.6 percent in 1978. The anticipated price rise for 1979, meanwhile, is 80 percent.

Bearing in mind the expanded money supply that the election economy creates, it must be considered a great success if the annual price increase in 1980 even stays below 100 percent.

2. Economists in general say, "If all prices increased at the same rate, inflation would not be a problem." But the fact is, all prices do not increase at the same rate in the inflationary process.

The ultimately unwise price interventions which the state makes in Turkey further increase the negative effects of inflation on the economy. Such that:

The value of Turkish currency abroad has now become a point of conflict between the political parties. Yet in conditions of worsening inflation, it makes no sense at all to make out the problem to be the value of the currency alone. If one wishes to protect the value of the currency, inflation must first be brought under control. Otherwise, lowering the value of the currency at the inflation rate becomes not just inevitable but necessary as well.

Turkey is very slow about changing the foreign value of its currency in accordance with inflationary price increases. Thus unwise domestic interventions are added to the negative influences coming from abroad.

Interest rates are also left trailing far behind price increases. This blocks, on the one hand, the growth of voluntary savings and, on the other, the ability of interest to play an effective role in the selection of investments. It is a fact not to be underrated that in Turkey, which has a

lower rate of investment than other nations at the same income level, voluntary savings have declined in the 1970's in accordance with the national income. The difference between investments and domestic savings is one reason for the rise of the need for inflationary financing and the foreign payments deficit.

The substantial public production of goods in the country is in an extremely backward state, as prices do not cover costs. And this backwardness in the production of basic goods creates innumerable bottlenecks in the economy.

3. The link between income and work has been gradually severed in the process of inflation. So much so that the manager of a very large state factory may make less money than a smuggler or small shopkeeper who pays no taxes.

The deteriorating economic structure just feeds smuggling, every non-taxable field of employment and incomes with no link to labor.

The quality of income "to encourage work" has been lost in Turkey. Quite the opposite, the incomes earned by those who work against the economy have exceeded the incomes earned by those who contribute to the national income.

4. The severing of the income-work link is steadily disrupting income distribution in the country. Having a democratic regime which may be widely considered to favor wage-earners and peasants, Turkey has become the scene of a much worse income distribution pattern than such Far Eastern nations governed by authoritarian regimes as South Korea and Taiwan.

One reason for this is the distribution of resources in the economy according to the demand created by the new, high incomes. As a result, a lot of goods and services completely unnecessary to the economy have reached the level of production.

5. The country's failure to make necessary legal adjustments on time has brought even minimum wage earners to the position of paying taxes at a rate of almost 40 percent.

Especially in the income tax schedule where the highest rate is 55 percent, it could be said that the income tax in Turkey today has become a fixed-rate tax.

A result of the tax laws' gradual loss of meaning in the face of inflation is that before- and after-tax income distribution has become ever so much more inequitable. Excepting wage earners and companies, other free groups are paying taxes at whatever rate they want to. For a country with a parliamentary democracy to have a tax law vulnerable to all sorts of manipulations is not only a social disgrace, but a deep wound.



6. A fact paralleling the unhealthy economic structure in Turkey is the decline of the "growth rate" while the rate of population growth remains the same.

For the income growth rate and the population growth rate to be equal on the threshold of the '80's eliminates any chance of increasing percapita income. In the 1950's Turkey was 39th in the world as to level of per capita income, but fell to 40th in the mid-1970's. Unless radical solutions are found, there will likely be even worse results in the 1980's.

7. Unemployment is growing to incredible dimensions and a close guess would be that it is now at 15 percent. Increased layoffs by factories left idle by the foreign exchange squeeze will raise the unemployment rate even further.

8. It is clear that the economic problems are becoming grave from the social standpoint. But especially with regard to education, Turkey is a society far behind other societies at its own income level. Yet to be open to the outside world, to put the economic structure in order, it is necessary, first of all, to have a population with a high level of education and competence. It must not be forgotten that development, whether less or more, is directly related to the people within the society.

All of these are problems which have intensified in the 1970's. Yet problems bound over from earlier periods have been around for years. Of particular importance among them are:

The energy shortage.

The heavy burden of the transportation network on the Turkish economy.

An externally-dependent industrial structure whose input and investment goods are divorced from the internal market.

First Liberators Would Be Shocked to Death

Gevgilili: Professor Tunaya, with this clutch of problems which a specific process of historical change in Turkey has wrought about within the context of world conditions, what political bottlenecks, trends and alternatives does the country face? How has Turkey arrived at this point? On which particular points does the cumulative picture of crises make it necessary to act with care?

Tunaya: It is indeed troublesome that the picture should be this dark in Turkey as we enter the 21st century.



What can be seen, however, is that on the eve of the 1980's, Turkey is faced with a liberation problem just as it was in the 1920's.

When the Turkish Grand National Assembly met in 1920, everyone believed that liberation had been realized in Turkey. If the people of that day could come back to life and see what state Turkey is in 60 years later, they would probably die again of shock.

As in many periods, the basic problem before Turkey today is how the society can be liberated. And this requires, primarily, recognition one by one of the diseases strangling and eating away at the roots of the troubled tree. It must not be forgotten that diagnosis is half the cure. Seeing the problems clearly is the basic condition for writing the best prescription.

Turkey cannot be isolated from the world. The country's geographic situation adds certain qualities to its problems. The most important thing, however, is the need to bear in mind that Turkey sits at the crossroads between the developing and developed nations. To date, the more developed have not been seen to help the less developed in the way they take the leap. To expect such would be naive.

As for the reason Turkey has fallen into this situation...

The term "parliamentary democracy," which does not come easily to the tongue in Turkey, has a special meaning in the Constitution. Just as "presidential government" or "assembly government" system has a different meaning.

Under the republican roof, Turkey was placed in parentheses, neither democratic nor not democratic. All of these layers explain how the Turkish Republic is virtually a continuation of the Constitutional Sultanate.

The experiments tried have shown that replacing democracy with stricter authoritarian regimes is not the solution. In spite of this, however, views still abound in Turkey today which mean at bottom that "the 1961 Constitution is a luxury." According to them, it is impossible for the country to advance with the freedoms which have been provided and it is necessary to amend the Constitution.

Yet, it will not work to aim for changes which eliminate the atmosphere of freedom brought by the 1961 Constitution.

#### "Presidential Government" and Dictatorship

The "presidential government" is being advocated in certain party programs. Yet, such a system cannot add anything to Turkey. In a country which has fallen into a pit of such a tangle of social and economic problems, it is impossible to achieve a solution simply by rearranging the legislative and executive relationships. Moreover, strengthening the executive organ would

only strengthen its dictatorial inclinations. Amending the Constitution to institute a "presidential government" is not the way out for Turkey, which has tried, not just debated, strict regimes.

Democracy is a political regime which must be protected in Turkey. There are those who say from time to time, "The people do not understand democracy." Yet, the people's failure to allow civil war a chance, though they are constantly goaded toward civil war, shows very well what they do understand about democracy.

#### New Crises

Measures to be taken against the deep economic, political and sociological upheavals are not antidemocratic; they have a chance to succeed insofar as they are democratic.

To divorce oneself from realistic policies and to be captivated by certain low-grade thoughts is not to get Turkey out of the crises, and may bring even more crises. It must be realized that less developed nations cannot liberate less developed minds. The only chance of finding wise solutions to Turkey's basic problems lies in looking at them from the proper perspective and looking into them with the proper attitude.

#### Neither Authoritarian Regime Nor Civil War

Gevgilili: Professor Abadan-Unat, the 1980's seem to be a candidate for the historical crossroads when solutions to Turkey's cumulative problems may be sought, perhaps in different forms. How, during this search, may society be assured of retaining a democratic environment which is developing and moving forward, while avoiding great reversals and crises? What are the healthy roads to freedom for Turkey?

Abadan-Unat: Turkey's road to freedom is not in authoritarian systems. Liberation lies in a balance which further extends social justice but also is responsive to individual aspirations.

Today, Turkey has left behind the period of "raised expectations" and is heading toward a period of "disillusionment." Despite all the dark aspects of the picture, however, one must not ignore the fact that no mean development is taking place and that the democratic values are widely given importance throughout society. The conflicts and provocations of civil war in the society certainly are discouraging. But one must not forget that fear also can be used as a psychological element of warfare.

Looking at the point Turkey has reached today, the basic goal must be to prevent Turkey's losing confidence in itself. Especially, it must never be afraid of the freedoms it has attained. To consider the 1961 Constitution a luxury is cruel. In a country where even movies may still be censored, one must not consider the existing freedoms excessive.

One characteristic of the faltering parliamentary system in Turkey is that legislative matters of importance to society, such as the tax laws, are extremely slow to be acted on, while a move to amend the Constitution can sometimes take place with ease. Yet constitutional amendments, like those since 1971, usually bring only superficial solutions.

Today, such legal changes as would make parliamentary rules of procedure workable and modify the primary system in the Election Law may be considered at the first stage.

There are three major political trends of note on the subject of political power, neither of which seems likely to resolve the problems:

The first trend calls for unification of the two major political parties. Yet even if the Justice Party and the RPP merged momentarily, it could be no more than just a temporary experiment.

The question may be not so much unification of the two major parties as their learning to help each other. Violent polarization is not necessary. For example, the climate of courtesy in Sweden, where only one seat makes the difference between power and opposition, ought to be an interesting example for Turkey.

"Interim regime" rumors are still making the rounds like a phantom in the country. This route can resolve nothing for society either.

#### Presidential System Not Easy to Implement

There are also circles which contend that Turkey would be better off with the "presidential government" system based on creating a stronger executive by combining the freedom to act with the position of head of state. To date, this system has been practiced successfully only in the United States -- for historical reasons (springing from reaction to the British monarchy). All implementations of the presidential system in Latin America and the Far East have gradually turned into dictatorship.

The French-type, semipresidential system requires a sound political environment based on the social classes in which all the political parties are rooted. These prerequisites do not exist in Turkey.

In proposing solutions, it is necessary to bear in mind the political and social structure which exists in Turkey today. The following incident which occurred in Konya, for instance, shows once more the kind of deep thought that is required:

A voter in Konya asked the spokesman for one party: "If the gray horse wins, will he fight with his colts?"

When the voter was asked what the colts were, he replied: "The Council of State, the Audit Office, the Supreme Court..."

It is now imperative in Turkey to get rid of cheap political rhetoric and initiate a period of honest searching for the radical solutions which the structure requires.

#### Democracy and Rapid Growth Necessary

Gevgilili: The problems at the economic level may be found to have a probably interesting interaction with Turkey's political and social preferences. What social and political forecasts can be made for the Turkey of the '80's in view of the economic requirements, Professor Kazgan? From the standpoint of Turkey's development dynamics, what sort of features will economic solutions have to have in the long run?

Kazgan: To predict the future, it is necessary first to agree on the wisdom of two basic values:

1. Turkey will remain a parliamentary democracy in the '80's. One must expect to look for solutions to all the problems within this framework. For this reason, it is necessary to give prompt thought to how strong, stable governments may be formed in the existing regime. Even though the best possible prescriptions are found, they cannot be duly carried out unless we have stable governments.
2. Turkey is a nation which absolutely must move ahead at a rapid pace with its economic development in the 1980's.

It is necessary to think about any proposals for economic policies within these two frameworks.

First, the planning method now practiced must be changed. In the plans made to date, a goal has first been set for a specific rate of national income growth, then the dimensions needed to achieve this goal have been worked out, and investment distribution and project evaluations made. Yet experience in the latter '70's has shown that the envisaged rate of development is not realized unless specific foreign exchange goals are met.

This means that it has now become necessary to set a specific foreign exchange income goal first, not a specific rate of growth, in planning.

In the distribution of investments, it is important from the standpoint of planning to give priority to projects which open up the economy, earn foreign exchange, break the energy bottleneck (by using hydraulic power before nuclear energy), point transportation toward mass transit, and increase the general skills and competence of the people. Otherwise, a plan calculated to give priority to the manufacturing industry of the moment has very little meaning.



Unnecessary state intervention in the market economy must be gradually prevented. Interference by Turkish governments in every area from the price of margarine to the foreign exchange rate, from interest rates to the price of cement without first discovering the price needed for balance leads to speculation in the economy, the formation of unnecessary middleman profits and large imbalances in the distribution of investable funds.

Only state interventions concerned with investment funds for transfer to specific projects make any sense.

It is necessary also that the amount of funds to be transferred to specific projects be decided within the framework of principles set forth in the plan, not in accordance with personal judgments.

In a nation where the market economy conditions are this erratic, breakdowns in resource and income distribution must be considered run of the mill. It must not be forgotten that even socialist countries like Yugoslavia and Hungary make use of market economy mechanisms at certain stages.

Another priority problem is curbing the rate of inflation. Turkey's frequent entry into the election economy climate exacerbates inflation. Prior to the elections, the governments expand the money supply in order to give something to everybody. This fact may bring to mind a solution wherein a new election law should be passed to prevent the country's frequent entry into the election economy atmosphere, making coalition governments more difficult.

As it is not possible to halt inflation in the short term, it is necessary to take quite serious measures just to slow it down. And these measures will naturally meet stiff resistance from predictable groups. At the first move to restrict the credit volume, for instance, the entire business sector will raise its voice. When interest rates are raised to realistic levels, the banks will protest that they are losing their profits.

In order not to push discontent in the society to undesirable points, it is necessary to cut the rate of inflation slowly. But even slowing the rate alone is a kind of strength in itself.

#### Public and Taxes

The use of public resources is also a basic problem. If the largest investment errors in Turkey are made in the public sector, an important reason for this is that the people who "make the decisions" are not made responsible for the cost of the investment.

It is necessary under the new conditions that the large investment errors in the public sector be rectified with priority. If the rate of development is not sufficiently high at the end of the '70's, the reason is the funds squandered in the public sector.



It is possible to avoid repeating the same mistakes by disciplining public investments and integrating decision-making and responsibility. It is especially necessary to take measures which will make the Public Economic Enterprises independent of the political administrations.

There is an urgent need for revision of the Turkish tax system, which has eliminated any incentive to work.

Certain institutional changes must be made also in order to make Turkey an open, foreign exchange-earning nation. For instance:

1. The foreign exchange rate must be removed from politics. Foreign exchange cannot be earned by keeping the foreign exchange rate at artificial levels. From the standpoint of bringing the double exchange rate system practiced today to a more rational situation, attaching the second exchange rate to a floating system may be considered. In other words, while the basic goods necessary to the economy are purchased abroad on a controlled foreign exchange market, it is possible to sell products which are competitive on the foreign market at the controlled exchange rate and sell noncompetitive products at the floating rate.
2. Institutional changes must be made also to eliminate the high risk in exportation. Introducing export insurance and eliminating the risks brought about by the Turkish currency-protection law may be envisaged, for instance.
3. Production of the labor-intensive commodities thought to be competitive on the foreign market is in disarray. When there is heavy demand abroad, we have variations in quality among the products collected from different producers. Under these circumstances, it is necessary to stress export-oriented production methods. One way may be to organize firms in the framework of large export companies.

Moreover, voluntary savings must absolutely be supported in Turkey. It is necessary to keep interest rates at realistic levels and to have capital market legislation for this purpose. It must not be forgotten that the formation of a capital market creates an environment which reduces the inflationary effects of expanding the money supply. Anybody with money in Turkey today looks to buy, not to longer-term values, and this raises prices.

Importance must be given to slowing down the rate of population growth. If the necessary information on birth control methods were disseminated throughout the society, this goal would be more easily reached.

Gevgilili: Sooner or later, Turkey will find its own way. The important thing at the moment is what might be the best way to find it with the least distress. Professor Tunaya, using this approach, how much might Turkey's constitutional order and social structure be changed? What sort of organic ties might exist between the roots of the crisis and the means of resolving the problems?

## People Have Sense of Responsibility

Tunaya: In a society experiencing crisis, it is necessary first of all to be aware of what is going on internally and externally. If there is a question of disillusionment or a specific fear in Turkey, it is because the conditions within which it is occurring are not fully known.

Several large news agencies cover the world today. The developed nations are able to set up the conditions they desire in the less developed nations according to their own interests. Despite the Helsinki Accords, the less developed nations are under externally-imposed restrictions.

As for the problem of understanding the nation's internal structure:

Ismet Inonu said something in the 1930's when the Sivas railroad was opened that is largely indicative in this regard. Ismet Inonu recalled, "When the tithe was lifted, the peasants came and asked whether the state had other income," and he added, "In this country, it is necessary to govern knowing that there is a prime minister in every village."

Democracy creates a climate of optimism because it is, at bottom, a regime which values and trusts people. But this is not to say that promises should supercede realities or that things should be made out to be what they are not. Quite the opposite, it is well in democracy to keep the people fully informed.

Indeed, if there are even criticisms in the society about the delay in liquid fuel price increases in Turkey and about how low railroad fares are, it shows that there is a definite social responsibility among the people. And this responsibility must be taken as basic in the administration of the state, and the dialogue carried on with those who govern must take a positive line.

## Presidential Regime or Coalition?

Solutions of the sort proposed in the constitutional plan in order to escape from the negative conditions of the election economy such as abolishing interim elections or holding elections less often will be of no use, because even though interim elections do not make major changes, they are a way of taking a pulse-reading. It is not interim elections which inspire erroneous policies but erroneous policies which corrupt interim elections.

It is the cultural and qualitative development in modern society which these erroneous policies would eliminate.

A coalition government becomes necessary when one party is unable to form a majority administration on its own. It is a fact that the structural pluralism in Turkey is ultimately reflected in the political structure. And the need for coalitions will disappear only with changes in the social structure.

The "presidential government" system is really practiced only in the United States (though it is debatable how well it works). That country has a federal state structure, that is, not a singular but a pluralist structure.

Yet, it is seen in singular states, especially ones with a less developed structure, that if a presidential government is adopted, they immediately begin acting like a dictatorship.

As for "semipresidential regimes," they are an imitation of the presidential regime, and, especially in Latin America, have led to veiled dictatorships. History shows that these administrations have been unable to improve their less developed structures.

Turkey's governments, with certain exceptions, have not generally been weak. Perhaps some measures may be considered to facilitate the functioning and predominance of parliament. For instance, it may even be useful for Turkey, in connection with the majority envisaged for the meeting of parliament, to amend the parliamentary rules of procedure or even the Constitution itself so as to improve its social power and quality. But a solution for Turkey cannot be found in presidential or semipresidential regimes.

The gradual growth of party discipline in Turkey has the effect of also strengthening the governments. When the 1924 Constitution was written, even Atatürk was not granted excessive authority. He was not given the authority to dissolve the Assembly. It would be much better, from the historical standpoint, to look to strengthening the houses of parliament.

Toward: What?

Gevgilili: The forum to appraise the general overview of Turkey on the threshold of the 1980's has set forth the following results:

1. The Turkish society of today does not have a uniform structure. In addition to the elements which spring from the traditionalist structure in itself, there are visible defects in the institutional area and, though new roads are being taken, civil rights -- the final stage outstanding in the democratic development of Turkey -- have yet to be firmly entrenched.

Within this three-pronged sociopolitical structure, occasional conflicts and developments which stumble over each other occur; Turkey is beset by the difficulties of assuming a modern identity. Nevertheless, the direction of this development is towards ensuring the general development of democratic rights and freedoms in Turkey.

2. Turkey is face to face with important growing pains and problems from the economic standpoint. The largely externally-dependent economic structure is producing foreign debt burdens and the foreign payment crunch. And on the international level, the foreign trade patterns, which work to the

benefit of the developed nations, are pushing the nations in Turkey's position into a situation which each year is a little worse than the year before, forcing a growing portion of national income to be transferred abroad.

Disorders at the political and social level make it difficult for suitable policies to evolve, and state interference in the economy increase the disarray from another direction. As a result, we have an unhealthy structure with mounting inflation and poor utilization of resources.

3. The problem before Turkey has characteristics similar to the famed "How shall we be saved?" question just prior to the Republic. In the 1920's, Turkey saw that it had fallen into a situation in which it was bound hand and foot by serious internal and external conditions. However, the crisis of today is not exactly the same as the crisis of yesterday. The society has come a long way, it has achieved institutional advances in the social and political field and has established to a significant degree a constitutional structure requiring a democratic order.

4. The dilemma of the 1980's is how Turkey will take what it has accomplished so far and redirect it to meet the new problems. There is broad agreement on the view that the expected results cannot be obtained through changes to introduce a presidential or semipresidential government or solutions which strengthen repressive trends. The solution depends on whether the existing structure can be defined correctly in a much more concrete way at the economic, social, political and cultural level and whether the new distribution of authority and cooperation which this definition requires can be carried out.

Turkey has the internal dynamism to find the solution. The crises also have a compelling dynamic which both calls for the radical solutions needed and has brought them to the situation where they can no longer be put off.

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## FUEL SHORTAGES ANGUISH A COLD WINTER

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Oct 70 p 3

[Text] Ankara (Mediterranean News Agency) -- Turkey is facing the threat of a cold winter because of the fuel shortage, which is worsening with the onset of cold weather and recently reached the point of extremity even in the provinces where elections will be held.

According to information obtained by an AKAJANS [Mediterranean News Agency] correspondent, Turkish Petroleum Office and TPAO [Turkish Petroleum Corporation] authorities stated that the Petroleum Office has been able to make only 47 percent of its spot purchases for 2 months and the Central Bank is unable to obtain the foreign exchange to meet gasoline and diesel fuel commitments.

## Oil Exploration

Meanwhile, the TPAO, which is able to operate only 17 of its 38 towers, is testing less than at any time in the past 5 years and, while the idle capacity in the refineries reached 3 million tons in the first 6 months of 1979, the state budget suffered a loss of \$130 million for spot purchases. Considering that \$410 million was spent for the processed product as of the first 8 months of the year, the loss exceeds \$140 million.

## Cause of Shortage

Various circles attribute the on-going fuel shortage to different reasons, according to the findings of the AKAJANS correspondent. Former Energy and Natural Resources Ministry Undersecretary Necdet Seckinoz, expressing his views on the matter in the monthly publication of a political party, contends that the oil shortage in our country has nothing to do with the world-wide oil shortage resulting from the strategy practiced by the oil-producing nations and that the shortage in our country stems only from lack of knowledge and incompetence. Seckinoz said that local crude oil production could increase only through oil exploration and that the concrete example of exploration activities was the soundings taken, and gave the following information: "The TPAO tested 104,000 meters in 1974, raising that figure to



112,000 meters in 1975, 142,000 meters in 1976, and 160,000 meters in 1977, but tested only 100,000 meters in 1978. Soundings in the first 6 months of 1979 were taken on only 44,861 meters and this figure can only be 90,000 meters by the end of the year. While the TPAO had only 12 test towers in 1974, it had put 38 towers into operation by the end of 1977, but the officials themselves admit that they have been able to operate only 17 of these towers in the past 20 months. By the end of June 1979, half of the 3.75 million-ton imports had been made from Iraq, Libya, Iran and the USSR with which we have intergovernmental agreements, almost 1.5 million tons of oil had been bought as spot purchases from brokers, losses exceeding \$100 million had been suffered in 6 months and 10 billion liras paid to brokers. In the first 6 months of 1979, 6.5 million tons of liquid fuel were consumed in our country; 4.33 million tons of this were produced in our refineries, 2.15 million tons were imported, and while there was an idle capacity of 3 million tons at the refineries, it was not put into operation, petroleum products were imported and \$399 million were spent in 6 months. If, instead, 2.25 million tons of crude oil had been bought and processed at our refineries, \$270 million alone would not have been lost. There is nothing intelligent about leaving the American-Turkish Corporation Refinery idle and spending \$30-\$40 more per ton for petroleum products instead of crude oil."

In this context, other reasons for the general oil shortage in the country are the operation of the American-Turkish Corporation Refinery at 35 percent capacity, the realization of only 47 percent of the spot purchases planned by the Petroleum Office for the 2-month period and the Central Bank's failure to provide the foreign exchange needed by the TPAO and the Petroleum Office for imports, claiming that it did not have the necessary power. Some authorities have stated that failing to reach agreement with the USSR, in contrast to Iran and Iraq, to exchange wheat for oil is among the causes of the shortage.

#### **We Will Shiver This Winter**

These are the reasons it is being said that the furnaces in buildings heated by fuel oil systems will not be burning. In fact, distribution companies have begun cancelling their contracts with apartment building managers. Because of the worsening liquid fuel shortage, Turkey is facing the threat of a cold winter this year.

The Energy and Natural Resources Ministry has set mix ratios for fuel oil.

According to the directive published by the ministry, heavy fuel oil will be 90 percent marine diesel and 10 percent truck diesel. Central heating fuel will contain 26 percent truck diesel and 74 percent heavy fuel oil, with maximum viscosity of 400 redwood. Number 5 fuel oil will consist of 20 percent truck diesel and 80 percent heavy fuel oil, and number 6 fuel oil will consist of 100 percent heavy fuel oil.

## ENERGY PRODUCTION SHORTFALLS LAID TO MISHANAGEMENT

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 11 Oct 79 p 2

[Article by Neodet Seckinoz, Master Engineer, former undersecretary of Energy and Natural Resources and Public Works Ministries]

[Text] The citizenry is growing weary of uncalled-for and unexpected interruptions of electricity. The citizens contend that "everyone could plan what they were going to do when and not get caught in inconvenient situations if they would only announce the interruptions in advance," but they get no response from the officials.

It was announced on 6 March 1979 that the interruptions in service would be discontinued as having completely private and political purposes, but pirate interruptions have continued unofficially almost every day, and this practice has reached intolerable limits recently, with the public thoroughly disgusted. Despite this, there have been no announcements to date by the officials.

Interruptions in electric service are usually made according to a schedule. And these schedules are announced to the provinces. This practice has recently been abandoned and the Turkish Electric Power Enterprise has begun unannounced interruptions. If anyone asks about it, excuses are made about maintenance, breakdowns, etc.

Energy and Natural Resources Minister Deniz Baykal, announcing in a statement on 3 March 1979 that the electricity interruptions would end, said:

"Our production is at a level to meet the increased demand that this decision would create under normal circumstances.

"Production has increased through more efficient utilization of the water collected at the dams.

"Liquid fuel power stations are working less because higher production has been obtained through resolving the technical bottlenecks and problems at the lignite stations.

"We will continue this practice as long as we encounter no unexpected breakdowns. In such an event, however, we will again inform the public of the situation."

In spite of this statement, the public has neither been informed nor adequate electricity produced.

#### Cheap Heroics

The increase in electricity demand has been very low in 1978 and 1979 because the established industry in our country has been operating at 50 percent capacity. Those who found this opportune have tried to create the impression that they have resolved the country's electricity problem. If they had been able to get the existing facilities operating well, they would have been the hero of this cheap success only in the eyes of the citizens who did not know that industry is virtually at a standstill. However, when oil could not be obtained, the Ambarli, Hopa, Aliaga and Seydisehir power plants could not be used and even this low electricity demand could not be met. Although an attempt was made to close this gap by shifting the burden to the hydraulic stations, this did not produce results either.

Electricity production in 1978 increased only 5.1 percent over 1977. At the end of August 1979, there was only a 5.6 percent increase over the same period of 1978. However, in 1975, 1976 and 1977, there were 15.3 percent, 17.4 percent and 16.1 percent increases respectively over the previous years. Capacity of the production installations in operation at the end of 1977 was 25 billion kilowatt hours. If the amount we are able to purchase from Bulgaria and the USSR is added to this, the demand which can be met is around 23.5 billion kilowatt hours.

Since the increase in 1979 is 5.6 percent and 1978 consumption was 21.5 billion kilowatt hours, this year's demand will be around 23 billion kilowatt hours.

If the system had been working well, an electricity requirement with this low an increase could have been fully met and interruptions in service would have been unnecessary in 1979.

#### Empty Claims

However, production at the thermal power stations in 1979 has been short by 1.6 million kilowatt hours. The lignite stations, though it has been claimed that "their problems have been resolved and they are running smoothly," produced 600 million kilowatt hours less than programmed in the first 8 months. Production has been 1 billion kilowatt hours less than in the programs at the stations which have not been in operation on the claim of saving liquid fuel.

Thus, while production has been 1.6 billion kilowatt hours short in 8 months, the citizenry has been deprived of 764 million kilowatt hours.

#### Dams Dried Up

In order to make up these shortages, the dams have unwisely been worked more than they should and their bottoms have dried up. There is not enough water left in the dams to meet the electricity requirements this winter, and next year's irrigation is threatened as well.

It would be well to make one distinction here. The Keban Dam is excluded from this observation, because there is no water shortage at this dam as it has enough water to operate eight units, though only four units are in operation.

Water levels on 31 August 1979 as compared to the programs were: 18 meters low at Almus Dam, 8 meters low at Hirfanli Dam, 15 meters low at Sariyar Dam and 12 meters low at Kemer Dam. Replenishing this diminished water supply depends on our having a very wet winter or more interruptions in electric service.

As a result:

In the first 8 months of 1979, electricity production is behind the program goals, has been administered haphazardly, insensitive to the national needs and technical requirements, has caused loss of money to our economy at home and abroad, and the public has suffered random interruptions of service.

#### Production Shortfalls

(millions of kwh)

Station	Program	Actual	Shortfall
Fuel oil: Ambarli	2,585	2,171	414
Hopa	215	100	115
Mersin	380	332	48
Total	3,180	2,603	577
Diesel: Aliaga	290	167	123
Seydisehir	300	9	291
Total	590	176	414

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## 'HURRIYET' VOICES CONCERN ABOUT ARMENIAN GROUP'S ACTIVITIES

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 79 p 9

[Article by Cem Basar]

[Text] In room number 161 of a hotel 40 kilometers outside of Athens, four people remained secluded for a full day. Within the closed-off room, the four discussed what would be the heaviest blows which they could administer against Turkey on the eve of the elections. As the hotel where the meeting was being held belonged to a Greek Cypriot, the Cypriot staff of the hotel stood guard to ensure that no one approach the room where the meeting was going on. The four who took part in the meeting were as follows: "Alfred", the representative of the "Armenian Revenge Commandoes", who had arrived from Cyprus bearing a Lebanese passport; "Panayotu", of the PEAM [expansion unknown] organization; a Kurd, using the name "Azadeyi", from the KAWA [expansion unknown] group; in addition, a representative of the illegal Turkish Communist Party, using the name "Kazim Yasar". "Kazim Yasar" had secretly gone to Athens two years ago and participated in a meeting of communists held there. The representatives of the Armenian, Greek Cypriot, and Kurdish "vengeance organizations" left Greece during the last days of September and the first days of October.

At this meeting, many things were discussed and decided upon. One of these was planning for the Armenians to commit new crimes and spill Turkish blood. The first blood was shed 15 days after the meeting: Ahmet Benler, the son of our Ambassador in the Hague Ozdemir Benler, was brutally murdered on 12 October. It is certain that other crimes will follow this one; it is clear from the course of events that the Armenians will shed more blood in the days to come.

The reason for this certainty is that the Armenians had arranged an exhibition in Athens on 22 - 23 September under the aegis of the Communist Party; at this exhibition, photographs of the slain Turkish ambassadors, shot and lying in blood, were displayed; above them were placed legends reading "We will continue to exact our revenge", "This makes one", "This makes two", and "This makes three". While this exhibition was going on, the above-mentioned conference of "vengeance organizations" was also taking place. As if this were not enough, Armenians passed out leaflets in the streets of Athens and put up posters during the night.



## Madrid Massacre

The same activity had been witnessed among the Armenians in Athens prior to the Madrid "massacre". Before that incident, also, leaflets had been distributed, posters had been hung, threatening letters had been sent to Turks, and, while everyone's attention was on Athens, their kinsmen carried out the slayings in Spain. Before Danis Tunaligil, Ismail Erez, and Taha Carim were killed, too, a number of conspicuous incidents had taken place in Athens, while a number of French-language communiques had been mailed from Thessaloniki. Exactly 15 days after these communiques had been mailed and a bloody map of Armenia had been hung in the streets of Athens, the massacre of ambassadors began.

Immediately following the 1974 Cyprus Operation, at the end of October and beginning of November, Greek Cypriots, Greeks, and Armenians held a series of meetings, one after another, in order to investigate ways of forcing Turkey into difficult circumstances. Even though they were unable to secure coordination among themselves, these contacts gave rise to the development of a number of activities aimed against our nation. For some reason, the Greek Cypriots did not at first want to combine their struggle with that of the Armenians, even though later they received them with open arms. For this reason, the Armenians, remaining on their own at first, changed their methods and tried to further their subversive actions against Turkey "from within", as a sort of closed circuit. Towards the end of 1974, Armenian leaders going to the U.S. from Beirut and France worked to mobilize the Armenians there. Arabs of Armenian ancestry, who had reorganized the old "Hunchak" party and made it into a revenge organization aimed against the Turks, carried out the "provocation" for this. Most of these were Syrians. The reins of "Hunchak" are in their hands.

## KGB and CIA

The focal point of the Armenian activities directed against Turkey was in Beirut when the civil war in Lebanon broke out. Later, it moved to Cyprus and to France. Armenians who had left Syria and Iran and settled in Beirut infected Armenians throughout the world with animosity and hatred toward Turks. In order not to attract attention, these people established a number of groups under different names to carry out activities against Turkey. However, these groups all came to be directed from a single source. In fact, a number of forces concealed behind the Armenians have succeeded in utilizing them for their own ends. Just as those who want to divide or destroy Turkey from within aid the Kurds, the Greek Cypriots, the Maoists, and the revolutionary communists, they are supporting the Armenians as well. In plain words, one end of the stick is in the hands of the KGB, while the CIA holds the other. Those who incite the Armenians against Turkey are the Syrians, backed by the Russians. As for America, although it is aware of a number of murky activities directed against Turkey which are developing on its own land, it pretends not to see them and thus aids in their buildup.

When "Hunchak" representatives went from Beirut to the U.S. in the latter part of 1974 and made their first contacts with their kinsmen living there, they did not encounter the interest that they had expected. No intelligent Armenian-American approved of bloody actions against Turkey, and in fact they shunned

the Hunchak provocateurs. While it would be expected that, in a country in which the police are as powerful as those of the U.S., the rabble-rousers would be deported, only a short time later, leaders of the Armenian community who opposed them began to receive threatening letters from the "vengeance organization." These threats were to the effect that, if the amount of money assigned to the recipient to be donated "in order to be utilized in the struggle against the Turks" were not given, the recipient would be killed, together with his family.

#### Money by Threats

By the same method, money is being collected from rich Armenians in France, Switzerland, Italy, Lebanon, Greece, and even Turkey. One elderly Armenian banker in Thessaloniki, who did not give in to these threats, was decapitated by a Lebanese communist. Although there were those in America who stood up to these threats and informed the FBI of the situation, those who informed were eliminated by means of bombs placed in their houses and cars, since the federal police had had no success in the matter. It is estimated that, due to the fear aroused among the Armenians, the money collected amounts to 2 million dollars.

Those who direct the Armenians' activities against Turks form a "Central Committee." The authority to spend the millions in their Swiss bank rests with this Committee.

#### Who Is Zaven?

One Armenian, a member of the "Armenian Revenge Organization" who goes by the name "Zaven" (and is also thought to be a member of the Central Committee), went from Paris to Athens at the end of February, 1975. After spending two days in the Greek capital, he travelled to Nicosia in an airplane of the Greek Cypriot airline, where he rented a car and drove to Limassol. While in Limassol, "Zaven" met with a wealthy Armenian banker from Beirut by the name of Tosbahian. As Tosbahian administered the financial affairs of various Palestinian Arab organizations, he was one Armenian well respected by the Arabs. During this meeting, "Zaven" asked Tosbahian to find some Palestinian Arabs who would carry out the crimes of the "Armenian Revenge Organization" in exchange for money. Tosbahian, an uncle of whom was the leader of the communists in Beirut, introduced "Zaven" to one of the Palestinian terrorist leader Habbash's men. This Palestinian was the leader of a 20-man guerrilla band which carried out totally independent operations.

This team, known as the "Vengeance Commandoes", is known within Habbash's organization for its operations oriented solely toward political crimes. The crimes of the "Vengeance Commandoes" were executed with sufficient skill as to furnish examples for the literature of spy novels. Experts on terrorism in Europe claim that the "Vengeance Commandoes" have been specially trained in Russia.

Immediately after the talks between "Zaven" and the Palestinian in March 1975 at Limassol, the rumor began to spread in Armenian circles in Europe and in

America that "We will take our revenge upon the Turks before the year is out; wait and see." The men of MIT [National Intelligence Organization] who keep an eye on dangerous Armenian organizations abroad were unable to unearth any indications to cause suspicion apart from this rumor. It is at this point that the crimes carried out against the Turkish ambassadors are cloaked in darkness. The Armenians claim that they carried out the murders themselves, yet it is also said that this matter was carried out by the Vengeance Commandoes for 150,000 dollars, and that it had been planned with the knowledge of both the CIA and the KGB.

#### Vengeance Commandoes

Allegedly, a CIA operative of Armenian descent had learned of the situation and reported it to his Agency. The operation to kill the Turkish ambassadors had been planned in a nation of the Eastern Bloc, the name of which we are obliged to keep secret in order not to cause a diplomatic scandal. Likewise, it is no longer a secret that the "Vengeance Commandoes", in two teams, travelled through Germany to Austria and Paris with diplomatic passports and cars with diplomatic license plates, all belonging to a certain Arab nation. In consequence, we must state this: that the bloody activities aimed against Turks by Armenians are developing steadily, and are becoming extremely dangerous. What causes worry, rather than the Armenians themselves, is the dark forces concealed behind them. The time has come to wage war against these forces. Only thus can we halt the danger, for otherwise, even more sons of Turkey will be slain in the same "hit and run" manner.

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